Original Article

How Sanctions Affect Public Opinion in Target Countries: Experimental Evidence From Israel

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Abstract

How do economic sanctions affect the political attitudes of individuals in targeted countries? Do they reduce or increase support for policy change? Are targeted, "smart" sanctions more effective in generating public support? Despite the importance of these questions for understanding the effectiveness of sanctions, they have received little systematic attention. We address them drawing on original data from Israel, where the threat of economic sanctions has sparked a contentious policy debate. We first examine the political effects of the European Union's (EU) 2015 decision to label goods produced in the West Bank, and then expand our analysis by employing a survey experiment that allows us to test the differential impact of sanction type and sender identity. We find that the EU's decision produced a backlash effect, increasing support for hardline policies and raising hostility toward Europe. Our findings further reveal that individuals are likely to support concessions only in the most extreme and unlikely of circumstances—a comprehensive boycott imposed by a sender perceived as a key strategic ally. These results offer theoretical and policy implications for the study of the effects of economic sanctions.

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Introduction

Economic sanctions have become an important foreign policy tool, with recent targets ranging from Russia to Iran to North Korea. Increasingly, senders have turned to "smart" sanctions, designed to target the beneficiaries of policies opposed by sender states while avoiding devastating consequences for the broader population. Sender governments have repeatedly emphasized their commitment to engage with rather than punish populations in target countries, so as to effectively achieve policy change. As President Obama noted when signing the Iran Sanctions Act, "even as we increase pressure on the Iranian government, we're sending an unmistakable message that the United States stands with the Iranian people as they seek to exercise their universal rights."[1]

Do publics in targeted countries withdraw support from their government and its policies, as sender states would wish them to do? Or do they, instead, rally around their leaders and direct their frustration outward? More generally, how do sanctions affect various segments of the target country's population, and are these attitudes sensitive to various features of sanction policies? These questions are at the heart of the debate on the effectiveness of sanctions, yet to a large extent they are still open to debate. The scholarly literature has generated conflicting expectations: On one hand, sanctions are posited to cause a *deprivation effect*, leading the public to turn away from the government and from the policies that brought about international condemnation. On the other hand, sanctions can lead publics to rally around the government and its policies and blame their hardships on sender states, resulting in a *backlash effect*. Recently, a more nuanced approach has highlighted the *distributional effects* of sanctions, arguing that political consequences vary across society depending on which group is targeted, the relative cost of changing course, and the salience of the policy at hand.

Though assumptions about public attitudes and behavior in the target country underlie many of the academic and policy debates about sanctions, they have rarely been tested directly. Much of the scholarly literature on sanctions is written from the sender state's perspective with relatively little attention to domestic politics of the target country (Bolks & Al-Sowayel, 2000; Drezner, 2011). While sanctions are a key tool of foreign policy, they are also, from the target state's perspective, an exogenous shock that shapes domestic politics, potentially allowing leaders to manipulate public opinion

by shifting blame to external actors. This article thus contributes to an emerging research agenda in comparative politics on the domestic consequences of sanctions (Frye, 2017; Schreresberg, Grillo, & Passarelli, 2017).

In addition, empirical studies of sanctions' effectiveness typically use the country-year as the unit of analysis. Though informative, studies that treat target countries as unitary actors have limited ability to test theories that are based on core assumptions about domestic politics, especially regarding distributional effects (Hyde, 2015; Solingen, 2012). To date, a number of studies have investigated how sanctions affect the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in targeted countries (Allen, 2008; Drury & Peksen, 2012; Escribà-Folch, 2012; Peksen & Drury, 2010; Wood, 2008). Yet these studies do not directly test the impact of sanctions on public opinion, nor have they examined how different features of sanction policies affect various segments of the population.

Importantly, existing work is also subject to inherent limitations of observational data, as it is difficult to isolate the effects of sanctions on domestic politics from other dynamics that take place in international crises, or from the factors that brought about the sanctions in the first place. Formal theories of the differential domestic effects of sanctions generally test their models using historical case studies and have faced difficulty measuring what policies affected which groups and in what ways (Lektzian & Patterson, 2015). Many political consequences of sanctions in targeted states thus remain poorly understood.

This article begins addressing this gap by providing direct measures of the domestic political consequences of sanctions and assessing their effect on different societal groups in the target state. We draw on a series of survey experiments that we conducted in Israel in the wake of the European Union's (EU) 2015 decision to label products from the West Bank or the Golan Heights as "made in settlements." The decision was designed, and widely expected, to have an adverse impact on Israel's trading relations, and perhaps more importantly, to signal to the right-wing government of Israel that there are consequences to its attempts to entrench Israel's control of the West Bank. As such, the labeling decision was condemned in Israel as both an economic and symbolic sanction that politicians and pundits of all stripes linked to the international Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. We first gauge the effects of the EU's decision on a broad set political outcomes, including attitudes toward the contested policies, the country's leadership, and the sender state, and on broader debates surrounding civil liberties.

We find little evidence that, at least in the short term, the Israeli public would exert pressure on its government to concede in the face of the EU's limited, targeted sanctions. When exposed to information about the labeling

decision, a majority of the population *increases* its support for settlements in the West Bank and its opposition to peace negotiations. Importantly, this effect is not limited to Israel's ideological right but extends to the political center-left opposition. Second, while we do find that the decision spurs a drop in support for the country's current leadership, this drop appears to be driven by the desire for an even more resistant (i.e., hawkish) leadership rather than for acquiescence. Third, and also consistent with backlash effects, we find that the labeling decision increased in-group solidarity (with settlers), while raising hostility toward Europeans.

The advantage of our experimental design is that it enables an assessment of the differential political impact of an actual, salient political event. The drawback is that we are limited to the unique features of the labeling decision: a targeted measure with relatively limited economic costs, from a specific sender. To test whether our findings depend on the specific attributes of the EU's decision, we conduct a second survey experiment that manipulates two features of hypothetical sanctions—*sanction type* and *sender identity*—and examine how these factors impact political attitudes when compared with the targeted measure implemented by the EU. Building on insights from the literature on economic sanctions, we vary sanction type along two dimensions: whether the costs are mostly *material* or *symbolic*,[2] and the extent to which the sanction is *targeted* versus *comprehensive*. To this end, we assess whether an academic boycott (targeted, nonmaterial), travel restrictions (semitargeted, nonmaterial), and a wholesale boycott of Israeli goods (comprehensive, material) differ in their impact from the actual sanction imposed on Israel: targeted measures against West Bank goods (targeted, material). As for sender identity, we vary whether sanctions are *unilateral* or *multilateral*, and whether the sender is perceived as relatively *supportive* or *critical* of Israel's government. Here, we examine how EU measures (unilateral, critical sender) differ from sanctions by the United States (unilateral, supportive sender) and the Quartet on the Middle East (multilateral, critical sender).

Our second (hypothetical scenarios) experiment reinforces the findings from the first (real event) experiment: Most prevalent forms of sanctions generate considerable backlash among Israelis, such that supporters of both government and opposition parties tend to rally around the government's policies rather than mobilize for change. Furthermore, we find that (hypothetical) sanction scenarios increase support for policy change only among supporters of Israel's political opposition and only in the most extreme of circumstances: when imposed by a key strategic ally and when involving a comprehensive boycott of all Israeli goods. We discuss the implications of these findings for theory and policy in the concluding section.

This study is based on a single case and is therefore limited in its ability to produce generalizable results, especially for nondemocratic settings. Nevertheless recent research indicates that some of our findings may have broader applicability: For example, Frye (2017) examines the effects of sanctions on public opinion in Russia and similarly finds that they increase hostility toward sending states, and that multilateral and unilateral sanctions do not differ in their impact on public opinion. Though the study does not find that sanctions directly affected Russian support for the government, it does suggest that the policy that generated the sanctions—the annexation of Crimea—remains highly popular even after the sanctions. These findings are consistent with the results herein.

In addition, an in-depth single-country case study allows generating different insights from those of a time-series cross-section analysis, the traditional design in studies of sanction effectiveness. First and foremost, our approach allows us to document and analyze the differential effects of sanctions on the preferences of key groups in society. These divergent effects are a key component for understanding the mechanism by which sanctions may affect a government's choice of policy (Solingen, 2012). Furthermore, by embedding experiments in the study, we can test how variation in sanction features (e.g., the sanction sender, the type of penalty imposed) can affect the *same* target population. A single-country study of this sort can thus illuminate causal mechanisms, add a reliable "data point," and provide useful new perspectives that can guide future work on the impact of sanctions generally, and targeted sanctions in particular.

Substantively, our findings contribute most directly to the debate on sanction effectiveness. Past work has largely focused on identifying systemic factors (e.g., regime type) associated with sanction success, but the causal mechanisms linking sanctions to their presumed political effects remain poorly understood (Allen, 2008; Major & McGann, 2005). By demonstrating the differential effects of sanctions on various political groups in the target state, our study speaks to the nascent empirical literature on targeted sanctions, an increasingly popular policy instrument (Cortright & Lopez, 2000).[3] Contrary to most theoretical expectations, we find that targeted sanctions generate a backlash among both supporters *and opposers* of the government and its policies, at least in the short term. While public opinion does not always drive the adoption of policies by leaders, the attitudes of domestic audiences, at least in democratic settings, are a powerful constraint that can be difficult for leaders to ignore. These findings thus raise questions about the utility of especially symbolic and "informational" targeted sanctions as a means of inducing compliance. Whether substantial, sustained comprehensive sanctions can lead to a policy change in the long term is an open question for future work to address.

Our study also contributes to research on crises and the "rally around the flag" effect. This work tends to assume that support for the leadership and its policies go hand in hand in times of crisis. Our study suggests that these dimensions are in fact separate and that publics can rally around the government's policies while at the same time decreasing their approval of the incumbent leadership. This can occur either because the public prefers someone more hawkish in times of international crisis or because the incumbent is blamed for not having averted the crisis in the first place. Either way, our analysis indicates that the two constructs—change in attitudes toward the incumbent government and toward its contested policies—are not necessarily positively correlated.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: We first provide some context on the Israeli case. Next, we lay out the theoretical groundwork of the study, outlining three theoretical perspectives on the political effects of sanctions and the empirical predictions of each. We then present our method and findings for our first experiment (EU's actual sanction) and extend the analysis with a second experiment (hypothetical scenarios varying sanction type and sender identity). We conclude with a discussion of implications for both theory and policy.

Israel and Sanction Threat: The Political Context

Economic sanctions have long been a feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Arab League imposed a boycott on Israel since its establishment in 1948.[4] The boycott lasted for several decades until it was gradually relaxed as Israel entered into peace agreements with its neighbors—Egypt (1979), Jordan (1994), and the newly established Palestinian Authority (1995)—and a number of countries in the Gulf withdrew their participation.

In the past decade, following the collapse of the Oslo Accords and the subsequent Second Intifada, the issue of sanctions against Israel has received renewed prominence. In 2005, a group of Palestinian civil society organizations launched the BDS movement, which calls for economic sanctions on Israel to pressure it to "end the occupation and colonization of all Arab lands," recognize the rights of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality, and respect the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes.[5] Drawing explicitly on the South African model, the initiators of the movement appealed to individuals and organizations worldwide to sanction Israel and pressure their governments to do the same. Over time, the coalition evolved into a loosely organized international campaign that seeks to promote sanctions in the economic, academic, and cultural spheres. With peace negotiations stalled and a hardline government in power since 2009, the discussion of economic measures against Israel has intensified.

The BDS movement has sparked a heated global debate. On one hand, its supporters advocate it as a nonviolent means of ending the Israeli military occupation over the West Bank and creating a new regime founded on equality and civil rights. Its critics, however, charge that BDS does not seek to criticize or change Israeli policies but to delegitimize the Israeli state and to dispute Israel's right to exist. They also reject the comparison with South Africa's Apartheid regime, arguing that Israel is a liberal democracy that has sought peace with its neighbors and whose policies vis-à-vis Palestinians are driven by security concerns.[6]

A debate has also unfolded about the effectiveness of the BDS campaign. While some believe that its effects are becoming more noticeable in academic and cultural circles,[7] most observers agree that its economic impact has thus far been limited.[8] Recently, however, Israel has sparred with the EU over its issuing of guidelines that mandate labeling food, drinks, and cosmetic products produced in Israeli settlements. Though not formally a sanction, the ruling was broadly perceived in Israel as such and was immediately linked to the BDS campaign.[9]

The labeling decision was a major political blow to the Israeli government, which had exerted considerable diplomatic efforts to prevent it. From an economic perspective, the impact of the product labeling decision on the country as a whole is estimated to be fairly limited. According to the Israeli Ministry of Finance, the new EU guidelines would affect approximately $50 million in exports, constituting less than 1% of the $14 billion value of Israeli exports to Europe (Koren, 2015). The measure's impact on the settlement economy is much more substantial, however, affecting around a fifth of the 200 to 300 million dollar value of goods produced in Israeli settlements annually ("EU Requires Labeling of Products Produced in Israeli Settlements," 2015). Moreover, the decision magnified concerns among Israel's business community about potential spillover into other commercial activities which would have a far greater impact.[10] In general, the Israeli Finance Ministry estimates the potential cost of the BDS movement at $3.2 billion, approximately 1% of its GDP. A recent RAND report claims that this figure is, if anything, an understatement.[11]

The actual damage to the settlement economy, together with spillover concerns, are one reason the Israeli government has treated the EU's labeling decision as a full-blown economic sanction. At least as important was the EU decision's *informational content*: signaling to the Israeli government that it cannot expect to continue adopting unilateral actions designed to entrench Israel's control of the West Bank without facing consequences from the international community. For these three reasons, Israeli politicians and analysts called the decision tantamount to a boycott, and one that is bound to escalate

and inflict considerable damage (Ravid & Khoury, 2015). Notably, these sentiments were not limited to coalition members of prime minister Netanyahu's hawkish government. Isaac Herzog, then the leader of the oppositional Labour Party, called the decision a victory for the BDS movement ("EU Settlement Labeling Is 'a Win for BDS,'" 2016), and Yair Lapid, another senior opposition member, argued that the decision was a "de facto boycott" with the potential of generating disaster for the Israeli economy (Nahmias, 2015).

The EU's decision and the increasing visibility of the global BDS campaign present an unusual opportunity to investigate the effects of sanctions on public opinion. The Israeli case is especially appropriate because sanctions are argued to be particularly effective in democracies, where publics have considerable leverage over the leadership. On the other hand, sanctions may also alienate democratic publics, because by definition they have a greater stake in the leadership's policies. As such, they may view government policy as more legitimate than publics in authoritarian countries. In the next section, we lay out these competing theoretical perspectives before turning to describe our study.

The Political Consequences of Sanctions

The large literature on sanctions has primarily focused on assessing whether and when sanctions are effective.[12] A key assumption that underlies much of this work is that sanction effectiveness is mediated by domestic politics. Specifically, three sets of arguments raise different expectations with respect to the domestic political dynamics that sanctions bring about.

The *deprivation* perspective holds that when sanctions cause significant economic costs, citizens mobilize in demand that the leadership of the target country reverse its policies or step down (Allen, 2008; Kirshner, 1997; Mack & Khan, 2000). The cost of sanctions is likely to be a stronger instigator of policy change when the leaders are less insulated from the public, as is the case in democracies (Bolks & Al-Sowayel, 2000; Marinov, 2005). Moreover, when sanctions inflict greater damage or are harder to circumvent (e.g., when they are multilateral rather than unilateral), they are likely to be particularly effective (Bapat & Morgan, 2009; Martin, 1993).[13]

A second approach posits that sanctions bring about the opposite response, namely a *backlash* effect. According to this view, citizens tend to reject outside pressure and, instead, support their leaders during international crises. Sanctions are thus seen as counterproductive, leading to a rallying of the public around the leadership and to intensification of in-group solidarity (Kam & Ramos, 2008). Such a response may be the result of a surge in patriotism and

nationalist sentiment (Mueller, 1970; Pape, 1998) or because of muted criticism from the opposition in times of an external challenge (Brody, 1991), especially when the sanctions are successfully branded as foreign meddling in a domestic dispute. Either way, the predicted outcome is the opposite of the one implied by the deprivation argument.

A third set of expectations centers on what we refer to as the *distributional* argument. It holds that when sanctions are targeted, the effect is not a general shift in the public stance—as implicitly assumed by the two previous approaches—but rather a heterogeneous response. In other words, interest groups or constituencies directly affected by the sanction are expected to react differently from those who are not the target of the sanction. Though there is some debate over the question of who the "appropriate" target group is, most scholars argue that sanctions are most effective in bringing about change in policy when they directly target the government and its core supporters (Brooks, 2002; Cortright & Lopez, 2000; Kirshner, 1997), because these core groups will then pressure the government to change policies or withdraw their support from the government. Targeted sanctions are seen as likelier to produce the intended effect when three conditions are in place: (a) the lower the salience of the contested policy to the core group is, (b) the greater the difficulty to shift costs from the targeted group to the rest of society, and (c) the lower the cost of policy change is to the targeted interest group compared with the cost of sanctions. An alternative argument holds that sanctions that target core groups can be effective because they send a signal of foreign support that emboldens the opposition and increases its ability to mobilize followers (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1999).

Empirical studies on the effects of sanctions offer few clear-cut conclusions and, in some instances, produce seemingly contradictory findings (Allen, 2008; Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007; Major & McGann, 2005; Marinov, 2005). This may be in part because many studies of sanctions have not examined public opinion directly, instead assuming the public's position from the government's observed response (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 2007). Systematic insights about public opinion in the sanction's target country are thus lacking.

Given these limitations, how do the three theoretical approaches apply to the Israeli case, and what predictions can we draw regarding the likely public response to sanctions? In a democratic setting akin to the Israeli case, the deprivation perspective predicts that as sanctions become more costly and/or comprehensive, public support for the contested policies would drop (Mack & Khan, 2000). A second prediction relates to identity of the "sender": the broader the range of countries participating in the sanctions, the stronger the shift in public opinion would be against the government's contested policy.

These predictions may hold in some scenarios of sanctions imposed on Israel. Yet in the specific case of the labeling decision, it is not clear that the deprivation perspective's predictions would apply. On the one hand, it is a sanction with relatively modest economic costs. On the other hand, Israel is a democracy and the sanction was imposed by a block of coordinating countries, which combined represent Israel's largest export market.

Since the labeling of settlement products is a targeted measure, predictions stemming from the distributive approach may be more relevant. Specifically, the labeling measure primarily affects the economic fortunes of the settlers, who are a hardcore constituency of Netanyahu's government. We expect that the labeling decision is unlikely to cause them to withdraw their support from the status-quo to alleviate the sanctions. This is because none of the conditions stated above as key for targeted sanctions to be effective are met in this case. In particular, the costs of the sanctions are much lower for the targeted group than the cost of policy change. Moreover, the Israeli government can—and in fact, did—shift costs away from settlers by offering commensurable compensation to West Bank exporters for any lost revenue.

That said, the distributive argument also suggests that a sanction like the labeling decision would increase support for policy change among those that are opposed to the government, in this case the center and the left. Predictions regarding the Israeli right who are not settlers are more ambiguous.

Finally, the backlash argument suggests that sanctions should raise support for Israeli hardline policies and its leadership. A backlash may lead to an increase of in-group solidarity and thus to greater hostility toward outside actors advancing the sanctions and toward opposition groups that are critical of the government's policy. Yet while these effects may be expected for more comprehensive sanction scenarios, the labeling decision as a targeted measure is not expected to lead to backlash among the general (nonsettler) public, and certainly not among opposition groups, which were not targeted to begin with.

Data and Method

To study the effects of sanctions on political attitudes, we conducted two experiments embedded in a national online survey of a sample of 2,385 Israeli adults. The survey was fielded in March and April 2016. Respondents were recruited by iPanel, Israel's largest opt-in online panel company. Quota sampling was used to match our sample to the population on gender, age, district, and education. Summary statistics of the sample are reported in Table A1.

Our first experiment exploits the fact that, just months earlier in November 2015, the European Commission issued guidelines mandating labeling the origin of goods produced in the West Bank and the Golan Heights and sold in the EU as "made in Israeli settlements." The labeling decision allows us to test the backlash and distributional perspectives, both of which generate expectations regarding the effects of targeted measures, as outlined previously. It does not, however, allow us to directly test the deprivation perspective, which assumes significant damage inflicted on a large part of society. We test these effects using simulated scenarios in Study 2, described below.

Though news of the labeling decision had made headlines in November, it had since faded in Israel's intense news cycle. We randomly assigned respondents to read a version of an actual news article reporting the EU's decision (published by Israel's most widely read news site) or an unrelated article from the same news source.[14] By using real news articles, we are able to assess the effects of reading actual information on sanctions while holding all other correlates of political attitudes constant.[15] As a manipulation check, immediately following the news report respondents were asked a number of factual questions on its content. Failure to respond correctly to any question resulted in being returned to the article screen again. Once the questions were answered correctly, respondents were able to continue with the survey. A balance test, reported in Table A2, indicates that our treatment and control groups are balanced on a series of key sociodemographic covariates.

In a realistic scenario, information about political events would not be communicated devoid of context but would more likely be framed in particular ways to advance competing political narratives (Chong & Druckman, 2007). We therefore drew on actual coverage of the labeling decision to identify six different responses to the event—three in support of the decision and three opposing it—and randomly assigned respondents who read about the labeling decision to one response in each category. For example, respondents might be told that, in response to the decision, some officials argued that it was important because it demonstrated the price of maintaining the status quo, while other officials argued that the decision was illegitimate meddling in Israeli democracy. For each respondent, we randomly varied both the positive and the negative frames that were assigned as well as the order in which they were presented. In this way, we increase the likelihood that results are driven by labeling effects and not by any particular frame.[16]

We then asked questions relating to four broad outcomes: support for Israel's policies that economic pressure seeks to change, support for the current government, in-group and out-group attitudes, and attitudes toward civil liberties, more broadly. We measure support for Israeli policies with two questions: The first asks about the respondent's position regarding renewing political

negotiations with the Palestinian Authority at this time, and the second asks about the respondent's position regarding the call to impose a blanket freeze on settlement construction. Responses range from 1 (*strongly support*) to 4 (*strongly oppose*). We measure support for leadership with a standard question asking whether respondents approve or disapprove of the way Benjamin Netanyahu is handling his job as prime minister, on a scale of 0 to 10.

To measure in-group and out-group attitudes, we asked respondents to rank their feelings toward Israelis, Jewish settlers in the West Bank, Palestinians, and Europeans, using a feeling thermometer of 0 to 100, in which higher values indicate warmer feelings. The order in which the groups were presented was randomized to avoid order effects.

Finally, to measure attitudes toward civil liberties, we use an index of six items that have been subject to heated debate in Israel: whether it should be legal or illegal for Israelis to publicly express sharp criticism against Israel; whether it should be legal or illegal for Israelis to publicly call for boycotting goods produced in the settlements; whether it should be legal or illegal for Israelis to publicly call for boycotting all Israeli goods; whether Israeli human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that criticize the Israeli occupation should be legal or illegal; whether Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than its Arab citizens; and whether Israeli Arabs' voting rights should be conditioned on taking a loyalty oath to the state. All items were recoded so that higher rankings represent more tolerant views. The six items are positively correlated with a Cronbach's alpha of .80.[17]

Given our theoretical expectations, we conduct all analyses for both the pooled sample and disaggregated by political group. As an indicator of political orientation, we use self-placement on a 7-point Right–Left scale. Reflecting the Israeli political landscape, we then divide this scale into three blocs, coding those who identified as 1 or 2 as belonging to the political right, those who identified as 3 or 4 as belonging to the center, and those who identified as 5 to 7 as belonging to the left.[18] We also asked respondents which party they voted for in the last election. An examination of vote choice by political bloc corroborates our self-placement measure. Finally, our survey also included measures for the following pretreatment covariates: gender, age, education, income, Israeli or foreign-born, religion, religiosity, ethnicity, district, and frequency of media consumption.

Experiment 1: Domestic Effects of Product Labeling

We first examine attitudes toward settlement product labeling among the Israeli population. We find that the measure is highly unpopular: measured on

Figure 1. Effects of settlement labeling on support for government policies (*N* = 2,385).
Results of ordinary least squares regressions in which each outcome is regressed on a binary treatment indicator that has the value of 1 for respondents who were exposed to information about the labeling decision and 0 for respondents who were exposed to placebo information. Models do not include any controls. Thick bars represent 90% confidence intervals; thin bars represent 95% confidence intervals. PA = palestinian authority.

a scale of 0 to 10, the mean level of support is 1.3. Among the ideological right, which constitutes approximately one third of our sample, mean support is 0.5. Among the center, which comprises around 43% of our sample, support is only slightly higher, at 0.9; and among the left, the mean level of support is 3.2. It is thus clear from the outset that sanctions are not supported by any part of the population, including the opposition, foreshadowing some of their political effects.

To examine the political impact of the labeling decision, we begin with its effects on attitudes toward the Israeli policies that the EU seeks to change—continued expansion of settlements in the West Bank and lack of progress in negotiations with the Palestinians. Figure 1 (top row, line denoted by circle symbol) shows that individuals exposed to the labeling information are less supportive of a settlement freeze than those in the baseline condition by .11 points, representing a 5% decrease.[19] The middle row shows that, in the pooled sample, respondents exposed to the labeling information are also .22 points less likely to support renewal of negotiations with the Palestinians, an 8% decrease relative to the baseline condition.

Analysis for the pooled sample may be misleading, however, because the labeling decision is a targeted measure whose costs fall primarily on the ideological right. Turning to the analysis disaggregated by bloc, the middle row

of Figure 1 indicates that the labeling decision reduced support for renewal of negotiations across all political blocs (though these effects are not statistically significant for the ideological left), whereas the political center also exhibits reduced support for settlement freezes (top row). While some distributional effects theories allow that key government support coalitions may rally and become further entrenched in their support for the targeted policies, none would predict the backlash effect we find among the Israeli opposition. Instead of remaining indifferent or mobilizing against the government, the median Israeli voter appears to move closer to the government's position when exposed to information about the labeling decision.

The distributional perspective further suggests that sanctions weaken targeted leaders by increasing dissent, either among government supporters or among the opposition. Reading about the labeling decision does in fact reduce approval of incumbent prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu across all political blocs, though the effect only approaches statistical significant for centrist voters. However, given that exposure to the labeling information hardens political attitudes, it may be that reduced opposition for Netanyahu reflects support for even more hawkish leaders, rather than for an opposition that would advocate policy change. If this were the case, reduced support for leadership would actually be consistent with the backlash perspective.

To test this possibility, we asked respondents who they believe is most qualified to serve as prime minister. In addition to Netanyahu, we provide nine response options representing senior politicians who might credibly vie for this title, as well as an open-text "other" option. Based on these responses, we code a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 for respondents who chose individuals who flank Netanyahu from the right.[20] We find that respondents exposed to information about settlement product labeling supported more hawkish candidates ($M = .18$, $SD = .38$) than those in the control condition ($M = .14$, $SD = .35$; $t = -2.49$, $p = .02$). This finding calls for caution in interpreting leader destabilization as an indicator of sanction effectiveness.

The backlash perspective suggests that sanctions can bite for symbolic reasons. Seen in this light, even relatively limited and targeted steps such as product labeling can be seen as threatening, thereby triggering, in addition to more hawkish attitudes, increased in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. Our results provide support for this view. Figure 2 shows that those exposed to information on product labeling exhibit warmer feelings toward Israelis, though the increase is relatively small and not statistically significant in the subgroup analysis. Solidarity with Israeli settlers, however, increases more substantially, from a baseline mean of 55.4 to a mean of 59.8. Again, the increase is driven primarily by Israeli centrists.

Figure 2. Effects of settlement labeling on in-group out-group attitudes (*N* = 2,385). Results of ordinary least squares regressions in which each outcome is regressed on a binary treatment indicator that has the value of 1 for respondents who were exposed to information about the labeling decision and 0 for respondents who were exposed tom placebo information. Models do not include any controls. Thick bars represent 90% confidence intervals; thin bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Turning to attitudes toward out-groups, we find no evidence for increased hostility toward out-groups in general: Feelings toward Palestinians are not affected by news about the labeling decision. Feelings toward Europeans, already fairly cool with a baseline mean of 53.7 points, decline by 3.35 points. This result is consistent with the expectation that publics will direct their anger toward the sender state rather than their own government.

Finally, backlash theories predict that leaders will attempt to divert attention from external economic pressure by shifting blame to minorities and marginalized groups. Indeed, recent years saw numerous legislative initiatives designed to curtail the operations of human rights NGOs and obstruct equality between Jewish and Arab citizens (Fuchs, Blander, & Kremnitzer, 2015). As shown in Figure 3, however, we do not find that exposure to information about product labeling affects public support for civil liberties. This is the case for the civil liberties index (first row) and generally true for all its constituent items.

Overall, results from our first experiment do not support distributional theories that argue that sanctions targeted at government supporters draw them away from the government, nor theories that predict that such sanctions embolden the opposition and spur dissent. Instead, a number of findings emerge from the analysis: First, we find that exposure to information about labeling settlement products produces a political backlash *especially among*

Figure 3. Effects of settlement labeling on support for civil liberties (*N* = 2,385).
Results of ordinary least square regressions in which each outcome is regressed on a
binary treatment indicator that has the value of 1 for respondents who were exposed
to information about the labeling decision and 0 for respondents who were exposed
tom placebo information. Models do not include any controls. Thick bars represent 90%
confidence intervals; thin bars represent 95% confidence intervals. NGOs = nongovernmental
organizations; WB = west bank.

the more dovish opposition, reducing support for resuming negotiations with
Palestinians and for halting settlement construction. Second, our results sug-
gest that reduced approval of leaders targeted by sanctions does not indicate
increased support for concessions due to sanctions, but quite the contrary—It
reflects popular support for a leader with an even more hawkish platform.
Finally, even targeted sanctions appear to increase in-group solidarity and
out-group hostility. However, this does not necessarily translate into increased
support for curtailing civil liberties and human rights.

Experiment 2: Sanction Characteristics and Mass Attitudes

A key advantage of the first experiment is that it presents respondents with a
real-world event that took place rather than a hypothetical one. Subjects are
therefore more likely to have formed realistic opinions on the issue. Yet
despite this feature increasing the experiment's internal validity, it is difficult
to gauge how sensitive our findings are to the particular elements of the EU
decision, in terms of its origins and scope. Perhaps the backlash we observed
results only from highly targeted sanctions, or those imposed by a single
sender, but does not occur when countries use comprehensive sanctions or

coordinate a multilateral sender sanction. In addition, the targeted nature of the labeling measure does not allow us to adequately test the deprivation perspective. To address these issues, our second experiment constructs a hypothetical sanctions scenario and randomly manipulates features of the sender and the sanction. This allows us to assess how a shift to a sender that is not Europe, and a shift to a sanction that is not targeted at the West Bank, affects support for policy change.

Our second experiment began with the following introductory script:

> The lack of progress in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority led a number of countries in the world to consider steps designed to influence the policies of the Israeli Government. Following are a number of questions on this topic.

Respondents were then told that due to statements by a number of political officials, some worry about the possibility that sanctions will be imposed on Israel as a means of influencing it to make substantial progress with the Palestinians.

To assess whether multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions, and whether the effects of sanctions differ depending on whether the sender state is perceived as supportive or critical, we randomized the *identity of the sender* state as either the EU (unilateral, critical), the U.S. government (unilateral, supportive), or the Middle East Quartet, a group of states including the United Nations, the United States, the EU, and Russia (multilateral, critical). Next, we varied the *sanction type* across two dimensions: the degree of targeting, and material versus symbolic costs. Here, we randomized whether the sender was considering a boycott of goods from the West Bank (material, targeted),[21] a boycott of goods from Israel (material, comprehensive), a boycott of Israeli academic institutions and researchers (symbolic, targeted), and the imposition of substantial restrictions on travel visas for Israelis (symbolic, semitargeted).

Finally, to ensure that the actual costs of the sanctions are held constant, we assign monetary values to the sanction. In general, our vignette noted that "experts estimate that if the sanctions are imposed in the coming year, the direct and indirect costs to the Israeli economy would be NIS 300 million." However, to more precisely account for the variation in costs between targeted and comprehensive sanctions, those who received the boycott of Israeli goods treatment were randomly assigned either to a cost of NIS 300 million (as in the other conditions) or a cost of NIS 1.2 billion. We use this variable as a control variable in all models.

In this experiment, our main dependent variable is attitudes toward the policies targeted by sanctions. To measure these attitudes, we asked respondents the following question after they read the vignette: "Given that trade with the sender constitutes more than 20% of Israeli exports, what do you think the government should do about the possibility of sanctions?"[22] Response choices indicated, in randomized order, that the government should (a) change its policies to reduce tensions with the sender; (b) continue its current policies and ignore the sender; or (c) continue its current policies and punish the sender for its initiative (retaliation). For the sake of clarity, we dichotomize this variable, assigning a value of 1 to those who would change government policies in response to sanctions and 0 to those who support retaining current policies.

Table 1 reports the conditional marginal effects of sanction type and sender identity for ordinary least squares (OLS) models with and without covariate adjustment. The base categories of the key independent variables are an EU (*sender identity*) boycott of West Bank goods (*sanction type*). Thus, the table's last row in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7, reports the baseline probabilities of support for policy change for European-imposed targeted sanctions on West Bank goods. As expected, baseline support levels of support for policy change vary considerably by bloc, from 8% among the right, to 45% among the center, to 76% among the left. To get a better sense of these effects, Figure 4 plots the effects of sanctions conditional on sender identity and effects of sender identity conditional on sanction type (using Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table 1).

The top left panel of Figure 4 shows that a shift from an EU boycott of West Bank goods to other sanctions from different senders does not produce a significant shift in attitudes toward policy change. Analysis by political bloc reveals a different picture, however. We find that the political center is significantly more likely to support policy change—compared to EU targeted sanctions on West Bank goods—when sanctions shift from a targeted boycott of West Bank goods to a comprehensive boycott of Israeli goods, *but only when* the sender is the United States. This result is underscored by results in the bottom panel of Figure 4. In general, U.S. initiated sanctions are more likely to increase support for policy change, but the results are only statistically significant for comprehensive sanctions of Israeli goods. Again, this result is strongly driven by the Israeli center, which is clearly more willing to support policy change when a U.S. boycott of Israeli goods is involved. Results also reveal a significant effect of Quartet-initiated comprehensive sanctions among the left, though it should be noted that baseline support for policy change in this bloc is already very high.

Finally, as an additional measure of backlash, we examine whether sanction type and sender identity have an effect on Israeli support for retaliation

Table 1. Estimates for Supporting Policy Change (Conditional Effects).

	Full sample		Ideological right		Ideological center		Ideological left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sanction type								
Israeli goods	0.052	0.043	0.077	0.085	0.037	0.032	0.008	−0.006
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Academic boycott	0.036	0.025	0.080	0.074	0.009	0.034	0.098	0.046
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Visa restriction	0.034	0.037	0.072	0.068	−0.013	0.018	0.107	0.066
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Sender identity								
USA	0.070	0.067	0.100	0.111*	0.061	0.069	0.082	0.034
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.081)
Quartet	0.031	0.007	0.043	0.053	−0.024	−0.018	0.004	−0.050
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Interactions								
Israeli Goods × USA	0.043	0.036	−0.148*	−0.136	0.157	0.145	0.035	0.024
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Israeli Goods × Quartet	−0.002	0.026	−0.112	−0.116	0.056	0.047	0.142	0.193*
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Academic Boycott × USA	−0.058	−0.061	−0.110	−0.101	−0.026	−0.039	−0.089	−0.037
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.119)	(0.118)

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

	Full sample		Ideological right		Ideological center		Ideological left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Academic Boycott × Quartet	−0.053	−0.046	−0.049	−0.059	0.047	0.015	−0.134	−0.071
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Visa Restriction × USA	0.018	−0.001	−0.038	−0.040	0.062	0.014	−0.072	−0.023
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.112)
Visa Restriction × Quartet	−0.055	−0.034	0.006	0.016	0.017	−0.015	−0.139	−0.071
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.110)
Baseline								
Constant	0.401***	−0.029	0.082*	0.034	0.451***	−0.117	0.756***	0.604
	(0.037)	(0.125)	(0.046)	(0.271)	(0.059)	(0.232)	(0.057)	(0.380)
Individual controls								
N	2,385	2,385	802	802	1,030	1,030	553	553
R^2	.008	.148	.012	.060	.019	.093	.030	.119

Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$.

Figure 4. Conditional effects of sanction type and sender identity on policy change (*N* = 1,532).

Results of ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is a binary outcome that takes the value of 1 when a respondents indicates that in response to the (hypothetical) sanction Israel should change its hawkish policies in the West Bank and compromise. This outcome is regressed on two treatments, as well their interactions: (a) four-category variable capturing different sanction *types* (with boycott of West Bank goods serving as the reference category); and (b) three-category variable capturing different possible senders (with the EU serving as the reference category). Graphed models do not include controls. Thick bars represent 90% confidence intervals; thin bars represent 95% confidence intervals. EU = European Union; WB = West Bank.

against the sender. Here, our dependent variable is coded 1 for those who would respond to sanctions by continuing current policies and punishing the sender, and 0 otherwise. The top panel of Figure 5 shows that the Israeli right is significantly more supportive of retaliation when Israeli goods are boycotted by the United States, compared with a European boycott of West Bank goods. However, the bottom panel shows that in general, U.S.-initiated sanctions reduce support for retaliation among the Israeli Right and Center. This indicates that Israelis are far more apprehensive about retaliating against their chief strategic ally.

The patterns uncovered by our second experiment are revealing: we find that most sanctions, regardless of type or origin, do not increase support for policy change among median Israeli voters. The only exception is a comprehensive boycott imposed by the United States, Israel's key ally. Sanctions

Figure 5. Conditional effects of sanction type and sender identity on retaliation (*N* = 1,532).
Results of ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is a binary outcome that takes the value of 1 when a respondents indicates that in response to the (hypothetical) sanction Israel should not only keep its hawkish policies in the Wes Bank but also retaliate against the sender. This outcome is regressed on two treatments, as well their interactions: (a) four-category variable capturing different sanction *types* (with boycott of West Bank goods serving as the reference category); and (b) three-category variable capturing different possible senders (with the EU serving as the reference category). Graphed models do not include controls. Thick bars represent 90% confidence intervals; thin bars represent 95% confidence intervals. EU = European Union; WB = West Bank.

such as these are expected to raise support for changing policies, reflecting the deprivation perspective prevalent in much of the sanctions literature. However, such sanctions are also the most extreme and least likely scenario. Less extreme sanctions such as academic and cultural measures do not appear to achieve their intended effects, at least in terms of swaying public opinion.

Discussion and Conclusion

The use of economic sanctions, especially targeted ones, is on the rise worldwide, but it remains unclear how exactly these sanctions affect targeted populations. While policymakers often express hope that sanctions will turn populations away from intransigent leaders, research has generated conflicting expectations: On one hand, it is argued that sanctions in general, and

targeted sanctions in particular, are likely to spur public dissent and mobilize political oppositions, especially in democratic settings. On the other hand, sanctions could rally populations around their government and its policies, deflecting blame toward the sender state or worse, toward marginalized or oppositional groups. This study provides a first assessment of these questions in a salient and divisive context: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Our central finding is that most types of economic sanctions produce a political backlash, increasing support for those policies that the sanctions seek to alter and raising hostility toward the sender. These effects are particularly strong among the political center, precisely the group that would be expected to mobilize around the opposition when sanctions are targeted. While sanctions may reduce support for incumbents, this is only because the general hardening of positions leads individuals to seek even more hawkish leaders. The only exception we find to this general pattern is the hypothetical scenario of comprehensive sanctions initiated by the United States, Israel's chief strategic ally. Such extreme sanctions do increase pubic support for policy change but are also highly unlikely.

This study represents a first effort to map the effects of sanctions on different sectors of public opinion. It is thus subject to a number of limitations. First, it could be that sanctions lead to backlash in the short term but that the public response changes over time. Galtung (1967), for example, argues that targeted states can initially adapt to sanctions, drawing inward and even strengthening their governments, "and only later—perhaps much later, or even never," disintegrating politically, when the damage becomes extremely severe. Similarly, Brooks (2002) argues that fatigue or frustration could lead publics to eventually support concessions. On the contrary, some have argued that the impact of sanctions is strongest in the immediate aftermath of the time they are imposed (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Smith, 1995). Our data do not allow us to resolve this debate, and in any event it is unclear when a tipping point is likely to occur, if at all. Furthermore, evidence from other contexts suggests that backlash is not necessarily short-lived, at least for targeted sanctions. For example, polling data from Russia indicate that support for Russia's annexation of Crimea and for Vladimir Putin have remained constant at approximately 80% since sanctions were imposed in March 2014, and that Russian approval ratings of the United States and EU dropped by 20% to 30% and have remained low.[23] This suggests that backlash effects may be fairly durable, though further research would be needed to establish the pattern in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

Second, as in any case study, there may be features unique to the case that shape public reactions to sanctions. For example, Israel's history may have generated a siege mentality among large sections of the public that

exacerbate the sense of threat that arises due to targeted sanctions and leads to a greater degree of in-group cohesion and backlash. However, a number of countries that have been targeted by sanctions, such as Iran and Russia, have also developed a similar mentality for historical reasons, and these features may therefore be more common than initially apparent. In addition, though Israel has extensive trade with the EU, its economy is strong and it therefore may be able to sustain resistance for a longer period. A targeted state that is more dependent on external trade and assistance may experience more pressure to comply. Further research in other empirical contexts can shed more light on these questions.

An additional question raised by the analysis is what constitutes effectiveness. It may be argued that the goal of sanctions in general, and the BDS campaign in particular, is not to sway public opinion in the targeted country but to achieve other ends, such as putting pressure on particular firms, signaling international opposition to a targeted country's behavior, containing it, or responding to political pressure in the sender state. In the Israeli case, one might postulate that the sanctions are intended to deter potential investors from investing in the West Bank or to satisfy constituents in the sender country. The impact of sanctions on other such outcomes is an interesting question that lies beyond the scope of this study.

The first experiment we conducted focused on exposing participants to a news report about the EU's labeling decision. Given that this information was already reported in the news, it could be argued that the experimental treatment made certain information more salient but did not reveal *new* information. For some, that is surely the case. Yet this point suggests that our findings represent a lower-bound effect of a sanction announcement. If the information was entirely new to everyone, the effect would likely have been more sizable.

The case we study also highlights the fact that the *type of measure* put forth by a foreign government aimed at bringing about change in the behavior of a target state is sometimes in a "grey area," and thus a source of deep contention. This gray area includes an array of measures, ranging from requirements of labeling with certain product features (e.g., Genetically modified organism [GMO] products) all the way to outright embargoes on imports from a certain country. Indeed, while the labeling decision was perceived in Israel as an outright economic sanction, the EU insisted that it was a technical measure and not a political one. Such disagreement on the nature of a labeling requirement is reminiscent of some of the most famous cases brought to the WTO's dispute settlement body—the tuna-dolphin or the shrimp-turtle

cases—in which the two sides of the dispute debated not just the technical specifics of the case but also the broader interpretation of the labeling measure in question.

From a theoretical perspective, our study points to several avenues for future work. First, and contrary to conventional wisdom, it suggests that targeted sanctions in democratic settings may actually lead to further entrenchment of the policies objected to by the international community. This finding is important in light of the growing turn to targeted sanctions. While there may be other, humanitarian reasons to prefer targeted measures over comprehensive ones, their instrumental benefits should be subject to further examination. Second, our findings also point to a potentially interesting distinction between prospective and retrospective costs. It could be that people respond to the expectation or threat of sanctions in one way, but respond differently when when the actual costs are already imposed. Indeed, studies on the attitudinal effects of the Vietnam war find divergent effects for the expectation of possible military service as opposed to the actuality of getting drafted to the war (Erikson & Stoker, 2011; Jenning & Markus, 1977). Whether this pattern holds in the context of sanctions is an open question.

The results of our study also highlight the utility of complementing the cross-national research program on sanctions with in-depth, systematic single country studies. While we recognize the limitations of case studies for detecting cross-national patterns, we contend that the benefits of the approach are also considerable. In particular, it allows us to study the intricacies of sanctions' domestic political dynamics, which are at the heart of debates over targeted sanctions and are crucial for understanding the conditions under which sanctions may be more or less likely to lead to policy change.

The focus on a single case also allows us to examine some untested assumptions in the literature regarding the mechanisms that determine whether or not a sanction will "succeed." For example, several studies attribute the correlation between democracy and effective sanctions to the withdrawal of public support from incumbents. This mechanism, which has rarely been tested directly, is at odds with our results indicating a backlash. Indeed, our study suggests that democratic publics may resent international meddling in their political process, viewing it as antidemocratic. Expanding the approach taken here to the study of other cases of target states can be a useful avenue to deepen our understanding of those crucial mechanisms, thereby informing policymaking in what has become an increasingly popular means of foreign policy.

Appendix

Table A1. Sample Summary Statistics.

Variable	M	SD	Minimum	Maximum	N
Economic					
Gender	0.512	0.5	0	1	2,385
Age	41.846	14.547	18	70	2,385
Education: No matriculation	0.179	0.383	0	1	2,385
Education: Matriculation	0.169	0.375	0	1	2,385
Education: College	0.424	0.494	0	1	2,385
Education: Graduate degree	0.228	0.419	0	1	2,385
Income: Bottom quintile	0.208	0.406	0	1	2,385
Income: 2nd quintile	0.18	0.384	0	1	2,385
Income: 3rd quintile	0.19	0.392	0	1	2,385
Income: 4th quintile	0.218	0.413	0	1	2,385
Income: Top quintile	0.204	0.403	0	1	2,385
Religiosity					
Secular	0.612	0.487	0	1	2,385
Traditional	0.179	0.384	0	1	2,385
Religious	0.132	0.338	0	1	2,385
Very religious	0.077	0.267	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity					
Born in Israel	0.819	0.385	0	1	2,385
Jewish	0.986	0.117	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity: Other	0.001	0.035	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity: Sephardic	0.317	0.466	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity: Ashkenazi	0.483	0.5	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity: Former USSR	0.077	0.266	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity: Mixed	0.106	0.309	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity: Israeli	0.006	0.076	0	1	2,385
Ethnicity: Arab	0.01	0.098	0	1	2,385
District					
Jerusalem	0.095	0.294	0	1	2,385
North	0.101	0.302	0	1	2,385
Haifa	0.125	0.331	0	1	2,385
Center	0.28	0.449	0	1	2,385
Tel Aviv	0.223	0.417	0	1	2,385
South	0.136	0.343	0	1	2,385
Judea/Samaria	0.039	0.194	0	1	2,385

Table A2. Balance Table.

	Control mean	Treatment mean	Difference of means	*p* value for difference of means
Economic				
Gender	0.513	0.511	0.002	.911
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.021)	
Age	42.093	41.708	0.384	.536
	(0.493)	(0.374)	(0.622)	
Education	2.713	2.693	0.020	.651
	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.043)	
Income quartile	3.088	2.997	0.091	.136
	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.061)	
Religiosity				
Secular	0.623	0.606	0.017	.421
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.021)	
Traditional	0.183	0.178	0.005	.745
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.016)	
Religious	0.122	0.137	−0.015	.294
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.014)	
Very religious	0.073	0.080	−0.007	.542
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	
Ethnicity				
Born in Israel	0.826	0.815	0.011	.495
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.016)	
Jewish	0.986	0.986	−0.000	.942
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	
Other	0.001	0.001	−0.000	.930
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
Sephardic	0.304	0.325	−0.021	.281
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.020)	
Ashkenazi	0.491	0.478	0.013	.530
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.021)	
Former USSR	0.081	0.074	0.006	.569
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	
Mixed	0.109	0.105	0.004	.765
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.013)	
Israeli	0.002	0.008	−0.005	.093
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Arab	0.012	0.008	0.003	.438
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	

Table A2. (continued)

	Control mean	Treatment mean	Difference of means	*p* value for difference of means
District				
Jerusalem	0.102	0.091	0.011	.398
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.013)	
North	0.114	0.095	0.019	.139
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.013)	
Haifa	0.124	0.125	−0.001	.940
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)	
Center	0.279	0.280	−0.001	.958
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.019)	
Tel-Aviv	0.220	0.225	−0.005	.788
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.018)	
South	0.121	0.145	−0.024	.099
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)	
Judea/Samaria	0.040	0.039	0.001	.871
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	
N	853	1,532	2,385	

Table A3. Effects of Reading About EU Labeling Decision.

	Full sample		Ideological right		Ideological center		Ideological left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Resuming negotiations with Palestinians	−0.223*** (0.043)	−0.185*** (0.037)	−0.166*** (0.062)	−0.199*** (0.061)	−0.219*** (0.053)	−0.194*** (0.050)	−0.069 (0.061)	−0.034 (0.060)
Support for settlement freeze	−0.110** (0.045)	−0.076** (0.037)	−0.009 (0.057)	−0.048 (0.053)	−0.102* (0.056)	−0.053 (0.051)	−0.015 (0.065)	−0.022 (0.062)
Prime minister approval ratings	−0.122 (0.129)	−0.226** (0.115)	−0.266 (0.211)	−0.189 (0.206)	−0.293* (0.173)	−0.387** (0.164)	−0.193 (0.166)	−0.223 (0.165)
Feelings toward Israelis	1.535* (0.788)	1.348* (0.764)	1.325 (1.111)	1.295 (1.123)	1.044 (1.189)	0.446 (1.177)	0.799 (1.769)	1.544 (1.762)
Feeling toward settlers	4.385*** (1.257)	3.704*** (1.076)	2.193 (1.816)	3.069* (1.701)	4.478*** (1.600)	3.528** (1.504)	0.920 (2.037)	1.191 (1.956)
Feelings toward Palestinians	−0.787 (0.945)	−0.373 (0.886)	0.905 (1.184)	0.555 (1.181)	0.516 (1.302)	0.413 (1.298)	−1.607 (1.893)	−1.099 (1.906)
Feelings toward Europeans	−3.351*** (0.981)	−3.094*** (0.938)	−3.231* (1.870)	−3.934** (1.836)	−2.845** (1.365)	−2.227* (1.352)	−2.013 (1.765)	−2.412 (1.776)
Civil Liberties Index	0.002 (0.043)	0.021 (0.039)	0.092 (0.057)	0.069 (0.057)	0.037 (0.052)	0.049 (0.051)	−0.011 (0.081)	−0.024 (0.079)
Individual controls		X		X		X		X
N	2,385	2,385	802	802	1,030	1,030	553	553

Results of ordinary least squares regressions in which each outcome is regressed on a binary treatment indicator that has the value of 1 for respondents who were exposed to information about the labeling decision and 0 for respondents who were exposed tom placebo information. Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 do not include controls, while Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 include covariates, as discussed in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Notes

1. See Remarks by the President at Signing of the Iran Sanctions Act, July 1, 2010. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-iran-sanctions-act
2. Symbolic sanctions should not be thought as "immaterial," because they have an important informational component, signaling that the target state cannot expect to continue operating under impunity.
3. Rather than use the comprehensive-targeted dichotomy, some scholars classify sanctions as limited, moderate, or extensive (Hufbauer, Elliott, Cyrus, & Winston, 1997). We use the term *targeted sanctions* to indicate not sanctions that are limited in scale but that are targeted at particular individuals or segments of society held to be responsible for the objectionable behavior (Hufbauer & Oegg, 2000).
4. The boycott predated the founding of the state by a number of years, having been imposed against the Jewish community in Palestine in 1945.
5. For the full text of the initial BDS call, see https://bdsmovement.net/call.
6. The Anti-Defamation League's statement on BDS is a case in point: http://www.adl.org/israel-international/israel-middle-east/content/backgroundersarticles/bds-campaign-backgrounder.html.
7. See, for example, Federman and Binkley (2016).
8. Calls by the BDS movement to boycott Israeli firms operating in the West Bank have, nonetheless, pushed several export-oriented companies to close their West Bank operations and relocate them in Israel proper. See "Sodastream Leaves West Bank as Ceo Says Boycott Antisemitic and Pointless" (2015).
9. Critics in Israel pointed out, for example, that the EU did not label goods produced in other contested areas such as Western Sahara, Northern Cyprus, or Tibet, see http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-eu-labeling-idUSKCN0SZ21120151110.

10. See Eran, Feldman, and Yashiv (2015).
11. See "The Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" 2015, p. 28. For comparison, overall welfare losses to the South African economy in the late 1980s owing to sanctions were estimated at 2% of growth per annum (Brooks, 2002, p. 23).
12. Factors associated with effectiveness include regime type (Bolks & Al-Sowayel, 2000; Hart, 2000; Lektzian & Souva, 2007), the cost of sanctions (Drury, 1998; Hufbauer et al., 2007), presence of targeting (Cortright & Lopez, 2002), the salience of the issue under dispute to the target country (Adrian, Ang, & Peksen, 2007), and the endorsement of international institutions (Bapat & Morgan, 2009; Martin, 1993).
13. The relative effectiveness of unilateral versus multilateral sanctions has been subject to considerable debate; see Bapat and Morgan (2009) for a review and discussion.
14. Both articles were slightly abridged to a more manageable length. See Supplemental Information (SI) for full text of both articles.
15. We did not ask respondents before exposing them to the treatment whether they had already been exposed to this news in real-time, to avoid priming effects. As a proxy we asked respondents about their level of news consumption, but controlling for this variable does not affect out results. In any case, if such prior knowledge did exist, it would mean observed effects are actually understated, as noted in the conclusion.
16. Detailed information about the measurement of framing effects, as well as framing results (which were largely nonsignificant), are reported in Section 2 of the SI.
17. Following Anderson (2008), a summary index is a weighted mean of standardized outcomes in which the weights—the inverse of the covariance matrix—are used to maximize the amount of information captured by the index.
18. Our categorization relies on Israeli perceptions of which attitudes belong in which bloc.
19. Tabular results for models with and without covariate adjustment are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. All figures herein report results with covariate adjustment.
20. Right-wing oppositional figures include Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Lieberman, and Moshe Feiglin.
21. Our survey uses the term *Judea and Samarea* for the West Bank, in accordance with Israeli parlance.
22. When reading this question, respondents viewed the sender and sanction type to which they had been assigned.
23. See Russell (2016), but see Frye (2017).

Supplemental Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online at the *CPS* website http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0010414018774370.

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