**Online Appendix for:**

**“The Economic Consequences of Partisanship in a Polarized Era”**

**This Version: June 27, 2017**

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**Online Appendix 1: Pre-Analysis Plan & Deviations, Study 1**

The following is a plan describing the data collection procedures and primary experimental hypotheses for an experiment that was conducted on the freelancing website oDesk at the beginning of 2015. This document was written prior to the beginning of the experiment, which began on 6 February 2015.

**I. Procedures**

The experiment consists of hiring workers from the freelancing platform oDesk and measuring their performance on a short editing task. We will place an advertisement on the website explaining the task and seeking freelancers. The description of the job will include (1) a description of the assignment, including its length; (2) a link to a Google survey from which we can obtain the participant’s political identification; and (3) an initial wage, which we will set at $11.11, or a net wage of $10 to the participant. (oDesk takes 10% from a fixed price wage as a service fee). For each advertisement, we will hire 15 freelancers, repeating as needed to reach a reasonable sample size. We will additionally list as a desired quality that the freelancer live in the United States, and will only hire those freelancers who meet this criterion.

For each advertisement, we will hire the first 12 respondents who live within the US [ANNOTATED NOTE, 3/23/17: THIS WAS A TYPO; SHOULD READ “15 respondents”]. The task itself is to edit a PDF document of the promotional materials for an invented software company. The text of the task runs approximately 7 pages single-spaced in Microsoft Word, while the design elements of the PDF were prepared using Adobe InDesign. When we send each participant their official contract, we will attach the task with instructions directing them to place all edits within a Word document with the placement and description of each correction clearly indicated. While we are primarily interested in whether the participants find specific grammatical mistakes that we have seeded throughout the document, we will also encourage the participants to provide substantive feedback on how the document could be improved, either in its design or in the text. We will also direct the participants to use the Chicago Manual of Style as their reference when editing the document, since this was our standard when placing the errors into the text.

Once we have received the corrections from each of the participants, we will approve their payment, then review their work and determine the number of mistakes that they incorrectly identified or failed to identify; their performance on the task will be our first dependent variable. Before closing the oDesk contract for the participants, we will send each the following message:

*Thank you again for your help in editing these materials. If we were to work with you again in the future, what do you think a fair wage would be for an assignment of similar scope and length?*

The price that they return will be our second dependent variable. We believe that the task should take each participant approximately one hour, in which case we can interpret the participant’s response as a (approximate) proposal for a future hourly wage. We will then close their contract through oDesk. As long as the freelancer returns an edited document, we will give them a 5-star rating on the platform in order to help them secure future employment.

The experimental manipulation is the partisan signal that the participant is exposed to when completing the task. The first paragraphs of the task describe the background of founders of the invented company, Jake and Andrew, and the initial inspiration for the software that the materials are promoting. These paragraphs read as follows (with grammatical mistakes removed):

*Our two founders, Chris and Matt, began their company while working together on* ***[Democratic/Republican/non-profit]*** *fundraising efforts in Michigan. Too often, they found themselves spending time explaining layout and style conventions for publicity materials and not enough time in the field working for* ***[Democratic/Republican/their]*** *causes. Their solution was a brand-new way of thinking about word processing that allowed them the time to follow their passion promoting their* ***[Party/Party/organization]*** *around the state. After their time with the [Democrats/Republicans/non-profit] ended, Chris and Matt developed their initial word processor into an entire suite of products that they believe will revolutionize the way global business works.*

The bolded text is manipulated in each of the experimental conditions. In the **Democratic condition**, the participant sees the first word contained in each of the bracketed locations, i.e. Democratic, Democratic and Party; in the **Republican condition**, the participant sees the second word contained in each of the brackets; and in the **control condition**, the participant sees the third word. In each group of 15 freelancers, 5 will be randomly assigned to Republican condition, 5 to the Democratic condition, and 5 to the control condition.

In pre-tests of the experimental design, the freelancers who applied for the task were almost exclusively women. To avoid a large demographic imbalance, we will use an oDesk feature that allows us to invite recommended freelancers to apply for our job. We will use this to help ensure that the number of men and women hired for the position is balanced. We can obtain other pertinent demographic information such as age, race or geographic region through the oDesk profiles of the freelancers. In particular, we can obtain the mean wage that a participant receives for work they receive through oDesk, which we include in our model for the participant’s post-task wage proposal.

Finally, in the Google survey that we ask the freelancers to complete as part of their application for the position, we obtain party ID through the standard question:

*Please answer the following question if you live in the United States: generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a:*

* *Strong Republican*
* *Not very strong Republican*
* *Lean toward the Republican Party*
* *Lean toward the Democratic Party*
* *Not very strong Democrat*
* *Strong Democrat*
* *I do not live in the US*

**II. Hypotheses and Models**

We defined the following variables for our model:

* : The value of the dependent variable for participant *i*. In our experiment, can be one of two possible variables:
  + The number of mistakes that the participant either failed to correctly identify or misidentified in their corrections.
  + The wage that the participant proposed upon completing the assignment.
* : A sequence of dichotomous variables representing the respondent’s party ID. Let *k* =-3 correspond to “Strong Republican”, *k* = -2 correspond to “Not very strong Republican,” and *k* = -1 correspond to “Lean toward the Republican Party,” and let *k* = 1, 2, 3 correspond to Lean, Not Very Strong, and Strong Democratic, respectively. Then corresponds to the dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if participant *i* gave answer *k* on the Google survey.
* , respectively): A dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 if the participant received the Republican (Democratic, respectively) treatment as part of their task.
* Participant *i*’s mean wage on oDesk, collected from the freelancer’s publically available profile.

With these variables, we can present our model for the first dependent variable as:

where is a matrix of appropriate demographic covariates. Our hypotheses can be stated in the following manner:

***Hypothesis 1*:**  Let represent the number of mistakes participant *i* makes when editing the promotional materials. Then and for *k* < 0. In words, a Republican who receives the Republican treatment will commit fewer errors, while a Democrat will commit more. Similarly, for *k* > 0, and : Republicans who received the Democratic treatment will commit more errors, while a Democrat will commit fewer.

For the second dependent variable, we modify the above model to include the participant’s mean wage as a covariate:

***Hypothesis 2*:**  Let represent the wage participant *i* proposes after editing the promotional materials. Then and for *k* < 0. In words, a Republican who receives the Republican treatment will propose a lower wage, while a Democrat will propose a higher one. Similarly, for *k* > 0, and : Republicans who received the Democratic will propose a higher wage, while a Democrat will propose a lower one.

For each of the models, the following hypothesis applies:

***Hypothesis 3***: For either dependent variable, let *j* = 1 or 2. Then is increasing in |*k*| within each party, i.e. for a given sign of *k*. In words, for strong Republicans and strong Democrats, the size of the effect of the experimental manipulation on their performance on the task and their proposed wage should be larger than the corresponding effect for weaker Republicans and Democrats, respectively. (We do not make claims about the comparison between, say, weak Democrats and strong Republicans).

**Deviations from the Pre-analysis Plan**

1. Rather than completing the experiment on ODesk (which was rebranded as Upwork during the course of the experiment), we chose to move to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a popular freelancing platform for conducting social science experiments. This change was due to the difficulty in raising a sufficiently large sample in the time frame and with the budget available on ODesk, whose parent company underwent a substantial restructuring over the course of the experiment.
2. Along with moving to a new platform, we shortened the length of the task substantially (to one page) and reduced the number of errors. We did this to make the task more attractive to a larger number of freelancers and to reduce the wage for participating. We paid Mechanical Turk workers $3 for their task, which took approximately 15 minutes, for an hourly wage of $12 (similar to the $10 effective wage we had offered on ODesk for the longer task).
3. Given the change in the platform and task, we were able to incorporate the demographic questionnaire into the beginning of the survey we used to administer the task; therefore, the timing of the experiment was somewhat different than what was described above.
4. In the models used to test our hypotheses, we pool the effects on Democrats and Republicans into common “copartisan” and “counterpartisan” conditions; see the main text for more details on this construction.
5. The “grade” dependent variable was constructed by determining which errors were correctly identified. Respondents were not penalized for identifying incorrect errors. We also measured overall effort by counting the total number of corrections made. We also automate the grading process by checking for the correct line number of the correction rather than manually determining whether the error was correctly identified. While this likely introduces some small measurement error in our dependent variable, we do not expect these mistakes to be associated with the underlying covariates, and so should any error should affect the efficiency of the estimates, not the relationship between experimental conditions.
6. We also included several survey-based perceptual variables in our instrument not included in our pre-analysis plan. We discuss these measures in Online Appendix 5 below.
7. In order to recruit a large enough sample for proper inference, the worker qualification constraints were slightly relaxed in moving from wave one to wave two. This change did not appear to substantively impact the results from the experiment, however, as the individual wave results are broadly similar across dependent variables.
8. Due to some outliers in the reservation wages (likely caused by typos or misunderstanding), the dependent variable was capped at $20. As shown in Online Appendix 6, results are not sensitive to this truncation.

**Online Appendix 2: Materials for Study 1**

**Survey shown to participants, Study 1**

**Intro:** At McConnell & Partners, we're interested in learning more about the diverse group of individuals who work with us. Before we give you the editing task, we ask that you please fill out this short questionnaire to help us learn more about your qualifications and your personal background.

Q1. How much experience do you have copyediting texts or designing text layouts?

1. I have substantial experience editing texts and designing layouts (more than 100 hours)
2. I have a good deal of experience editing texts and designing layouts (between 50 and 100 hours)
3. I have some experience editing texts and designing layouts (between 0 and 50 hours)
4. I do no yet have experience editing texts and designing layouts.

Q2. If you have experience as a professional editor, which of the following types of documents do you have editing? (select all that apply)

1. Business newsletters or promotional materials.
2. Magazine or newspaper articles.
3. Professional websites.
4. General text content (blog posts, personal correspondence)
5. Technical articles (for example, an academic publication)
6. Other

**[IF Q2=Other]**

Q2b. Please list the types of documents that you have experience editing.

Q3. Which types of documents are you most interested in gaining experience editing? (select all that apply)

1. Business newsletters or promotional materials.
2. Magazine or newspaper articles.
3. Professional websites.
4. General text content (blog posts, personal correspondence)
5. Technical articles (for example, an academic publication)
6. Other

**[IF Q3=Other]**

Q3b. Please list the types of documents that you have experience editing.

Q4. Next, we would like to collect some demographic information to help us assess the diversity of our workforce: first, how old are you?

1. Younger than 18 years old
2. 18-30 years old
3. 31-45 years old
4. 46-55 years old
5. 56+ years old

Q5. What is your gender?

1. Male
2. Female

Q6. In what country are you located?

Q7. If you live in the US, in what region do you live?

1. The Northeast
2. The South
3. The Midwest
4. The Southwest
5. The West Coast
6. I do not live in the US

Q8. Please answer the following question if you live in the United States: generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a:

1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican
3. Lean toward the Republican Party
4. Lean toward the Democratic Party
5. Strong Democrat
6. I do not live in the US

Q9. What is the highest level of education that you have received?

1. Less than a high school degree
2. High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
3. Some college but no degree
4. Associate’s degree
5. Bachelor’s degree
6. Graduate degree (e.g., MA/MS, JD, MBA, PhD)

**[The following text was then displayed prior to the task]**

Again, thank you for your help with our project. On the following screen, you will find a draft of a page of our website. Please read over this document, making note of any grammar or spelling errors you find. If you find an error, please record the mistake in the following format:

**[line number]: [description of mistake]**

where you will fill in the line number and description of the mistake you find. For example,

**13: “Company” is spelled incorrectly.**

We have provided line numbers on the left-hand side of the text to help you identify where the mistake occurred. After making note of any mistakes in the text box at the bottom of the page, continue with the survey; the corrections you put into the box will be automatically recorded.

**[IF CONDITION = NEUTRAL, NEUTRAL TASK DISPLAYED]**

**[IF CONDITION = DEMOCRATIC, DEMOCRATIC TASK DISPLAYED]**

**[IF CONDITION = REPUBLICAN, REPUBLICAN TASK DISPLAYED]**

Q10. Do you have any additional recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness of this webpage?

Q11. Thank you again for your help with editing these materials. Would you be interested in working with us again?

1. Yes
2. No

**[IF Q11 = YES]**

Q12. If we were to work with you again in the future, what do you think would be a fair wage for an assignment of similar scope and length? (Please type in a total payment amount below without the dollar sign)

Q13. Lastly, we want to ask you a few questions about what you think of our company and our product.

How much do you think companies would benefit from using our product?

1. A great deal
2. A lot
3. A moderate amount
4. A little
5. Not at all

Q14. How well do you think the following statement describes our company?

“McConnell & Partners is an organization with integrity that can be trusted to do what’s right for its clients.

1. Extremely well
2. Very well
3. Moderately well
4. Slightly well
5. Not well at all

Q15. How well do you think the following statement describes our company?

“McConnell & Partners is the kind of company that I’d like to work for.”

1. Extremely well
2. Very well
3. Moderately well
4. Slightly well
5. Not well at all

**Conclusion:** Thank you for your response, and again, thank you for your help improving our website.

**Job Posting, Study 1**

**Title:** Help Us Edit Our Website

**Description:** We are looking for help with editing the text that will appear on our website. We will pay you $3 to edit one webpage.

**Reward per Assignment:** $3.0

**Text of Posting:** Thank you for your help with our editing project. After a short survey about your background, you will see one page from the website, and will be asked to make note of any grammar or spelling mistakes that you find in a text box below. Finally, you will be asked a few questions about your opinion of our product and our company. The entire task is self-contained (there will be no need to download any documents) and should take less than half an hour. At the end of the survey, you will receive a confirmation code that you can input below to receive your payment. We look forward to receiving your input on our website.

**Text Subjects were Instructed to Edit, Study 1**

On the next page, we present a screenshot of the image respondents were instructed to edit. We present the neutral condition, though note that the only change for the Republican (Democratic) condition would be to say the founders met working as fundraisers for Republicans (Democrats).

Macintosh HD:Users:mleven:Dropbox:behavioral_pp:Main Paper Edits:task2-mturk_neutral.pdf

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Online Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Tests (Study 1)** | | | | |
|  | Full Sample | Control Group | Dem. Employer | Rep. Employer |
| Gender |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 52.2% | 52.7% | 49.4% | 54.4% |
| Female | 47.9 | 47.3 | 50.6 | 45.6 |
| χ2(2) = 2.11 (*p* = 0.35) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  |  |  |  |
| 18-30 | 41.8% | 39.6% | 45.5% | 40.3% |
| 31-45 | 43.0 | 45.0 | 39.2 | 44.9 |
| 46-55 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 9.0 | 9.2 |
| 56+ | 5.9 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 5.6 |
| χ2(6) = 4.42 (*p* = 0.62) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience |  |  |  |  |
| Substantial | 12.5% | 11.0% | 13.1% | 13.4% |
| Good Deal | 19.9 | 23.7 | 18.3 | 17.7 |
| Some | 47.4 | 46.9 | 47.5 | 47.8 |
| No experience | 20.2 | 18.3 | 21.2 | 21.1 |
| χ2(6) = 6.75 (*p* = 0.34) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.5% |
| High School | 10.2 | 9.1 | 12.4 | 9.0 |
| Some College | 27.3 | 28.1 | 26.5 | 27.2 |
| Associates Degree | 13.1 | 12.2 | 12.4 | 14.6 |
| Bachelor’s Degree | 38.5 | 37.9 | 38.9 | 38.6 |
| Graduate Degree | 10.6 | 12.2 | 9.5 | 10.2 |
| χ2(10) = 6.39 (*p* = 0.78) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Party Identification |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 69.6% | 68.2% | 68.6% | 71.8% |
| Republican | 30.4 | 31.8 | 31.4 | 28.2 |
| χ2(2) = 1.54 (*p* = 0.46) | |  |  |  |

**Online Appendix 4: Results by Wave of Data Collection and Partisanship (Study 1)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | Dependent variable: | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | Wage | Errors Caught | Total Edits | Wage | Errors  Caught | Total Edits |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Co-partisan | -0.35\* | -0.59 | -1.34\* | -0.38\* | -0.72 | -1.52\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.43) | (0.29) | (0.16) | (0.43) | (0.57) |
| Counter-partisan | -0.12 | -0.02 | -0.45 | -0.10 | 0.03 | -0.38 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.43) | (0.57) | (0.16) | (0.42) | (0.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.10 | 0.45\*\* | 0.62\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.06) | (0.15) | (0.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.06 | 0.40\* | 0.52\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.07) | (0.19) | (0.26) |
| Constant | 3.46\*\* | 6.04\*\* | 7.50\*\* | 2.94\*\* | 3.46\*\* | 3.99\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.31) | (0.41) | (0.28) | (0.75) | (1.00) |
| Co-partisan minus Counter-partisan | -0.24  (0.16) | -0.56 (0.42) | -0.89  (0.57) | -0.28  (0.16) | -0.76  (0.42) | -1.15\*  (0.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 299 | 299 | 299 | 299 | 299 | 299 |
| R2 | 0.017 | 0.008 | 0.018 | 0.031 | 0.054 | 0.065 |
|  | | | | | | |

**Table A4A: The Effect of Employer Partisanship on Employee Behavior (Study 1, Wave 1)**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions. Education is measured on a six-point scale ranging from less than a high school diploma (1) to a graduate degree (6). Experience is measured on a four-point scale ranging from “no experience” (1) to “substantial experience” (4).

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | Dependent variable: | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | Wage | Errors Caught | Total Edits | Wage | Errors  Caught | Total Edits |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Co-partisan | -0.18 | -0.20 | -0.33 | -0.15 | -0.07 | -0.16 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.23) | (0.29) | (0.12) | (0.22) | (0.33) |
| Counter-partisan | 0.05 | 0.06 | -0.02 | 0.05 | 0.05 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.23) | (0.33) | (0.12) | (0.22) | (0.32) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.05 | 0.51\*\* | 0.65\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.11) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.20\*\* | 0.20\*\* | 0.34\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.05) | (0.10) | (0.15) |
| Constant | 3.39\*\* | 5.57\*\* | 6.96\*\* | 2.73\*\* | 2.95\*\* | 3.42\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.16) | (0.24) | (0.20) | (0.39) | (0.57) |
| Co-partisan minus Counter-partisan | -0.23  (0.12) | -0.26 (0.23) | -0.31 (0.33) | -0.20  (0.12) | -0.12  (0.22) | -0.12 (0.33) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 933 | 933 | 933 | 933 | 933 | 933 |
| R2 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.023 | 0.062 | 0.051 |
|  | | | | | | |

**Table A4B: The Effect of Employer Partisanship on Employee Behavior (Study 1, Wave 2)**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions. Education is measured on a six-point scale ranging from less than a high school diploma (1) to a graduate degree (6). Experience is measured on a four-point scale ranging from “no experience” (1) to “substantial experience” (4).

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | Dependent variable: | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | Wage | Errors Caught | Total Edits | Wage | Errors  Caught | Total Edits |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Co-partisan | -0.22\* | -0.30 | -0.58\* | -0.21\* | -0.23 | -0.49 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.29) | (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.28) |
| Counter-partisan | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.12 | 0.01 | 0.05 | -0.11 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.29) | (0.10) | (0.19) | (0.28) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.06 | 0.49\*\* | 0.63\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.10) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.16\*\* | 0.24\* | 0.37\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.04) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| Wave Two | 0.04 | -0.32 | -0.06 | 0.00 | -0.45\* | -0.24 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.19) | (0.28) | (0.09) | (0.19) | (0.27) |
| Constant | 3.38\*\* | 5.92\*\* | 7.13\*\* | 2.80\*\* | 3.44\*\* | 3.81\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.29) | (0.18) | (0.36) | (0.52) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-partisan minus Counter-partisan | -0.23\*  (0.10) | -0.34  (0.20) | -0.45  (0.29) | -0.22\*  (0.10) | -0.28  (0.20) | -0.37  (0.28) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 |
| R2 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.022 | 0.059 | 0.050 |
|  | | | | | | |

**Table A4C: The Effect of Employer Partisanship on Employee Behavior Controlling for Wave (Study 1)**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions. Education is measured on a six-point scale ranging from less than a high school diploma (1) to a graduate degree (6). Experience is measured on a four-point scale ranging from “no experience” (1) to “substantial experience” (4).

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | Dependent variable: | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | Wage | Errors Caught | Total Edits | Wage | Errors  Caught | Total Edits |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Co-partisan | -0.31\*\* | -0.39 | -0.68 | -0.29\* | -0.33 | -0.60 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.24) | (0.35) | (0.12) | (0.24) | (0.34) |
| Counter-partisan | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.09 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.09 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.24) | (0.35) | (0.12) | (0.23) | (0.34) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.60 | 0.48\*\* | 0.63\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.32) | (0.07) | (0.10) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | ⎯⎯ | 0.16\*\* | 0.22\* | 0.37\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.04) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| Republican | -0.12 | 0.04 | 0.33 | -0.11 | 0.03 | 0.32 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.31) | (0.44) | (0.15) | (0.30) | (0.43) |
| Co-partisan x Rep. | 0.28 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.28 | 0.37 | 0.43 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.44) | (0.63) | (0.21) | (0.43) | (0.62) |
| Counter-partisan x | 0.01 | 0.06 | -0.10 | 0.01 | 0.11 | -0.05 |
| Rep. | (0.21) | (0.43) | (0.62) | (.021) | (0.42) | (0.60) |
| Constant | 3.45\*\* | 5.67\*\* | 6.98\*\* | 2.83\*\* | 3.16\*\* | 3.55\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.17) | (0.25) | (0.17) | (0.36) | (0.51) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 | 1232 |
| R2 | 0.008 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.024 | 0.056 | 0.053 |
|  | | | | | | |

**Table A4D: The Effect of Employer Partisanship on Employee Behavior by Partisanship (Study 1)**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions. Education is measured on a six-point scale ranging from less than a high school diploma (1) to a graduate degree (6). Experience is measured on a four-point scale ranging from “no experience” (1) to “substantial experience” (4).

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

**Online Appendix 5: Survey-Based Results on Perception of Firm (Study 1)**

The table below presents the results of analyzing additional survey-based variables collected for Study 1 on how workers viewed the firm: “McConnell & Partners is an organization with integrity that can be trusted to do what’s right for its clients” (which we label “Integrity” in the table below), “How much do you think companies would benefit from using our product?” (which we label “Benefit Customers” below), and “McConnell and Partners is the kind of company that I’d like to work for” (which we label “Work for Company” below). There were no treatment effects for the first two survey-based measured, and a significant difference between the “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” conditions in the expected direction for the “Work for Company” outcome variable.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | Dependent variable: | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | Integrity  (1) | | Benefit Customers  (2) | | Work for Company  (3) | |
|  |
| Co-partisan | -0.02 | | 0.08 | | 0.08 | |
|  | (0.08) | | (0.08) | | (0.08) | |
| Counter-partisan | -0.09 | | 0.03 | | -0.07 | |
|  | (0.08) | | (0.08) | | (0.08) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.52\*\* | | 3.45\*\* | | 3.42\*\* | |
|  | (0.06) | | (0.06) | | (0.06) | |
| Co-partisan minus Counter-partisan | 0.07  (0.08) | | 0.06  (0.08) | | 0.14  (0.08) | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 1229 | | 1231 | | 1231 | |
| R2 | 0.001 | | 0.001 | | 0.003 | |
|  | | | | | | |

**Table A5: Employee Perceptions of the Firm, Study 1**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed)

**Online Appendix 6: Robustness Checks, Study 1**

*Confounders of Individual-Level Partisanship*

One potential concern with our main analyses is that while respondents are randomly assigned to experimental conditions, respondents’ party identification is an observational variable. Accordingly, the observed effects of the co-partisan and counter-partisan treatments may be due to some omitted factor correlated with party identification rather than party identification itself. For instance, a Republican respondent may request a lower wage from a Republican vs. Democratic employer not because the respondent is a Republican but because they are less educated. We consider this to be unlikely given that the experimental treatments directly signaled party identification, and not some other demographic characteristic such as education. Nonetheless, we conduct two main sets of analyses to address this concern.

First, we test whether respondent party identification is the best moderator of the experimental treatments compared to other demographics in the dataset. To assess this, we compare the improvement in fit between two models: (1) a model including dummy variables for the two experimental conditions as well as a demographic variable; (2) a model including all variables as model #1 but also including the interactions between the demographic variable and the experimental treatment dummies. Given that the experimental treatments signal party identification, we would expect respondent party identification to yield the largest improvement in fit compared to the other demographics. As shown in Table A6A below, this was indeed the case, particularly for the reservation wage outcome variable, for which we observed the strongest effects of the experimental treatments.

The second test we conduct is to estimate models that include dummy variables for the two experimental conditions, respondent party identification, and the interaction between respondent party ID and the experimental treatment dummies. We then add additional demographics to this baseline model, along with interactions between the demographic variable and the experimental treatment dummies. We then assess whether the coefficient estimates of “Republican Task x Republican Dummy,” “Democratic Task x Republican Dummy,” and the difference between these two interaction terms is stable after including additional demographics. If the coefficients are indeed stable, then it suggests that the findings are not confounded by some other demographic variable correlated with party identification. As shown in Table A6B below, the coefficients estimations are extremely similar across model specifications.

*Truncation of Reservation Wage*

As noted in the main text, due to a few outliers (potentially caused by typos or misunderstanding), we truncated the reservation wage outcome variable to be $20. As shown in Figure A6A, the treatment effect estimates are generally insensitive to the specific truncation level set around $20.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **Party ID** | **Age** | **Experience** | **Education** | **Gender** |
| *Wage Requested* | **Baseline R2** | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.019 | 0.008 | 0.005 |
| **Interaction R2** | 0.008 | 0.01 | 0.025 | 0.009 | 0.007 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Percentage Increase** | 59.74 | 31.33 | 26.57 | 8.11 | 38.35 |
|  |  | **Party ID** | **Age** | **Experience** | **Education** | **Gender** |
| *Errors*  *Caught* | **Baseline R2** | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.03 | 0.011 |
| **Interaction R2** | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.03 | 0.014 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Percentage Increase** | 73.29 | 10.72 | 68.92 | 4.67 | 28.59 |
|  |  | **Party ID** | **Age** | **Experience** | **Education** | **Gender** |
| *Total*  *Edits* | **Baseline R2** | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.023 | 0.008 |
| **Interaction R2** | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.025 | 0.009 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Percentage Increase** | 22.22 | 21.17 | 23.92 | 5.98 | 17.54 |

**Table A6A: Improvement in Fit from Interaction with Covariates (Study 1)**

*Note:* Entries represent R2 statistics from a simple regression of the relevant dependent variable (from top to bottom: reservation wage, grade and number of answers) on the task (Democrat or Republican) dummies, the listed covariate (party ID, age, experience, education or gender), and, for the second row in each subsection, the interaction of the task variables with the covariate.

**Full Set of Regressions to Produce Table A6A**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Wage Requested | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Add  PID  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.20  (0.10) | -0.20  (0.10) | -0.20  (0.10) | -0.19  (0.10) | | -0.20  (0.10) | |
| Rep Task | 0.00  (0.10) | 0.00  (0.10) | 0.00  (0.10) | 0.01  (0.10) | | 0.00  (0.10) | |
| Republican | -0.03  (0.09) |  |  |  | |  | |
| < 45 Years Old |  | -0.22  (0.11) |  |  | |  | |
| High Educ. |  |  | 0.16  (0.08) |  | |  | |
| High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.36  (0.08) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -0.07  (0.08) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.019 | | 0.005 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Grade on Task | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Add  PID  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.23  (0.20) | -0.23  (0.20) | -0.21  (0.20) | -0.22  (0.20) | | -0.21  (0.20) | |
| Rep Task | 0.02  (0.20) | 0.02  (0.20) | 0.00  (0.20) | 0.03  (0.20) | | 0.00  (0.20) | |
| Republican | 0.17  (0.18) |  |  |  | |  | |
| < 45 Years Old |  | -0.43  (0.23) |  |  | |  | |
| High Educ. |  |  | 1.00  (0.17) |  | |  | |
| High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.39  (0.18) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -0.57  (0.16) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.030 | 0.005 | | 0.011 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Number of Answers | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Add  PID  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.52  (0.29) | -0.52  (0.29) | -0.50  (0.29) | -0.50  (0.29) | | -0.50  (0.29) | |
| Rep Task | -0.13  (0.29) | -0.14  (0.29) | -0.16  (0.29) | -0.13  (0.29) | | -0.16  (0.29) | |
| Republican | 0.42  (0.26) |  |  |  | |  | |
| < 45 Years Old |  | -0.60  (0.33) |  |  | |  | |
| High Educ. |  |  | 1.22  (0.24) |  | |  | |
| High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.62  (0.25) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -0.57  (0.24) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.023 | 0.008 | | 0.008 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Wage Requested | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Add  PID  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.31  (0.12) | 0.18  (0.25) | -0.20  (0.16) | -0.06  (0.12) | | -0.34  (0.14) | |
| Rep Task | 0.00  (0.12) | 0.11  (0.25) | -0.10  (0.16) | 0.00  (0.12) | | -0.11  (0.13) | |
| Republican | -0.14  (0.15) |  |  |  | |  | |
| < 45 Years Old |  | -0.03  (0.19) |  |  | |  | |
| High Educ. |  |  | 0.11  (0.14) |  | |  | |
| High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.48  (0.14) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -0.25  (0.14) | |
| Rep Task x Rep | -0.02  (0.21) |  |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Rep | 0.34  (0.21) |  |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x < 45 |  | -0.12  (0.27) |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x < 45 |  | -0.46  (0.27) |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x High Educ. |  |  | 0.16  (0.20) |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x High Educ. |  |  | 0.00  (0.20) |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.06  (0.21) | |  | |
| Dem Task x High Exp. |  |  |  | -0.42  (0.20) | |  | |
| Rep Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.24  (0.19) | |
| Dem Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.29  (0.19) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.008 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.025 | | 0.007 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Grade on Task | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Add  PID  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.39  (0.24) | 0.13  (0.51) | -0.46  (0.32) | -0.41  (0.25) | | -0.52  (0.28) | |
| Rep Task | 0.03  (0.24) | 0.19  (0.52) | 0.07  (0.33) | 0.12  (0.25) | | -0.34  (0.27) | |
| Republican | 0.02  (0.30) |  |  |  | |  | |
| < 45 Years Old |  | -0.22  (0.40) |  |  | |  | |
| High Educ. |  |  | 0.90  (0.29) |  | |  | |
| High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.29  (0.30) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -1.03  (0.28) | |
| Rep Task x Rep | -0.06  (0.44) |  |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Rep | 0.50  (0.43) |  |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x < 45 |  | -0.21  (0.56) |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x < 45 |  | -0.42  (0.56) |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x High Educ. |  |  | -0.11  (0.41) |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x High Educ. |  |  | 0.40  (0.40) |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x High Exp. |  |  |  | -0.30  (0.43) | |  | |
| Dem Task x High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.61  (0.43) | |  | |
| Rep Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.74  (0.40) | |
| Dem Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.64  (0.40) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.031 | 0.009 | | 0.014 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Number of Answers | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Add  PID  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.68  (0.35) | 0.27  (0.74) | -0.90  (0.46) | -0.68  (0.35) | | -0.60  (0.40) | |
| Rep Task | -0.09  (0.35) | 0.43  (0.74) | -0.15  (0.47) | -0.02  (0.35) | | -0.49  (0.39) | |
| Republican | 0.30  (0.44) |  |  |  | |  | |
| < 45 Years Old |  | -0.06  (0.57) |  |  | |  | |
| High Educ. |  |  | 1.00  (0.42) |  | |  | |
| High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.55  (0.43) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -0.88  (0.40) | |
| Rep Task x Rep | -0.18  (0.63) |  |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Rep | 0.53  (0.62) |  |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x < 45 |  | -0.67  (0.80) |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x < 45 |  | -0.93  (0.80) |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x High Educ. |  |  | -0.01  (0.59) |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x High Educ. |  |  | 0.67  (0.59) |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x High Exp. |  |  |  | -0.35  (0.61) | |  | |
| Dem Task x High Exp. |  |  |  | 0.57  (0.61) | |  | |
| Rep Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.72  (0.58) | |
| Dem Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.22  (0.58) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.025 | 0.009 | | 0.009 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Wage Requested | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Baseline Model  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Republican Task x Republican Dummy | -0.02  (0.21) | -0.02  (0.21) | 0.01  (0.21) | -0.03  (0.21) | | -0.04  (0.21) | |
| Democratic Task x Republican Dummy | 0.34  (0.21) | 0.26  (0.21) | 0.34  (0.21) | 0.30  (0.21) | | 0.32  (0.21) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Difference in Coefficients | -0.35  (0.21) | -0.28  (0.21) | -0.33  (0.21) | -0.33  (0.21) | | -0.35  (0.21) | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.008 | 0.017 | 0.014 | 0.028 | | 0.010 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Grade on Task | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Baseline Model  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Republican Task x Republican Dummy | -0.06  (0.44) | -0.03  (0.45) | 0.04  (0.43) | -0.07  (0.44) | | -0.15  (0.44) | |
| Democratic Task x Republican Dummy | 0.50  (0.43) | 0.47  (0.44) | 0.51  (0.42) | 0.45  (0.43) | | 0.40  (0.43) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Difference in Coefficients | -0.56  (0.44) | -0.50  (0.45) | -0.47  (0.43) | -0.53  (0.44) | | -0.54  (0.44) | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.004 | 0.010 | 0.053 | 0.018 | | 0.017 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Number of Answers | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Baseline Model  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Republican Task x Republican Dummy | -0.18  (0.63) | -0.19  (0.64) | -0.05  (0.62) | -0.19  (0.63) | | -0.26  (0.63) | |
| Democratic Task x Republican Dummy | 0.53  (0.62) | 0.43  (0.63) | 0.54  (0.61) | 0.46  (0.62) | | 0.42  (0.62) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Difference in Coefficients | -0.70  (0.63) | -0.62  (0.64) | -0.59  (0.62) | -0.64  (0.63) | | -0.67  (0.63) | |
| Observations | 1231 | 1231 | 1231 | 1231 | | 1231 | |
| R2 | 0.006 | 0.015 | 0.048 | 0.020 | | 0.012 | |

**Table A6B: Stability of Coefficients with Additional Covariate Interactions (Study 1)**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Each model represents the addition of both (1) the main effect of the listed covariate and (2) the interaction of the covariate with each of the task (Republican and Democratic) dummies. The three tables are for the three main dependent variables.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed)


**Full Set of Regressions to Produce Table A6B**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Wage Requested | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Baseline Model  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.31  (0.12) | -0.59  (0.23) | -0.07  (0.34) | 0.41  (0.27) | | -0.44  (0.21) | |
| Rep Task | 0.00  (0.12) | -0.03  (0.23) | -0.14  (0.24) | 0.18  (0.27) | | -0.10  (0.15) | |
| Republican | -0.14  (0.15) | -0.16  (0.15) | -0.15  (0.15) | -0.10  (0.15) | | -0.12  (0.15) | |
| Age |  | 0.08  (0.08) |  |  | |  | |
| Education |  |  | 0.09  (0.05) |  | |  | |
| Experience |  |  |  | 0.31  (0.08) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -0.24  (0.14) | |
| Rep Task x Rep | -0.02  (0.21) | -0.02  (0.21) | 0.01  (0.21) | -0.03  (0.21) | | -0.04  (0.21) | |
| Dem Task x Rep | 0.34  (0.21) | 0.26  (0.21) | 0.34  (0.21) | 0.30  (0.21) | | 0.32  (0.21) | |
| Rep Task x Age |  | 0.02  (0.12) |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Age |  | 0.18  (0.12) |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x Educ. |  |  | 0.03  (0.08) |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Educ. |  |  | -0.06  (0.08) |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x Exp. |  |  |  | -0.07  (0.11) | |  | |
| Dem Task x Exp. |  |  |  | -0.31  (0.11) | |  | |
| Rep Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.23  (0.19) | |
| Dem Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.29  (0.19) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Difference in Coefficients | -0.35  (0.21) | -0.28  (0.21) | -0.33  (0.21) | -0.33  (0.21) | | -0.35  (0.21) | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.008 | 0.017 | 0.014 | 0.028 | | 0.010 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Grade on Task | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Baseline Model  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.39  (0.24) | -0.41  (0.47) | -1.04  (0.69) | -1.03  (0.56) | | -0.65  (0.31) | |
| Rep Task | 0.03  (0.24) | 0.09  (0.49) | 0.17  (0.71) | 0.32  (0.56) | | -0.30  (0.30) | |
| Republican | 0.02  (0.31) | -0.07  (0.31) | -0.03  (0.30) | 0.05  (0.31) | | 0.11  (0.31) | |
| Age |  | 0.27  (0.17) |  |  | |  | |
| Education |  |  | 0.47  (0.11) |  | |  | |
| Experience |  |  |  | 0.27  (0.16) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -1.04  (0.29) | |
| Rep Task x Rep | -0.06  (0.44) | -0.03  (0.45) | 0.04  (0.43) | -0.07  (0.44) | | -0.15  (0.44) | |
| Dem Task x Rep | 0.50  (0.43) | 0.47  (0.44) | 0.51  (0.42) | 0.45  (0.43) | | 0.40  (0.43) | |
| Rep Task x Age |  | -0.04  (0.25) |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Age |  | 0.03  (0.24) |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x Educ. |  |  | -0.04  (0.16) |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Educ. |  |  | 0.17  (0.16) |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x Exp. |  |  |  | -0.12  (0.22) | |  | |
| Dem Task x Exp. |  |  |  | 0.30  (0.22) | |  | |
| Rep Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.75  (0.40) | |
| Dem Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.66  (0.40) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Difference in Coefficients | -0.56  (0.44) | -0.5  (0.45) | -0.47  (0.43) | -0.53  (0.44) | | -0.54  (0.44) | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.004 | 0.010 | 0.053 | 0.018 | | 0.017 | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |  | |  |
|  | Dependent Variable: Number of Answers | | | | | | |
|  |
|  | Baseline Model  (1) | Add  Age  (2) | Add Education  (3) | Add Experience  (4) | | Add  Gender  (5) | |
| Dem Task | -0.68  (0.35) | -0.92  (0.68) | -1.60  (0.99) | -1.47  (0.80) | | -0.75  (0.45) | |
| Rep Task | -0.09  (0.35) | -0.29  (0.70) | 0.09  (1.02) | 0.08  (0.80) | | -0.42  (0.43) | |
| Republication | 0.30  (0.44) | 0.18  (0.45) | 0.24  (0.43) | 0.34  (0.44) | | 0.38  (0.44) | |
| Age |  | 0.37  (0.25) |  |  | |  | |
| Education |  |  | 0.61  (0.16) |  | |  | |
| Experience |  |  |  | 0.40  (0.23) | |  | |
| Male |  |  |  |  | | -0.91  (0.41) | |
| Rep Task x Rep | -0.18  (0.63) | -0.18  (0.64) | -0.5  (0.62) | -0.19  (0.63) | | -0.26  (0.63) | |
| Dem Task x Rep | 0.53  (0.62) | 0.43  (0.63) | 0.54  (0.61) | 0.46  (0.62) | | 0.42  (0.62) | |
| Rep Task x Age |  | 0.11  (0.35) |  |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Age |  | 0.16  (0.35) |  |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x Educ. |  |  | -0.05  (0.23) |  | |  | |
| Dem Task x Educ. |  |  | 0.24  (0.23) |  | |  | |
| Rep Task x Exp. |  |  |  | -0.07  (0.32) | |  | |
| Dem Task x Exp. |  |  |  | 0.37  (0.32) | |  | |
| Rep Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.75  (0.58) | |
| Dem Task x Male |  |  |  |  | | 0.27  (0.58) | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| Difference in Coefficients | -0.70  (0.63) | -0.62  (0.64) | -0.59  (0.62) | -0.64  (0.63) | | -0.67  (0.63) | |
| Observations | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | 1,231 | | 1,231 | |
| R2 | 0.006 | 0.015 | 0.048 | 0.020 | | 0.012 | |

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Each model represents the addition of both (1) the main effect of the listed covariate and (2) the interaction of the covariate with each of the task (Republican and Democratic) dummies. The three tables are for the three main dependent variables.



**Figure A6A. Robustness of Results to Alternative Cutoff Choices (Study 1)**

Note: Figure plots point estimates of treatment effects (and associated 95% confidence intervals) for different truncations of the reservation wage dependent variable. “copart” refers to difference between co-partisan condition and control group. “counter” refers to difference between counter-partisan condition and control group. “diff” refers to difference between co-partisan condition and counter-partisan condition.

**Online Appendix 7: Pre-Analysis Plan & Deviations, Study 2**

The following is a plan describing the data collection procedures and primary experimental hypothesis for an experiment studying how partisanship affects the behavior of consumers. The procedures and hypotheses were written prior to the beginning of the experiment, which began on 4 October 2016.

**I. Procedures**

The experiment involves selling a $50 Amazon gift card for $25 to a group of potential customers for which we know their party identification. The participant pool comes from an email list obtained from the website Care2. Care2 hosts online petitions, and then captures and sells the email addresses of the signatories. The 1787 participants for this study signed a petition on climate change in July 2013 and responded to an initial survey invitation in February 2014. In the 2014 survey, these individuals were asked to report their party identification on a six-point scale: strong Democrat, not-strong Democrat, leans Democrat, leans Republican, not-strong Republican, strong Republican.

The individuals are emailed the following email message sent via the Qualtrics website:

|  |
| --- |
| [INSERT UNIVERSITY HEADER HERE] |

${e://Field/salutation},

You’re receiving this email because you signed a petition on the care2 website co-sponsored by NAME University researchers, and later filled out a survey for us. As part of our collaboration with volunteers [on/with] ${e://Field/condition}, we have a surplus of Amazon gift cards, and thought we’d offer you all the opportunity to purchase one of the extras. The cards have 50 dollars on them, and we are selling them for $25. If you’re interested, please follow the link below and let us know if you're interested in buying a card. We only have a limited number of cards, so please respond quickly if you're interested.  
   
To participate, please click on this link:  
   
${l://SurveyLink?d=Respond%20to%20offer%20here}  
  
If you’re concerned about the legitimacy of the offer, please contact the researchers at EMAILADDRESS, and we'll verify that the email link is safe.  
   
Sincerely,

NAME AND AFFILIATION

To opt-out of future emails from this survey,   
please ${l://OptOutLink?d=click%20here}

In the field ${e://Field/condition}, we will randomly assign individuals to be assigned to one of three conditions: {Republican campaigns; Democratic campaigns; a non-profit organization}. The “non-profit organization” condition will serve as the control group. Based on the party identification we have from the 2014 survey, we will categorize respondents as being in the co-partisan condition (e.g., Republicans assigned to receive the “Republican campaigns” treatment) or the counter-partisan condition (e.g., Republicans assigned to receive the “Democratic campaigns” treatment).

The main outcome variable will be whether the participant responds to the email invitation to purchase the gift card. We will randomly select 5 of the participants to receive the discounted gift card. Others will be told that the gift card has already been sold.

**II. Hypotheses and Models**

Our main regression specification will be:

*Pi* = *β0* + *β1Co-partisani* + *β2Counter-partisani* + *εi*

where *i* indexes respondents, *Pi* is a dummy representing whether the individual purchased the discounted gift card, *Copartisani* represents whether the individual was assigned to the co-partisan condition, *Counter-partisani* represents whether the individual was assigned to the counter-partisan condition, and *εI* is random error. The omitted category represented by the constant are individuals in the control condition. We will estimate the model via OLS (i.e., a linear probability model). As a robustness check, we will also estimate it via logistic regression.

Our principal hypotheses are that *β1* > 0 (i.e., in-group love) and that *β2* < 0 (i.e., out-group animus). Based upon the earlier experiments we have run, it is more likely that we will find evidence of in-group love than out-group animus. We will also statistically test the difference between the co-partisan and counter-partisan conditions.

**Deviations from the Pre-analysis Plan**

(1) We did not anticipate that some participants would respond to the email invitation but not complete the transaction (i.e., actually respond to the follow-up email to buy the card). Consequently, we analyze the data using both outcome variables: initial response and completed transaction.

(2) 79 emails did not send successfully. We dropped these observations.

(3) We also estimated the statistical model separately for strong partisans and not-strong partisans. We did not specify this test in advance.

**Online Appendix 8: Materials for Study 2**

Subjects in Study 2a all initially signed a climate change petition in July 2013. When they signed the petition, they provided their email addresses. They were then invited to complete a survey, in which they were asked to report their party affiliations. The subjects in Study 2a were the 1787 individuals who signed the original petition that completed the survey and for whom we have pre-treatment information on party identification.

All subjects were sent the following email, with the relevant university header at the top of the message. The experimental treatment is represented by the field: ${e://Field/condition}. Respondents were randomly assigned one of three values for this field: {Republican campaigns, Democratic campaigns, a non-profit organization }.

|  |
| --- |
| [INSERT UNIVERSITY HEADER HERE] |

${e://Field/salutation},

You’re receiving this email because you signed a petition on the care2 website co-sponsored by NAME University researchers, and later filled out a survey for us. As part of our collaboration with volunteers [on/with] ${e://Field/condition}, we have a surplus of Amazon gift cards, and thought we’d offer you all the opportunity to purchase one of the extras. The cards have 50 dollars on them, and we are selling them for $25. If you’re interested, please follow the link below and let us know if you're interested in buying a card. We only have a limited number of cards, so please respond quickly if you're interested.  
   
To participate, please click on this link:  
   
${l://SurveyLink?d=Respond%20to%20offer%20here}  
  
If you’re concerned about the legitimacy of the offer, please contact the researchers at EMAILADDRESS, and we'll verify that the email link is safe.  
   
Sincerely,

NAME AND AFFILIATION

To opt-out of future emails from this survey,   
please ${l://OptOutLink?d=click%20here}

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Online Appendix 9: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Tests (Study 2)** | | | | |
|  | Full Sample | Dem. Campaign | Rep. Campaign | Non-Profit Orgs. |
| Gender |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 39.5% | 39.9% | 40.6% | 38.2% |
| Female | 60.5 | 60.1 | 59.4 | 61.8 |
| χ2(2) = 0.73 (*p* = 0.69) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  |  |  |  |
| 18-30 | 3.7% | 3.9% | 3.8% | 3.6% |
| 31-45 | 8.7 | 7.3 | 8.6 | 10.2 |
| 46-55 | 13.6 | 17.1 | 14.3 | 9.6 |
| 56+ | 74.0 | 71.7 | 73.4 | 76.7 |
| χ2(6) = 14.97 (*p* = 0.02) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Race |  |  |  |  |
| Asian | 2.2% | 2.5% | 2.0% | 2.1% |
| Black | 1.9 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 2.1 |
| Hispanic | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 3.1 |
| White | 83.8 | 85.8 | 82.9 | 82.9 |
| Native American | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.9 |
| Other | 7.6 | 6.1 | 7.7 | 9.0 |
| χ2(10) = 8.94 (*p* = 0.54) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | 0.9% | 0.8% | 1.5% | 0.5% |
| High School | 6.3 | 6.3 | 7.2 | 5.4 |
| Trade School | 3.8 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 4.0 |
| Some College | 22.9 | 19.5 | 25.0 | 24.1 |
| College | 25.1 | 26.8 | 23.7 | 24.9 |
| Some Grad School | 9.4 | 10.4 | 8.5 | 9.2 |
| Graduate Degree | 31.7 | 31.9 | 31.2 | 32.0 |
| χ2(12) = 12.16 (*p* = 0.43) | |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Party Identification |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 95.0% | 93.4% | 95.6% | 95.9% |
| Republican | 5.0 | 6.6 | 4.4 | 4.2 |
| χ2(2) = 4.16 (*p* = 0.12) | |  |  |  |

Note: Sample sizes slightly differ from main analyses due to missing data on some demographics.

**Online Appendix 10: Logistic Regression Results and Results by Partisanship, Study 2**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Dependent variable: | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Responded | | Request to Purchase | Responded | | Request to Purchase | | Responded | | Request to Purchase |
|  | (1) | | (2) | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
| Co-partisan | 0.64 | | 0.59 | 1.01 | | 0.84 | | 0.19 | | 0.19 |
|  | (0.37) | | (0.41) | (0.53) | | (0.55) | | (0.54) | | (0.64) |
| Counter-partisan | 0.05 | | 0.14 | 0.09 | | 0.09 | | 0.01 | | 0.20 |
|  | (0.41) | | (0.44) | (0.64) | | (0.64) | | (0.54) | | (0.61) |
|  |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  |
| Constant | -3.86\*\* | | -4.05\*\* | -3.96\*\* | | -3.96\*\* | | -3.78\*\* | | -4.12\*\* |
|  | (0.29) | | (0.32) | (0.45) | | (0.45) | | (0.38) | | (0.45) |
| Co-partisan minus Counter-partisan | 0.59  (0.37) | | 0.45  (0.40) | 0.93  (0.53) | | 0.75  (0.55) | | 0.18  (0.54) | | -0.01  (0.61) |
|  |  |  | | |  |  |  | |  | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sample Type | Full | Full | | | Strong Partisans | Strong Partisans | Not Strong Partisans | | Not Strong Partisans | |
| Observations | 1657 | 1657 | | | 775 | 775 | 882 | | 882 | |
| AIC | 408.2 | 358.1 | | | 207.9 | 195.8 | 204.3 | | 165.9 | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |

**Table A10A: Robustness of Findings to Model Specification (Study 2)**

*Note*: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Dependent variable: | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Responded | | Request to Purchase | Responded | | Request to Purchase | | Responded | | Request to Purchase |
|  | (1) | | (2) | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
| Co-partisan | 0.019 | | 0.014 | 0.032\* | | 0.024 | | 0.005 | | 0.004 |
|  | (0.010) | | (0.009) | (0.015) | | (0.014) | | (0.013) | | (0.012) |
| Counter-partisan | 0.000 | | 0.001 | 0.002 | | 0.002 | | -0.002 | | 0.001 |
|  | (0.010) | | (0.009) | (0.015) | | (0.14) | | (0.013) | | (0.011) |
| Republican | -0.022 | | -0.018 | -0.019 | | -0.019 | | -0.024 | | -0.017 |
|  | (0.034) | | (0.031) | (0.170) | | (0.163) | | (0.033) | | (0.029) |
| Co-partisan x | -0.019 | | -0.014 | -0.032 | | -0.024 | | -0.005 | | -0.004 |
| Rep. | (0.047) | | (0.044) | (0.190) | | (0.182) | | (0.049) | | (0.043) |
| Counter-partisan | 0.029 | | 0.027 | -0.002 | | -0.002 | | 0.034 | | 0.030 |
| x Rep. | (0.044) | | (0.040) | (0.197) | | (0.188) | | (0.044) | | (0.038) |
|  |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  |
| Constant | 0.022\*\* | | 0.018\*\* | 0.019 | | 0.019 | | 0.024\* | | 0.017\* |
|  | (0.007) | | (0.006) | (0.010) | | (0.010) | | (0.009) | | (0.008) |
|  |  |  | | |  |  |  | |  | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sample Type | Full | Full | | | Strong Partisans | Strong Partisans | Not Strong Partisans | | Not Strong Partisans | |
| Observations | 1657 | 1657 | | | 775 | 775 | 882 | | 882 | |
| R2 | 0.004 | 0.002 | | | 0.008 | 0.005 | 0.002 | | 0.001 | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |

**Table A10B: Results by Partisanship (Study 2)**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Co-partisan” and “Counter-partisan” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

**Online Appendix 11: Replication and Extension of Study 2 on Consumer Behavior**

***Design* *and Procedures***

The experiment in Study 2 was administered to individuals that completed an earlier study on climate change. The advantage of this set up was that it provided us with a large sample of subjects on which we had prior information about their individual-level partisan leanings, and therefore were able to assess the effect of the treatments on different types of partisans. However the downside is that despite Study 2’s strong internal validity, its fairly unique population raises questions about its external validity.

The study described in this Online Appendix is therefore designed in a way that expands the external validity of the findings, yet does so at the cost of having to assess partisan bias in economic behavior at the aggregate level. We implemented the experiment on Craigslist, one of the largest online classified advertisement websites, over the course of one-and-a-half years.[[1]](#footnote-1) Visitors use the website to find news and information about ongoing events in their area, and, more importantly for our purposes, to buy and sell goods with their neighbors. The website currently operates in 413 geographic areas in the United States and is one of the most visited websites in the U.S. (Kidd 2011). As a leading venue for online transactions, it has been previously used by scholars to study economic exchange (Doleac and Stein 2013).

In each geographic market selected for our study, we posted an ad for an Amazon.com gift card similar to the one we sold in Study 2 (i.e., a $50 card offered for $25). Because of the wide variety of goods and services available on Amazon.com, we expect a diverse group of buyers to be interested in our posting. Gift cards are also often resold at discounts on Craigslist; while we offered a steep markdown on the sale price, significantly discounting gift cards is common practice on the website. Therefore, while our advertisement would look relatively attractive and therefore get more attention, it would not look out of place.

The headline of the ad, which was seen by potential purchasers when they visited the website, advertised “$50 Amazon Card for $25.” When users clicked on the headline, they saw the text of the ad (see the end of this Online Appendix for full study materials). As before, subjects were told that the cards were leftover thank-you gifts for volunteers at a fundraiser, and that we wanted to sell these extra cards at this discount to get rid of them. Our experimental manipulation was to again to subtly vary the partisanship of the fundraising event. In the control condition, subjects were simply told it was a fundraiser. In the two treatment conditions, they are told that it was a Democratic fundraiser (Democratic condition) or a Republican fundraiser (Republican condition). We included an email address in the ad, which also signaled partisanship: it was a name in the control condition (chrismcconnell5421), but it was “democratswin2016” or “republicanvictories” in the partisan conditions.[[2]](#footnote-2) The text of the ad, then, signaled to buyers the partisan identity of the seller. The question was whether this partisan signal would affect a potential buyer’s willingness to contact the seller about the card.

We ran the ad in 126 of the 413 markets maintained by Craigslist at the time of our study (15 September 2014 – 8 January 2016). We selected these markets via a stratified randomization process. We stratified markets into 9 strata based on terciles of the 2012 two-party vote share for Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election (mean: 51.8; s.d.: 12.0) and the thickness of the market (measured by its number of postings; mean: 185.7; s.d.: 210.3),[[3]](#footnote-3) and selected 14 markets from each stratum. This ensures that we have a range of areas in our study that vary in both partisanship and market thickness. Unlike in the previous two studies, in this study we do not have individual-level data on individuals' partisanship; our analytical strategy is therefore to assess whether the likelihood of selling a card is related jointly to the partisan message in the advertisement and the partisan lean of the market.[[4]](#footnote-4) Consequently, this study is best equipped to make inferences where the market is the unit of analysis⎯are there any frictions at the market level when partisan information is inserted into economic transactions?

Aside from the initial random selection into the sample, which occurred within strata, all further randomization (i.e., to experimental conditions) was done on the sample as a whole. That is, while we stratify to ensure a distribution of markets that spans the full support of population size and political affiliation, we did not additionally require strata to be equally represented in, for instance, different potential orderings of the experimental conditions.

In each selected market, we posted one of the advertisements (control, Democratic, or Republican) for two days, and recorded the number of offers we received to buy the gift card. On average, the ads received 1.77 responses (s.d. = 1.78).[[5]](#footnote-5) We left each ad up for two days because in a pre-test with markets not used in our study, we found that nearly all responses came within two days of posting. In each two-day period, we simultaneously posted ads in three different markets. Because the Craigslist website filters automatically remove identical ads posted in multiple markets, we had to very slightly vary the text of the ad to avoid the website filters; we account for these differences in our analyses below. For each response, we asked the customer to verify their locale to ensure that the response was not from outside the relevant geographic region. Each card in our inventory was offered to the first email we received, and if they were uninterested, we proceeded to the second email, and so forth until the card was sold. Subjects were emailed the code and we subsequently accepted payment via PayPal, which is typically used for these transactions when buyers and sellers cannot meet face-to-face.

In each market, we posted two of the three advertisements (we used random assignment to determine which two ads were posted in each market; see Tables A11A and A11B for descriptive statistics and balance tests).[[6]](#footnote-6) The order of the ads was random in that any of the three advertisements could have been posted first. To maximize statistical power, we focus our analysis below on a within-market analysis. That is, we calculate the difference in the number of offers between the two experimental conditions within each market. This allows us to control for differences between markets in terms of partisanship, market thickness, and so forth, and obtain the cleanest estimate of the effect of the treatment on sales. While between-subjects randomization ensures balance in expectation, our analytical approach guarantees that there are no differences between treatment and control observations with respect to fixed market/geographical characteristics.[[7]](#footnote-7) Finally, although the number of days between when each ad appeared in a given market varied due to the randomization, we ensured that each second posting in a market occurred at least three weeks after the first ad had appeared.

***Theoretical Predictions***

As with Study 2, our prediction is that individuals prefer to interact with co-partisan sellers and avoid counter-partisan ones. However, because we can only study market-level behavior here, evidence in this setting that partisanship spills over into economic domains would be that areas that are more Republican see more offers made when the seller is a Republican, relative to when the seller’s partisanship is not stated or when the seller is a Democrat (and likewise for Democratic sellers in Democratic areas).

***Statistical Model***

To identify the effect of the partisan signal on the number of responses received, we estimated Poisson[[8]](#footnote-8) and OLS regression models of the form:

*Rij* = *β0* + *β1Repij* + *β2Demij* + *β3*(*Repij*× *VSi*) + *β4*(*Demij*× *VSi*) + *ζi* + *εij* (2)

where *Rij* is the number of responses received in market *i* to advertisement *j*, *Repij* and *Demij* are indicators for whether the *j*th ad placed in market *i* are the Republican or Democratic ads (with the control ads as the omitted category), respectively, *VSi* represents Mitt Romney’s 2012 two-party vote share in market *i*, *ζi* is a fixed effect for market *i*, and *εij* is a stochastic error term.[[9]](#footnote-9) Here, our main hypothesis is that *β3*> 0 and *β4*< 0—the Republican ad should draw more responses in more Republican areas relative to the neutral ad. Similarly, the Democratic ad should draw more responses in more Democratic areas. Recall that each market produces two observations, so the inclusion of the fixed effects recovers the within-subjects estimate.

***Results***

We start by exploring our data graphically. Figure A11-1 displays the outcomes for each of the three possible within-market condition pairings: Republican ad vs. control ad, Democratic ad vs. control ad, and Republican ad vs. Democratic ad. Each point represents a market and the vertical axis measures the difference between the number of responses received between the two conditions. The three panels show the raw data, the regression line of response difference against Romney vote share, and a local linear regression line. Since the main effect of interest is an interaction between the treatment and a moderator, we incorporate the suggestion of Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2016) and include the loess smoother as a visual check on whether the interaction has approximately a constant effect over the support of the data. Although the data are a bit noisy, in each panel, the loess line remains close to the simple regression line, which suggests that a linear interaction is an appropriate model for estimating how response rates change with Romney vote share.

Examining these plots, we see little relationship between Romney vote share and response rates in either the Democrat/control and the Republican/Democrat markets. In the Republican/control markets, though, we see a clear upward trend: as markets have higher Romney vote shares, the difference in their response rates between the Republican and control advertisements is more positive. The regressions formalize this relationship, but the intuition is illustrated in the figures. More Republican (Democratic) markets seem to be responding more (less) often to a Republican seller than one who has not made his partisan attachments known. The intercept crosses at around 50 percent Romney vote share, suggesting that relative to the control group, the Republican ads perform worse in Democratic areas and better in Republican areas.

As shown in column (1) of Table A11-1, we find that *β3* is positive and statistically significant (*β*3 = .05, *p* = 0.05), indicating the Republican listing receives more responses in more Republican areas. Moreover, the estimated effect is substantial. Given that the median number of responses is 1.77, we predict that a 10 percent increase in the Romney vote share, which is a little less than a standard deviation, corresponds to approximately a 25 percent increase in the number of responses to the advertisement. Again, we emphasize that because this design relies on market-level variation in ideology, we cannot conclude with certainty that Republican buyers are rewarding posters who advertise their shared partisan affiliation. However, we can say that Republican sellers enjoy more success in markets where their 2012 presidential preference was broadly shared. In other words, partisanship affects markets where Republican sellers are operating. To make this effect concrete, imagine a hypothetical seller who included a signal of her Republican affiliation in her ad. We estimate that a Republican advertising in a market in which Romney received about 40 percent of the vote in 2012 (like Baltimore) would receive approximately one fewer response in the first two days of posting than if she were advertising in a market in which Romney received about 60 percent of the vote (such as Oklahoma City).

Interestingly, we do not find any effects for the Democratic ad when compared to the neutral baseline. Even in more Democratic areas, there is no difference from the control ad. Further, there is no significant difference in response rates across conditions within markets that received both the Republican and Democratic ads (although the estimated slope is negative per expectations). In our pre-analysis plan, we made no mention of a potential asymmetry, since we did not expect to find any.

As a robustness check, we estimate a Poisson model, which is presented in the second column of Table A11-1 (we also present several other count models in Table A13C, where we find very similar results). Since our left-hand side variable appears to follow a Poisson distribution, we estimate this alternative specification to make sure that our results are not being driven by the skew of the data. The results from the Poisson model are largely consistent with the results from the simple linear model. Finally, in our main analysis, there were two markets (New York City and Buffalo) that were excluded because we did not feel that they fairly represented the sample.[[10]](#footnote-10) In Table A11E, we show that our findings are robust to the inclusion of these observations.

Overall, looking across our two studies of consumer behavior (Studies 2 and this additional field experiment), we find that partisanship colors the willingness of buyers to engage with sellers. We have stronger individual-level evidence of this phenomenon in Study 2, and weaker ecological-level evidence in the market-level experiment, but they both support the same substantive conclusion.

**References**

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****

**Figure A11-1: Treatment Effects by Market Partisanship**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Number of Responses | Number of Responses |
|  | OLS | Poisson |
| Republican Ad | -2.48 | -1.27 |
|  | (1.25) | (0.69) |
|  |  |  |
| Democratic Ad | -0.87 | -0.40 |
|  | (1.13) | (0.64) |
|  |  |  |
| Republican Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.05\* | 0.03 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |
| Democratic Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.02 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | 4.76\*\* | 1.61\*\* |
|  | (1.03) | (0.37) |
|  |  |  |
| Difference between Republican and Democratic Ads | 0.025  (0.022) | 0.013  (0.012) |
| Includes market fixed effects? | Yes | Yes |
| N (observations) | 236 | 236 |
| N (markets) | 118 | 118 |
| R2 / Log Likelihood | .71 | -290.45 |

**Table A11-1: The Effect of Seller Partisanship on Consumer Behavior**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS or Poisson regression coefficients (as indicated) with associated standard errors in parentheses. “Republican Ad” and “Democratic Ad” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

**Pre-Analysis Plan & Deviations**

The following is a plan describing the data collection procedures and primary experimental hypotheses for an experiment that was conducted on the online marketplace Craigslist beginning in fall of 2014 and extending into the spring of 2015. This document was written prior to the beginning of the experiment, which began on September 15, 2014 at 9am PT.

**I. Procedures**

The experiment consists of placing an advertisement in 126 local Craigslist markets for a $50 Amazon.com gift card, which we sell for $25. Over the length of the experiment, which will last for 252 days, we advertise in each market 3 times, once for each of the three experimental conditions. In each market, we will list one ad during the first 84 days of the experiment, one during the second 84 days, and one during the third. By spacing the advertisements in this way, we hope to minimize the chance that visitors to the ad will recognize the language from our previous listings in the market. Each ad will be listed on the local Craigslist site for approximately 48 hours. We chose to list each ad for that length of time because a pre-test in two markets not included in our final sample (Cincinnati and Philadelphia) showed that nearly all responses came within 48 hours of the original posting.

It is not possible to ensure that the ads will be posted for exactly equal lengths of time due to the constraints of the website; the delay between when a user submits an ad and when Craigslist makes the ad public is not perfectly predictable. Rather, the time between when an ad is submitted and when it is removed will be 48 hours. For every two-day period during the experiment, we advertise in three markets concurrently. Because Craigslist does not allow users to post the same ad in multiple markets, each of the ads will be from a different experimental condition, which will help add variation between the multiple advertisements so as to avoid being flagged by the website. In addition, there will be very modest differences between the texts of ads run concurrently (see below) to further help us avoid being detected by the Craigslist filters (similar to the approach employed by Stein and Doleac 2013). In our analysis, we plan to track and control for all such changes in our results (though we have no ex ante reason to suspect that such minor wording changes will affect the results), and in each case, the text of the ad, aside from the language affected by the experimental manipulation, will be held constant for each market. Finally, it is also possible that Craigslist pulling down our ads might cause some unanticipated disruption in the execution of the experimental design.

Under these constraints, the advertisement schedule was randomized as much as possible. In particular, while we advertise in each market exactly once during each 82-day period, the exact two-day period during which we list the ad was randomly determined. Additionally, the order in which we apply each of the experimental conditions to a given market is random. Finally, the choice of the 126 markets we advertise in (out of 413 available Craigslist markets) was made via stratified randomization. From the set of all markets, we constructed 9 strata based on (1) the number of listings in the market and (2) the vote share for Mitt Romney during the 2012 presidential election. Then, we randomly selected 14 markets from each stratum to include in our experiment.

The primary experimental manipulation is the text of the ad. Each advertisement contained the subject:

**$50 Amazon card for $25!!**

While the body of the advertisement reads:

**For sale: $50 Amazon gift card for $25. I bought some as thank-you(s) (gifts/presents) for (volunteers/helpers/assistants) at a** *[Democratic fundraiser/Republican fundraiser/fundraiser]* **I (organized/put on/directed) and have leftovers I need to sell. (email/contact/reach) me through CL or at** *[godemocrats2016/gorepublicans2016/johnlawrence541]* **AT gmail.**

The bolded text outside of the parentheses represents the part of the ad that will be present in each advertisement, while the bolded text within parentheses will differ between ads posted concurrently (in order to avoid website spam filters as explained above). The italicized words in brackets are those we will vary between our experimental conditions. In the first condition, which we call the **Democratic signal**, the advertisement will use the words “Democratic fundraiser” in the first italicized location and “godemocrats2016” in the second. Similarly, the **Republican signal** will use the words “Republican fundraiser” in the first location and “gorepublicans2016” in the second. Finally, the **control signal** will use the words “fundraiser” and “johnlawrence541.”

After placing an ad in a market, we will record the total number of responses we receive and the number of respondents who make a counteroffer. In order to ensure that responses are both authentic and made by people living in the location associated with the Craigslist market (e.g. that respondents to an ad listed on the San Antonio Craigslist in fact live near San Antonio), we will reply to each response with the following email:

Thanks for your reply! Are you from the [market name] area? Where do you live?

Because transactions through Craigslist typically involve face-to-face meetings, it would not be considered uncommon or invasive to ask such a question. If a respondent replies and indicates that he/she is from the proper location, he/she will be counted as replying to our ad. We will eventually sell one gift card for each of the two-day periods in our experiment, i.e. one gift card for each group of three advertisements (up to the limits of our research project budget). In each instance, we will offer the card to the first authentic respondent, and if they later decide not to go through with the purchase, we will contact other respondents, with priority given to earlier responses, until we eventually complete a purchase or until we have exhausted the list of respondents.

The remaining data will come from two sources. We recorded a preliminary count for the number of listings in each market on June 23, 2014 to use during the stratified randomization and will take another count each time we post an ad in a market. The data on Mitt Romney’s vote share during the 2012 presidential election comes from the county-level reporting of election results. Craigslist markets and counties do not perfectly overlap. When a market is within a county, the entire vote share for the county is used as a proxy for the partisan leaning of the market. When a market spreads across multiple counties, we use the average Romney vote share across the counties as a proxy for partisan leaning.

**II. Hypotheses and Models**

**i. Across-market Hypotheses**

We define the following explanatory variables:

* : The percentage vote share for Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election in market *i*.
* : A dummy variable indicating whether advertisement *i* contained the Republican signal.
* : A dummy variable indicating whether advertisement *i* contained the Democratic signal.
* : A count variable indicating the number of listings in a market at the time that advertisement *i* was posted.
* : A dummy variable indicating whether advertisement *i* was listed in market *j*.
* : A dummy variable indicating whether advertisement *i* was listed during the two-day period {(Sunday, Monday), (Monday, Tuesday), … (Saturday, Sunday)}. (For compactness in notation below, we let *k* =1 signify (Sunday, Monday) and *k* =7 signify (Saturday, Sunday), with the other day-pairs defined accordingly).

We also define the following dependent variables:

* : A count variable indicating the number of responses to advertisement *i.*
* : A count variable indicating the number of counter-offers to advertisement *i.*

First, we consider whether there are differences in the response/counter-offer counts between the three conditions across markets. With these variables, we test the following models:

We will also include variables when appropriate to account for potential seasonal variation over the course of the experiment. Since both dependent variables are counts, these are Poisson models, possibly with a correction for zero-inflation. We will also estimate via OLS.

Our experimental hypotheses are:

* In the first model, > 0; as the Romney vote share in a market increases, the number of responses to an ad with the Republican signal increases.
* In the first model, < 0: as the Romney vote share in a market increases, the number of responses to an ad with the Democratic signal decreases.
* In the second model, < 0; as the Romney vote share in a market increases, the number of counter-offers to an ad with the Republican signal decreases.
* In the second model, > 0; as the Romney vote share in a market increases, the number of counter-offers to an ad with the Democratic signal increases.

**ii. Within-market Hypotheses**

Next, we test differences in the response/counter-offer counts between the three conditions within a market. To do this, we define the following variables:

* : The number of responses to an ad containing signal {*Republican, Democratic, Control}*
* : The number of counter-offers to an ad containing signal {*Republican, Democratic, Control}*

With these, we define two dependent variables:

* : The difference between the number of responses to the Republican ad and the Democratic ad when listed in market *i,* i.e.
* : The difference between the number of counter-offers to the Republican ad and the Democratic ad when listed in market *i,* i.e.

We test the models:

We will also consider using in the first model and in the second, respectively, as alternatives to as measures of the level of activity in a market. Because our dependent variables can take on negative values, we test these models using OLS with robust standard errors.

For these tests, our hypotheses are:

* will be increasing in Romney vote share. That is, in markets where voters predominantly chose Romney, people will be more likely to respond to the ad with the Republican signal (relative to the ad with the Democratic signal).
* will be decreasing in Romney vote share. That is, in markets where voters predominantly chose Romney, people will be less likely to make a counter-offer to the ad with the Republican signal (relative to the ad with the Democratic signal).

We also consider models in which we replace , with their respective absolute values and , and replace with |, i.e. the absolute difference from a 50% vote share for Mitt Romney. In these models, our hypotheses are:

* is increasing in |. That is, markets in which the vote went predominantly to a particular candidate, either Barack Obama or Mitt Romney, will see larger differences in the number of responses between the partisan conditions than markets in which the vote was more evenly split between the candidates.
* is increasing in |. That is, markets in which the vote went predominantly to a particular candidate, either Barack Obama or Mitt Romney, will see larger differences in the number of counter-offers between the partisan conditions than markets in which the vote was more evenly split between the candidates.

**Deviations from the Pre-analysis Plan**

1. The study took longer than 252 days due to the Craigslist spam monitoring system (which rejected our ads). The corresponding statements about timeliness (i.e., that we would post in all markets for the first time within the first 84 days of the experiment) also do not apply.
2. Rather than advertise three times in each market, we were only able to advertise twice due to time constraints placed on us by Craigslist’s spam monitoring system. The two conditions in each market were determined according to the initial randomization procedure described above.
3. All ads were placed in markets for approximately 48 hours. Due to posting constraints in the Craiglist software, there are some very minor (less than 30 minute) differences in ad duration across postings.
4. Not all ads posted concurrently were the same. In particular, each of the ads posted in a given 2-day period was one of three ad types, randomly assigned at the beginning of the posting period. See “Materials” section below for the text of these ads.
5. The emails used for the three accounts were changed to avoid spam detection, which would have caught the similarity between the Republican and Democratic emails. The replacement emails were democratswin2016@gmail.com, republicanvictories@gmail.com, and chrismcconnell5421@gmail.com.
6. Due to the very small number of counterproposals to our posts, we did not test the hypotheses that evaluate differences in counterproposal rates.
7. The title of the posting did not include exclamation points
8. The time between ads in each market varied between 4 weeks and 65.6 weeks, with the average time being 34.2 weeks.
9. There was variable spacing between postings (i.e., the gap between one set of three ads and the next); that is, one set of three ads did not necessarily go up the same day the previous set were taken down, again due to flagging from the spam filter.

(10) The procedure used to count email responses deviated from the one described in the pre-

analysis plan. The primary difference is that in deciding which emails to include, we did not require that individuals affirmatively respond that they lived in the local market. This was done to minimize the nuisance to respondents, and because this sort of communication behavior we later learned was atypical and abnormal on Craigslist. We did use responses to filter out individuals who were from far outside of the local market. In addition, there was some ambiguity about whether respondents from close to the local market, but possibly not within the defined boundaries, should be included. The current data reflect a relatively “lax” standard, where most respondents near to the market were included. In general, inability to identify buyer locations/identities is a source of measurement error, along with potential errors from hand coding. We performed a second tally of the data applying a stricter standard of inclusion based on buyer location, as a guard against potential data errors. The resulting data differs from the data analyzed in the Online Appendix in 35 market-ad instances (14.5% of observations), and the results obtained are essentially identical. In particular, the main significant effect (the Romney Vote Share x Republican ad coefficient) remains substantively unchanged (in the linear model we estimate it to be 0.045) and is significant at the 5% level, while the difference between the Republican and Democratic ads grows to 0.034. The data produced by the alternative coding scheme are available from the authors by request.

**Materials:**

**Part 1: Text of Craigslist Ads**

**Republican email:** republicanvictories@gmail.com

**Democratic email**: democratswin2016@gmail.com

**Neutral email**: chrismcconnell5421@gmail.com

**Title**: $50 Amazon card for $25

**AD TYPE 1:**

$50 Amazon gift card for $25. I purchased some as thank-you’s for volunteers at a [CONDITION] fundraiser I organized and have some left over I want to sell. If interested, email me through CL or at my gmail address, [CONDITION].

**AD TYPE 2:**

Selling $50 Amazon gift card for $25. I bought some as thank-you gifts for helpers at a [CONDITION] fundraiser I put on and have leftovers I need to sell. contact me through CL or at my gmail address, [CONDITION].

**AD TYPE 3:**

For sale: $50 Amazon gift card for $25. I got some as thank-you presents for assistants at a [CONDITION] fundraiser I directed and have some extra I’m trying to sell. reach me through CL or at my gmail address, [CONDITION].

**In the above ads, if CONDITION = Neutral, the first instance of CONDITION was left blank and the second was filled with the neutral email. If CONDITION = Republican, the first instance of condition was filled with “Republican” and the second was filled with the Republican email. If CONDITION = Democrat, the first instance of condition was filled with “Democratic” and the second was filled with the Democratic email.**

**For individuals we offered the card to, we sent the reply:**

Thanks for your reply! Where are you located?

I do have a card I can sell you, but unfortunately, I’m out of town right now. Would you be willing to pay through Paypal? I’m happy to send you the card number first, and you can pay after you confirm the number.

**For individuals we did not offer the card to, we sent the reply:**

Thanks for your reply! Where are you located?

Unfortunately, I’ve received offers for all the cards I have right now, but if someone takes back their offer and I’m able to sell you one, I’ll let you know.

**All posts were made at approximately 9am PST and removed 48 hours later.**

**Table A11A: Balance on Previously Recorded Listings**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | *Comparison Group* | | |
|  | **Mean** | Neutral and Republican | Neutral and Democratic | Democratic and Republican |
| Neutral and  Republican | 3876.5 | - | 0.47 (*p* = 0.643) | 1.54 (*p* = 0.125) |
| Neutral and Democratic | 3368.8 | -0.47 (*p* = 0.643) | - | 0.38 (*p* = 0.704) |
| Democratic and Republican | 2985.9 | -1.54 (*p* = 0.125) | -0.38 (*p* = 0.704) | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| The *F*-statistic for common group means is 0.44 (*p* = 0.64). | | | | |

**Table A11B: Balance on Romney Vote Share**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | *Comparison Group* | | |
|  | **Mean** | Neutral and Republican | Neutral and Democratic | Democratic and Republican |
| Neutral and  Republican | 52.4 | - | -0.67 (*p* = 0.51) | 1.74 (*p* = 0.08) |
| Neutral and Democratic | 53.7 | 0.67 (*p* = 0.51) | - | 2.31 (*p* = 0.02) |
| Democratic and Republican | 49.2 | -1.74 (*p* = 0.08) | -2.31 (*p* = 0.02) | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| The *F*-statistic for common group means is 3.0 (*p* = 0.05). | | | | |

**Table A11A and A11B: Balance of Experimental Conditions on Pretreatment Market-Level Covariates**

*Note*: Cell entries are pairwise *t*-tests between the row condition and the column (comparison) condition. The raw statistic is presented adjacent to the associated *p-*value in parentheses. Membership to each condition means that a market was treated with one ad of each type. For example, an ad in the “Neutral and Republican” condition received one neutral ad and one Republican ad. Raw counts for the numbers in each condition are as follows: Neutral and Republican (36 markets), Neutral and Democratic (41 markets), and Democratic and Republican (41 markets).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent variable: | | |
|  |
|  | Responses  [Poisson Model] | Responses  [Zero-Inflated Poisson Model] | Responses  [Negative Binomial Model] |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Republican Ad | -1.27 | -1.19 | -1.27 |
|  | (0.70) | (0.70) | (0.69) |
| Democratic Ad | -0.40 | -0.22 | -0.40 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.65) | (0.64) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Republican Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.03  (0.01) | 0.02  (0.01) | 0.03  (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Democratic Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.01  (0.01) | 0.01  (0.01) | 0.01  (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Republican minus Democratic | 0.01  (0.01) | 0.01  (0.01) | 0.01  (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Market Fixed Effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of Markets | 118 | 118 | 118 |
| Observations | 236 | 236 | 236 |

**Table A11C: Robustness of Results to Alternative Count Model**

*Note*: Cell entries are regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. For the zero-inflated model, the zero inflation is modeled using the number of listings on the day of the posting. For negative binominal model, numerical fitting is difficult due to small sample size and the large number of parameters, so estimates should be interpreted with caution.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent variable: | | |
|  |
|  | Responses | Responses | Responses |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Republican Ad | -2.48 | -2.09 | -2.24 |
|  | (1.25) | (1.19) | (1.25) |
| Democratic Ad | -0.87 | -0.50 | -0.95 |
|  | (1.13) | (1.08) | (1.13) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Republican Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.05\*  (0.02) | 0.04  (0.02) | 0.04  (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Democratic Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Republican minus Democratic | 0.03  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Market Fixed Effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Listings Variable? | No | Yes | No |
| DOY Effects? | No | No | Yes |
| Number of Markets | 118 | 118 | 118 |
| Observations | 236 | 236 | 236 |
| R2 | 0.707 | 0.739 | 0.735 |

**Table A11D: Robustness of Results to Inclusion of DOY Effects/Listings Variable**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent variable: | | |
|  |
|  | Responses  Buffalo Added | Responses  New York Added | Responses  Both Added |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Republican Ad | -2.24 | -2.12 | -1.94 |
|  | (1.24) | (1.12) | (1.11) |
| Democratic Ad | -0.74 | -0.68 | -0.58 |
|  | (1.13) | (1.09) | (1.10) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Republican Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.04  (0.02) | 0.04  (0.02) | 0.04  (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Democratic Ad x Romney Vote Share | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Republican minus Democratic | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.02  (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Market Fixed Effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of Markets | 119 | 119 | 120 |
| Observations | 238 | 238 | 240 |
| R2 | 0.717 | 0.707 | 0.717 |

**Table A11E: Robustness of Results to Inclusion of Buffalo/NYC**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

**Online Appendix 12: Pre-Analysis Plan, Study 3 (Original TESS Proposal)**

Few topics in public opinion research have attracted as much attention in recent years as partisan polarization in the American mass public (for a thorough review, see Fiorina and Abrams 2008).[[11]](#footnote-11) Much of this debate has centered on whether the American public is deeply divided over policy issues and whether this division has increased over time (Fiorina et al. 2005; Abramowitz 2010). Recently, scholars have suggested that partisan polarization extends beyond issue positions and political attitudes and shapes social interactions. Iyengar et al. (2012, 407) define “affective polarization” as people “dislik[ing] the opposing party” and “imput[ing] negative traits to the rank-and-file of the out party.” In other words, affective polarization reflects a personal dislike of the other side distinct from disagreement over policy (see also Mason 2015). Manifestations of affective polarization include not wanting to be friends with members of the opposing party, not wanting your children to marry them, exhibiting implicit prejudice against them, and even taste-based discrimination (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).

This proposal, part of a larger research agenda, builds on the literature on affective polarization in two main ways. First, while much of the extant literature has focused on how partisan identity leads to social and political conflict, we ask whether political polarization can affect *economic* behavior. When engaging in an economic transaction, does partisanship distort people’s desire to achieve material gains? If so, what type of ideological disagreements⎯social/cultural or economic⎯are associated with the strongest manifestations of such partisan bias? Second, much of the existing literature on both issue-based and affective polarization has primarily relied on survey measures and not behavioral outcomes. Our intention is to use behavioral measures to further distinguish mere partisan cheerleading from more committed partisan biases. We plan on piggybacking this design onto apolitical surveys that are already being conducted, asking three short questions before the study and one short question at the end of the study.

***Design***

Our design is based on a simple theoretical model, which we present in Appendix 2 in the interest of space. The model provides a framework for answering our key question: will respondents leave money on the table if it means enriching the other party? The model gives rise to the design described below, and also provides the appropriate statistical model for analyzing the data.

At the beginning of the survey, we will ask about the respondent’s party identification using the standard question wording employed by GfK, based on the partisanship item from the American National Election Study (all question wordings can be found in Appendix 1).[[12]](#footnote-12) We will then ask two questions ascertaining respondents’ positions on fiscal and social issues, respectively. After answering these three questions, respondents fill out the remainder of the shared questionnaire before answering the fourth and final question.

Our final question, which is placed at the end of the questionnaire, constitutes the randomized treatment. We will tell respondents: “As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.” One option is a simple payment of $3, which we refer to as a non-partisan offer. The second option, which we call the partisan offer, is a payment plus a donation to the campaign fund of the respondent’s opposing party. We use the party identification question asked earlier in the survey to determine the opposing party. We randomly manipulate the structure of the partisan offer as shown in the table below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Non-Partisan Offer | Partisan Offer |
| Condition 1 | $3 | $7 + $4 donation to opposing party’s campaign fund |
| Condition 2 | $3 | $7 + $10 donation to opposing party’s campaign fund |
| Condition 3 | $3 | $10 + $4 donation to opposing party’s campaign fund |

Note that in all three conditions, the respondent faces a choice between receiving a low payment without giving something to the other party (non-partisan offer), or more money but facilitating a contribution to the opposing party (partisan offer). This choice reveals the level of dislike for the other party; respondents face a tradeoff between leaving money on the table and assisting the opposing party. Condition 1 is the baseline condition where we see if people are willing to give up a 133% excess return to avoid the opposing party receiving benefits (a $4 donation to the opposing party’s campaign fund). In Condition 2, we again offer the same bonus (an extra $4) but increase donations to the opposing party’s campaign funds to $10. Comparing Conditions 1 to 2 allows us to estimate an elasticity of partisan bias. In Condition 3, we offer a higher excess return (233%) and keep the donation at $4. This again allows us to estimate an elasticity by increasing the personal cost of exhibiting partisan bias.

One potential concern with our design is that the relatively low stakes of our experiment limit its external validity. Existing research, however, suggests this should not be a problem: subjects’ behavior is repeatedly shown to be largely invariant to the stakes of the game until they become extremely large, representing a sizable fraction of monthly/yearly income (Anderson et al. 2001; Cameron 1999; Slonim and Roth 1998). Further, related work shows that even small monetary incentives will change partisans’ expressed degree of partisan bias (Bullock et al. 2015). These findings provide confidence that any effects we find here represent meaningful behavior and are not simply an artifact of the task involving low economic stakes.

***Hypotheses of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects***

Part of our focus here concerns the moderators of these effects. If indeed we find evidence of partisan bias that affects economic behavior, it is *ex ante* unclear which types of individuals would be more prone to exhibit such behavior. At a minimum, we would like to test the empirical support for three non-mutually exclusive hypotheses.

We can use the information we obtain from the survey items about respondents’ positions on social and economic issues to test the following conjecture:

*H1*. Individuals with extreme attitudes on social issues will more frequently eschew economic gains to express partisan goals (compared to those with extreme attitudes on economic issues) because social issues are more strongly associated with affective polarization. They will also be less supportive of the partisan offer in Condition 2 and less sensitive to the increased payment in Condition 3.

Although some literature points to the prominent effect of social issues, other research leads us to be more agnostic about the relative impact of social versus economic attitudes on individuals’ economic behavior. Richardson (1991), for example, finds that party systems that reflect long-standing cultural, religious, and social cleavages generate more intense conflict across party lines. Huber and Malhotra (2017) find that social sorting is strongest with respect to positions on social issues. Conversely, other scholars find that attitudes on the economic dimension more strongly predict inter-party animus (Bartels 2009; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Notably, none of these studies compared the impact of economic and socio-cultural differences as predictors of economic behavior. This question is therefore worthy of rigorous examination.

We also test two hypotheses from the existing literature in our more novel economic domain.

*H2*. Individuals who possess a stronger partisan identification will exhibit a stronger preference for the non-partisan offer (to avoid the discomfort of aiding the opposing party). They will also be less supportive of the partisan offer in Condition 2 and less sensitive to the increased payment in Condition 3.

The intuition underlying H2 is that as partisan strength increases, an individual more strongly identifies with his/her party. We are agnostic as to whether this reflects a tighter psychological bond, stronger issue agreement with the party, or some other factor. Our argument, building on prior work in the literature (Bartels 2002; Iyengar and Westwood 2015), is simply that those who identify more strongly with a party should display more marked partisan bias.

*H3*. Individuals who are better sorted ideologically (i.e., liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans) will exhibit a stronger preference for the non-partisan offer in all conditions. They will also be more sensitive to increased donation to the opposite party in Condition 2 and less sensitive to the increased payment in Condition 3.

H3 draws on research that highlights the underlying role of sorting in forging a stronger bond with one’s party. Research on polarization consistently shows that sorted partisans display stronger attachment to their party, and greater antipathy for the opposition (Levendusky 2009; Mason 2015), so we would expect to see them display stronger affinity for the non-partisan offer here. To be clear, H2 and H3 have been tested using survey self-reports in the existing literature; our contribution is to test them with a genuine behavioral outcome.

***Sample Justification***

This study requires a representative probability sample because we are seeking to make claims about how partisan polarization affects economic activity among Americans broadly speaking. Individuals participating in studies obtained through convenience samples are often more politically interested and also more politically extreme and partisan (Malhotra and Krosnick 2007; Yeager et al. 2011). Consequently, respondents from such samples are more likely to select the non-partisan offer (i.e., the no donation option) in light of their stronger partisan identification. Therefore, non-representativeness would bias our estimates.

We request 1000 subjects given than we are at four units of survey time. On average, the experiment costs a maximum of $8 per respondent in payments (the average cost of the partisan offer assuming equal numbers assigned to the experimental conditions). This means that the maximum total cost of respondent compensation is $8,000 if every respondent selects the partisan offer.[[13]](#footnote-13) We will use private research funds to fund the donations, so that there is no deception and actual funds are being distributed to the parties. We also have available an additional $5,000 in private research funds to increase the number of respondents or the stakes if the reviewers and co-PIs believe it is appropriate.

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**Appendix Part 1 (for Online Appendix 12): Questionnaire**

Q1. Generally speaking, I think of myself as a:

1. Democrat
2. Republican
3. Independent

**[IF Q1=1]**

Q1A. Would you call yourself a strong Democrat, or a not very strong Democrat?

1. Strong Democrat
2. Not very strong Democrat

**[IF Q1=2]**

Q1B. Would you call yourself a strong Republican, or a not very strong Republican?

1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican

**[IF Q1=3 OR Q1 REFUSED]**

Q1C. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

1. Closer to the Democratic Party
2. Closer to the Republican Party

Q2. Which of the following two statements is closer to your view of the role of religion in government?

There should be a strict separation between church and state

A nation’s policies should reflect the religious beliefs of the majority

1. Strongly agree that “There should be a strict separation between church and state.”

2. Somewhat agree that “There should be a strict separation between church and state.”

3. Not sure

4. Somewhat agree that “A nation’s policies should reflect the religious beliefs of the majority”

5. Strongly agree that “A nation’s policies should reflect the religious beliefs of the majority”

Q3. What do you think is the best way for the government to balance the budget?

Cut services and keep taxes at the same level

Raises taxes and keep services at the same level

1. Strongly agree that the best way is to “Cut services and keep taxes at the same level”

2. Somewhat agree that the best way is to “Cut services and keep taxes at the same level”

3. Not sure

4. Somewhat agree that the best way is to “Raises taxes and keep services at the same level”

5. Strongly agree that the best way is to “Raises taxes and keep services at the same level”

[INSERT APOLITICAL SURVEY HERE, THEN INSERT Q4]

[Randomly assign respondents to Q4A, Q4B, or Q4C.]

[In all versions of Q4, $PARTY is the opposing party. So if Q1 = 1 or Q1c = 1, $PARTY = Democratic/Democrats. If Q1 = 2 or Q1c = 2, $PARTY = Republican/Republicans]

Q4A. As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.

Option A: A $3 payment as a thank you

Option B: A $7 payment as a thank you, and the researchers will make a separate $4 donation to the $PARTY National Committee, an organization that helps $PARTY get elected to office.

Which of these two options would you prefer?

1. Option A
2. Option B

Q4B. As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.

Option A: A $3 payment as a thank you

Option B: A $7 payment as a thank you, and the researchers will make a separate $10 donation to the $PARTY National Committee, an organization that helps $PARTY get elected to office.

Which of these two options would you prefer?

1. Option A
2. Option B

Q4C. As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.

Option A: A $3 payment as a thank you

Option B: A $10 payment as a thank you, and the researchers will make a separate $4 donation to the $PARTY National Committee, an organization that helps $PARTY get elected to office.

Which of these two options would you prefer?

1. Option A
2. Option B

**Appendix Part 2 (for Online Appendix 12): Theoretical and Statistical Models Based on Experimental Design**

Based on the experimental design, we construct the following theoretical model of the respondent’s choice. Respondents will select the non-partisan offer (A) over the partisan offer (B) if they get higher utility from the non-partisan offer, or if:

*U*(*A*) – *U*(*B*) > 0 (a)

Let *λ* represent the payment from the non-partisan offer, *μ* represent the premium given to the respondent for selecting the partisan offer, *d* represent the donation given to the opposing party, and *I* be a “partisan intensity” parameter, representing strength of dislike for opposing partisans. Consequently, *U*(*A*) = *λ*, and *U*(*B*) = *λ* + *μ* − *dI*. We can rewrite equation (a) as:

*λ* − (*λ* + *μ* − *dI*) > 0 (b)

Rewriting equation (b), the respondent will select the non-partisan offer if *dI* > *μ*, or if the negative utility from the donation exceeds the premium from the additional money. The likelihood of accepting the non-partisan offer increases as: (1) the donation to the opposing party increases; (2) the respondent’s dislike of the opposing party increases; and (3) the premium for selecting the partisan offer decreases. The experimental design manipulates (1) via Condition 2 and (3) via Condition 3. We can learn about (2) by seeing how sensitive the choices are to changes in the stakes (i.e., the elasticities).

The experimental design and theoretical model imply a simple statistical model that recovers the elasticities. A general statistical model (that can be estimated by logit, for example) for respondent choice is: *Yi* = *α* + *β1di* + *β2μi* + *εi*.Here, *Yi* indicates whether the respondent accepted the partisan offer. When comparing Condition 1 to Condition 2, *β2μi* drops out since there is no variation in *μi*. When comparing Condition 1 to Condition 3, *β1di* drops out since there is no variation in *di*. We expect *β1* < 0 and *β2* > 0. Although this particular specification implies linear relationships, *di* and *μi* can be represented by dummy variables as well.

**Online Appendix 13: Questionnaire, Study 3**

Q1. Generally speaking, I think of myself as a:

1. Democrat
2. Republican
3. Independent

**[IF Q1=1]**

Q1A. Would you call yourself a strong Democrat, or a not very strong Democrat?

1. Strong Democrat
2. Not very strong Democrat

**[IF Q1=2]**

Q1B. Would you call yourself a strong Republican, or a not very strong Republican?

1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican

**[IF Q1=3 OR Q1 REFUSED]**

Q1C. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

1. Closer to the Democratic Party
2. Closer to the Republican Party

Q2. What are your religious beliefs? Please select the choice that you feel best represents your religious affiliation.

1. Protestant Christian
2. Catholic
3. Muslim
4. Jewish
5. Hindu
6. Buddhist
7. Atheist
8. Agnostic
9. Other

Q3. Do you live to the east or to the west of the Mississippi River?

1. East of the Mississippi River
2. West of the Mississippi River

Q4. Please consider the following statement:

“This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.”

Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Agree strongly

Agree somewhat

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree somewhat

Disagree strongly

Q5. Please consider the following statement:

“The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.”

Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Agree strongly

Agree somewhat

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree somewhat

Disagree strongly

Q6. Think back to the last time you saw a movie in a theater. What was the name of the movie?

[TEXT BOX]

Q7. Think about where you would like to take your next vacation. Where would you like to go?

[TEXT BOX]

[Randomly assign respondents to Q8A, Q8B, Q8C, Q8D]

[In versions Q8A and QD of Q8, $PARTY is the opposing party. So if Q1 = 1 or Q1c = 1, $PARTY = Democratic/Democrats. If Q1 = 2 or Q1c = 2, $PARTY = Republican/Republicans]

[In version Q8B of Q8, $RELIGION is the opposing religious affiliation. So if Q2 = 1, 2, or 9 is hand coded as Christian, $RELIGION = American Atheists (AA)/atheists. If Q2 = 7 or 8, or 9 is hand coded as atheist/agnostic $RELIGION = Christian Legal Society (CLS)/Christians]

[In version Q8C of Q8, $REGION is the opposing regional location. So if Q3 = 1, $REGION = Association of Western States (AWS)/west. If Q3 = 2, $REGION = Association of Eastern States (AES)/east]

Q8A. As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.

Option A: A $3.00 payment as a thank you.

Option B: A $6.00 payment as a thank you, and the researchers will make a separate $4.00 donation to the $PARTY National Committee, an organization that helps $PARTY get elected to office.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Payment to You | Payment to [RNC/DNC] |
| Option A | $3.00 | None |
| Option B | $6.00 | $4.00 |

Which of these two options would you prefer?

1. Option A

2. Option B

Q8B. As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.

Option A: A $3.00 payment as a thank you.

Option B: A $9.00 payment as a thank you, and the researchers will make a separate $4.00 donation to the $PARTY National Committee, an organization that helps $PARTY get elected to office.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Payment to You | Payment to [RNC/DNC] |
| Option A | $3.00 | None |
| Option B | $9.00 | $4.00 |

Which of these two options would you prefer?

1. Option A

2. Option B

Q8C. As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.

Option A: A $3.00 payment as a thank you.

Option B: A $3.00 payment as a thank you, and the researchers will make a separate $4.00 donation to $RELIGION, an organization that promotes the interests of $RELIGION in the United States.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Payment to You | Payment to [AA/CLS] |
| Option A | $3.00 | None |
| Option B | $6.00 | $4.00 |

Which of these two options would you prefer?

1. Option A

2. Option B

Q8D. As an additional thank you for filling out this questionnaire, we would like to give you a bonus cash payment. You can choose one of the two options below.

Option A: A $3.00 payment as a thank you.

Option B: A $6.00 payment as a thank you, and the researchers will make a separate $4.00 donation to the $REGION, a group that promotes projects in the states $REGION of the Mississippi River.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Payment to You | Payment to [WES/AES] |
| Option A | $3.00 | None |
| Option B | $6.00 | $4.00 |

Which of these two options would you prefer?

1. Option A

2. Option B

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Online Appendix 14: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Tests (Study 3)** | | | | | |
|  | Full Sample | Baseline | Higher Payment | Religion | Geography |
| Gender |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 47.8% | 47.0% | 49.1% | 48.6% | 42.4% |
| Female | 52.2 | 53.0 | 50.9 | 51.4 | 57.7 |
| χ2(3) = 3.6 (*p* = 0.31) | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18-29 | 16.0% | 16.2% | 17.0% | 15.0% | 14.8% |
| 30-44 | 21.7 | 22.2 | 21.3 | 21.5 | 20.9 |
| 44-59 | 28.8 | 28.3 | 28.5 | 29.9 | 28.6 |
| 60+ | 33.5 | 33.3 | 33.2 | 33.6 | 35.7 |
| χ2(9) = 2.5 (*p* = 0.98) | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Race |  |  |  |  |  |
| White | 74.0% | 72.2% | 73.4% | 76.3% | 76.5% |
| Black | 8.9 | 10.1 | 8.7 | 7.3 | 9.7 |
| Other | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 1.5 |
| Hispanic | 9.9 | 10.9 | 9.6 | 9.2 | 8.7 |
| Mixed | 3.2 | 2.7 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 3.6 |
| χ2(12) = 14.0 (*p* = 0.30) | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | 8.4% | 8.8% | 8.7% | 7.8% | 7.1% |
| High School | 30.8 | 30.0 | 31.1 | 31.3 | 32.1 |
| Some College | 28.4 | 30.1 | 27.5 | 26.7 | 30.6 |
| Bachelor’s Degree | 32.4 | 31.2 | 32.7 | 34.1 | 30.1 |
| χ2(9) = 6.1 (*p* = 0.73) | |  |  |  |  |

**Online Appendix 15: Additional Results, Study 3**

In this Appendix, we describe two additional sets of results. First, we show a revised version of Table 4 that includes the interaction between the higher payment condition and partisan strength. Second, we present results that highlight the moderating effects of economic and social attitudes on the treatment. While both of these analyses are important and useful, space constraints in the body of the paper prevented us from presenting them there.

We begin first with a revised version of Table 4 that presents the interactive effect of partisan strength and the Higher Payment Condition. We did not include this in the main paper because the Higher Payment Condition—unlike the Religion and Geography Conditions—was not designed to be a placebo or benchmark test for the baseline Partisanship condition in Study 3. Rather, the Higher Payment condition was designed to study the elasticity of partisan animus: if the payment is increased by 50% (from $6 to $9), are people more willing to help the opposing party? That said, we certainly could interact it with partisan strength to examine any potential interactions. The results are below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Accept Non-Partisan Offer | Accept Non-Partisan Offer |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | OLS | Logit |
| Religion Condition | 0.06\*\* | 0.31\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.13) |
| Geography Condition | -0.35\*\* | -1.46\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.20) |
| Higher Payment Condition | -0.04 | -0.20 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.11) |
| Strong Partisan | 0.21\*\* | 1.33\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.18) |
| Religion x Strong Partisan | -0.15\*\* | -1.03\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.25) |
| Geography x Strong Partisan | -0.20\*\* | -1.29\*\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.38) |
| Higher Payment x Strong Partisan | -0.02 | -0.35 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.25) |
| Constant | 0.68\*\* | 0.78\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.08) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 3148 | 3148 |
| R-squared/Log-Likelihood | 0.079 | -1749.98 |

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS or logistic regression coefficients (as indicated) with associated standard errors in parentheses; the dependent variable in all cases is accepting the non-partisan offer (Option A).

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

Note that the interaction terms for the Geography and Religion conditions are the same as reported in Table 4 in the main text, but there is not much evidence of an interactive effect for the Higher Payment condition. There is certainly an overall effect of the Higher Payment condition, as we report in the main text and in Table 4. When faced with the option of a 50% increase in their payment, fewer respondents take the non-partisan offer relative to our baseline condition. But we find no difference between strong partisans and not-strong partisans—the interaction term is not statistically significant in either the OLS or logit models. Indeed, we find it is income—not partisanship—that shapes subject behavior in the higher payment condition. In separate analyses available from the authors, we find that almost all of the elasticity effect is due to those making less than $35,000 per year (approximately the bottom third of the income distribution). Among respondents making more than $35,000, the difference in the acceptance rates between the Partisanship and Higher Payment conditions is only 2.8 percentage points (*p*=0.20). But among those making less than $35,000, the difference is 10.1 percentage points (*p*=0.01). The additional payment had the strongest effect on those who most needed the additional funds.

The Moderating Effects of Economic and Social Attitudes

*Economic Ideology*. Respondents were asked: “Please consider the following statement: ‘The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.’ Do you agree or disagree with this statement?” This item captures debates over government intervention into the economy (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2006) and has been asked in large surveys such as the American National Election Study (ANES). We define economic extremists as those who chose one of the two extreme response options (“strongly agree” or “strongly disagree”).[[14]](#footnote-14)

*Social/Moral Ideology*. Respondents were asked: “Please consider the following statement: ‘This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.’ Do you agree or disagree with this statement?” This item has been used extensively in previous research to measure broad social attitudes (e.g., Goren 2005) and has been asked in large surveys such as the European Social Survey (ESS). We define social extremists as those who chose one of the two extreme response options (“strongly agree” or “strongly disagree”).

We estimate the same regression model represented by equation (5) in the main text, but replace strength of partisanship with economic/social ideology as the moderator. We find that economic divisions are the main contributor to affective polarization (see Table below). Economic extremists were 8.6 percentage points more likely to accept Option A in the Partisanship Condition compared to economic moderates (*β3* = .09, *p* = .001). This difference is substantially larger than the divide between economic extremists and moderates in the Religion Condition, which is only about 1.1 percentage points (*β4* = -.07, *p* = .07). As expected, the placebo tests show that economic extremism does not predict the acceptance rate in the Geography Condition (*β3* + *β5* = -.02, *p* = .81).

Finally, the last set of tests finds that social attitudes are more predictive of religious divisions than partisan divisions (a symmetric pattern to what was found with economic attitudes). Social extremists were 9.5 percentage points more likely to select Option A in the Religion Condition than social moderates (*β3* + *β4* = .095, *p* = .002). This was 5.3 percentage points higher than the difference between social extremists and moderates in the Partisanship Condition (*β4* = .05, *p* = .18). This difference-in-difference does not quite achieve conventional levels of statistical significance, but is correctly signed and substantively meaningful. Lastly, the placebo test for the Geography Condition is consistent with theoretical expectations (*β3* + *β5* = .05, *p* = .46).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table: OLS Regressions Predicting Acceptance of Non-Partisan Offer** | | |
|  | Economic Extremists | Social Extremists |
| Religion | .04  (.02) | -.01  (.03) |
| Geography | -.38  (.04) | -.42  (.04) |
| Moderator | .09  (.03) | .04  (.03) |
| Religion x Moderator | -.07  (.04) | .05  (.04) |
| Geography x Moderator | -.10  (.07) | .00  (.07) |
| Constant | .72  (.02) | .74  (.02) |
|  |  |  |
| N | 2180 | 2183 |
| R2 | .08 | .08 |

**Online Appendix 16: Robustness Checks and Results by Partisanship, Study 3**

As we explained above, one concern is that there may be some factor correlated with partisanship—rather than partisanship itself—that explains our results. We can test for this by examining treatment effect heterogeneity. To the extent that other factors explain our treatment effects other than partisanship, we would expect to see differences in responses to the various offers by demographic characteristics of respondents.

We test for this in Table A16A below looking at heterogeneous effects based on age[[15]](#footnote-15), education, gender, race, strength of liberal-conservative self-identification, and whether or not the respondent is sorted (here, that their partisanship matches their ideological self-identification, that is, that they are a liberal Democrat or a conservative Republican).[[16]](#footnote-16) We do not find any consistent pattern of effects below. While we do find some heterogeneous effects, they are substantively small and theoretically uninteresting, and likely due to chance alone given the number of tests.

In Table A16B, we condition the results by partisanship.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Heterogeneity by:* | | | | | | |
|  | Race | Age | Education | Gender | Ideological  Strength | Partisan  Sorting |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Religion Condition | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.08\*\* | 0.07\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Racial/Ethnic Minority | -0.06\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.03) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Religion Condition x Minority | -0.03 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.05) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Geography Condition | -0.42\*\* | -0.33\*\* | -0.42\*\* | -0.47\*\* | -0.42\*\* | -0.41\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.11) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Geography x Minority | -0.01 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.08) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Higher Payment Condition | -0.04 | -0.10 | -0.05\* | -0.08\*\* | -0.03 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Higher Payment x Minority | -0.03 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.04) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  | 0.44\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.07) |  |  |  |  |
| Religion x Age |  | -0.15 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.11) |  |  |  |  |
| Geography x Age |  | -0.18 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.20) |  |  |  |  |
| Higher Payment x Age |  | 0.10 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.11) |  |  |  |  |
| College Graduate |  |  | 0.05 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.03) |  |  |  |
| Religion x College Graduate |  |  | -0.04 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.04) |  |  |  |
| Geography x College Graduate |  |  | 0.00 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.07) |  |  |  |
| Higher Payment x College Graduate |  |  | -0.01 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.04) |  |  |  |
| Female |  |  |  | -0.01 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.03) |  |  |
| Religion x Female |  |  |  | 0.06 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.04) |  |  |
| Geography x Female |  |  |  | 0.09 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.07) |  |  |
| Higher Payment x Female |  |  |  | 0.07 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.04) |  |  |
| Strength of Liberal-Conservative Self ID |  |  |  |  | 0.06\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.01) |  |
| Religion x Strength of Libcon Self ID |  |  |  |  | -0.06\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.02) |  |
| Geography x Strength of Libcon Self ID |  |  |  |  | -0.00 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.03) |  |
| Higher Payment x Strength of Libcon Self ID |  |  |  |  | -0.01 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.02) |  |
| Sorted Partisan |  |  |  |  |  | 0.16\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.03) |
| Religion x Sorted Partisan |  |  |  |  |  | -0.10\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.04) |
| Geography x Sorted Partisan |  |  |  |  |  | -0.01 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.07) |
| Higher Payment x Sorted Partisan |  |  |  |  |  | -0.01 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.04) |
| Constant | 0.77\*\* | 0.54\*\* | 0.74\*\* | 0.76\*\* | 0.69\*\* | 0.67\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3159 | 3159 | 3159 | 3159 | 3156 | 3159 |
| R-squared | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.07 |

**Table A16A: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Study 3**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. In all cases, the dependent variable is accepting the non-partisan offer. The units for age have been divided by 100 to ease coefficient interpretation.

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Democratic Respondents Only*** | | | | |
|  | *Dependent Variable:* | | | |
|  | Accept Non-Partisan Offer | Accept Non-Partisan Offer | Accept Non-Partisan Offer | Accept Non-Partisan Offer |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | OLS | OLS | Logit | Logit |
| Religion Condition | -.01 | .08\* | -.05 | .39\* |
|  | (.03) | (.03) | (.14) | (.18) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Geography Condition | -.48\*\* | -.39\*\* | -2.08\*\* | -1.64\*\* |
|  | (.05) | (.06) | (.25) | (.29) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Higher Payment Condition | -.05 | ⎯⎯ | -.24 | ⎯⎯ |
|  | (.03) |  | (.13) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Strong Partisan | ⎯⎯ | .21\*\* | ⎯⎯ | 1.30\*\* |
|  |  | (.04) |  | (.23) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Religion x Strong Partisan | ⎯⎯ | -.25\*\* | ⎯⎯ | -1.50\*\* |
|  |  | (.06) |  | (.33) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Geography x Strong Partisan | ⎯⎯ | -.27\* | ⎯⎯ | -1.61\*\* |
|  |  | (.11) |  | (.59) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | .74\*\* | .67\*\* | 1.05\*\* | .69\*\* |
|  | (.02) | (.02) | (.09) | (.11) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1615 | 1127 | 1615 | 1127 |
| R2 / Log Likelihood | .06 | .11 | -949.96 | -629.94 |
|  | | | | |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Republican Respondents Only*** | | | | |
|  | *Dependent Variable:* | | | |
|  | Accept Non-Partisan Offer | Accept Non-Partisan Offer | Accept Non-Partisan Offer | Accept Non-Partisan Offer |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | OLS | OLS | Logit | Logit |
| Religion Condition | .04 | .05 | .22 | .23 |
|  | (.03) | (.03) | (.16) | (.18) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Geography Condition | -.36\*\* | -.31\*\* | -1.55\*\* | -1.31\*\* |
|  | (.05) | (.05) | (.23) | (.27) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Higher Payment Condition | -.05 | ⎯⎯ | -.25 | ⎯⎯ |
|  | (.03) |  | (.14) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Strong Partisan | ⎯⎯ | .20\*\* | ⎯⎯ | 1.39\*\* |
|  |  | (.04) |  | (.29) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Religion x Strong Partisan | ⎯⎯ | -.05 | ⎯⎯ | -.30 |
|  |  | (.06) |  | (.42) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Geography x Strong Partisan | ⎯⎯ | -.13 | ⎯⎯ | -1.09\* |
|  |  | (.10) |  | (.54) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | .77\*\* | .70\*\* | 1.20\*\* | .87\*\* |
|  | (.02) | (.02) | (.10) | (.11) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1531 | 1048 | 1531 | 1048 |
| R2 / Log Likelihood | .04 | .10 | -846.69 | -538.09 |
|  | | | | |

**Table A16B: Forgoing Material Gains to Avoid Helping the Other Party by Partisanship (Study 3)**

*Note*: Cell entries are OLS or logistic regression coefficients (as indicated) with associated standard errors in parentheses; the dependent variable in all cases is accepting the non-partisan offer. The “Religion Condition,” “Geography Condition,” and “Higher Payment Condition” are dummy variables representing the experimental conditions.

\* = *p* < 0.05, \*\* = *p* < 0.01 (two-tailed).

**Online Appendix 17: Additional Studies, Study 3**

To help assess the robustness of our results, we ran additional versions of Study 3. Below, we describe each study and the conclusions that we drew from it.

**Donations to Both Parties**

One concern with the design of Study 3 is that subjects might select the non-partisan offer due to pragmatic reasons rather than due to animus. For example, if a subject gets the $6, but $3 goes to the opposing party, they feel like they should make a $3 donation to their own party to offset the opposing-party payment. While we are largely ambivalent on the mechanism (programmatic vs. animus), this is an important possibility to be investigated.

We designed an experiment with two separate versions, and subjects were randomly assigned to Version 1 or Version 2. The payoffs to subjects are captured in the table below:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Version 1** | | | |
|  | Payment to Subject | Payment to Opposing Party |  |
| Option A | 0.50 | None |  |
| Option B | 1.00 | 0.50 |  |
| **Version 2:** |  |  |  |
|  | Payment to Subject | Payment to Opposing Party | Payment to the Same Party |
| Option A | 0.50 | None | None |
| Option B | 1.00 | 0.50 | None |
| Option C | 0.75 | 0.25 | 0.25 |

Subjects in Version 1 face the same scenario that they faced in our original Study 3: a small payment to themselves vs. a larger payment to themselves, with money going to the opposing party (here, because of budget constraints, we lowered the payments to subjects). Subjects in Version 2 have the same two options as Version 1, but they also have the option of making offsetting donations to both parties (option C), which should address the pragmatic objection.

We conducted this study on Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk on 13-14 September 2016; subjects were paid $0.50, plus whatever amount they selected as a bonus payment in our study (the average payment was $1.30, including the bonus). Because we randomly assigned subjects to see either Version 1 or Version 2 of our experiment, we can simply compare across versions of our experiment to see how the inclusion of Option C—the option with offsetting political donations—changed subjects’ behavior.

In Version 1, which parallels our original experiment, 44% chose option A (the non-partisan option), and 56% chose option B. Note that the selection rate of option A in this experiment is a bit lower probably because of the unique MTurk subject pool, which is very interested in making money in exchange for work. In Version 2, 25% chose option A, 53% chose option B, and 21% chose option C. While the selection rate of Option B is stable across versions of the experiment, it seems like some respondents shift from Option A in Version 1 to Option C in Version 2. So there are some respondents whose decision seems to be shaped by pragmatic concerns more than animus. When you neutralize the donation to the opposing party (by giving an equal amount to the subject’s party), subjects are less enticed by the apolitical offer. Consequently, it is likely that some subjects in our GfK sample do reflect this sort of programmatic thinking. That said, animus is clearly still an important part of the story. After all, nearly one-half of subjects (46%) in Version 2 do not maximize their own payoff, and one-quarter of subjects refuse to give anything to the opposing party. Pragmatic concerns are real, but animus too is an important part of the story.

**Did We Prime Partisanship?**

Another concern about Study 3 is that we might have primed partisanship by asking for respondent’s party ID before the donation question. In other words, some subjects normally might not object to this sort of donation, but they object here because we primed their partisanship by asking them to report it at the start of our experiment. To test this possibility, we designed another study where we repeated part of the survey experiment on Mechanical Turk using workers for whom we had previously obtained self-reported party ID from a separate survey. In total, we contacted 997 workers, 634 of whom were Democrats and 363 were Republicans. 412 of those previously identified as Democrats responded, while 248 of those previously identified as Republicans responded. These respondents were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. In the first condition, participants completed a similar survey to the one in the original experiment. They were asked their partisan ID at the beginning of the survey, and after answering several question unrelated to their political beliefs, were presented with the choice between a 50 cent bonus for participating, or a 1 dollar bonus plus a 50 cent donation to the opposite party. In the second condition, participants were not asked to report their partisan ID until *after* being presented with the offer for their bonus to avoid the possibility that they would be primed by offering their affiliation. That is, if priming is inflating the percentage of participants who are willing to forgo a higher bonus on the basis of partisan concerns, we should observe a higher percentage of respondents taking option A (the bonus that does not entail a donation) in the first experimental condition than in the second.

The percentage of individuals choosing option A in the survey where partisan identification was elicited at the beginning of the survey was 47.4 percent, whereas in the condition where the partisan identification question was located at the end, participants selected also Option A 47.4 percent of the time. This difference is statistically insignificant (*p* = 0.96) and substantively close to zero. In short, we find strikingly consistent behavior across experimental conditions, and have no reason to believe that priming is an important explanation for the large observed partisan effects in the original experiment.

1. The study was pre-registered with [redacted] as Study [redacted] prior to data collection. The pre-analysis plan, and deviations from it, can be found at the end of this Online Appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The email addresses had to exhibit some variation in order to avoid automatic spam filters, so they could not be exactly parallel. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Most markets exist entirely within one county. When that occurs, we use the county election returns to measure Romney vote share. When the market crosses multiple counties, we used the average of all counties covered by the market. Average postings were determined by scraping all postings in the “For Sale” section for a randomly selected day in June 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. To our knowledge there was no major online marketplace that contained partisan information on consumers. Our analysis relies on the straightforward assumption that the number of Democratic (Republican) buyers is monotonically increasing in the Democratic (Republican) lean of the market. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The mean number of responses is very similar to earlier studies using this platform (e.g., Doleac and Stein 2013), indicating that our study successfully mimicked other transactions in these markets. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In our pre-analysis plan, we initially planned to list each of the three ads in each of the 126 markets, producing a complete within-subjects design. Unfortunately, due to difficulties with posting Craiglist ads, we were only able to list two of the three advertisements in each market. Further, six markets had to be excluded from the study due to difficulties with placing a second ad in the market, giving us 120 markets in our study. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Because the two ads were placed months apart from each other, it is unlikely that there are any treatment spillovers. It is also unlikely that key features of the market substantially changed over the course of the experiment. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. To assess robustness of the results, we also estimated various alternative count models including a Poisson model, a zero-inflated Poisson model, and a negative binomial model (see Table A11C). Results are consistent across model specifications. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Because the regression specification includes market fixed effects, the main effect of *VSi* falls out. We also estimate models including controls for day-of-the-week and market thickness and obtain similar results (see Table A11D). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. New York City was excluded because it was a substantial outlier in terms of Romney vote share and therefore was highly influential when estimating the regression line. Buffalo was excluded because of irregularities during the posting of the ad. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For study 3, our pre-analysis plan is our original TESS proposal. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. We count this branched item as a single question. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The study is well-powered. Employing Cohen’s test for multiple regression including pre-treatment covariates, assuming power of .8 and an alpha level of .05 (two-tailed), a sample size of 120-900 will allow us to detect a very modest difference in treatment conditions of 5 percentage points (assuming a 50% baseline, which is conservative). We request the larger sample size so we can test for heterogeneous treatment effects outlined in H1-H3. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. We also operationalized this variable and the social extremism item continuously and obtained similar results. We present results from the dichotomized measure in the main text for expositional clarity and simplicity. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The age variable in the table below has been divided by 100 to simply the coefficient presentation. So here, an additional year of age increases the probability of accepting the non-partisan offer by 0.44 percent. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For defining sorting, leaning partisans are counted as partisans (Keith et al. 1992). Treating leaning partisans as Independents (who are by definition unsorted) does not change our substantive results. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)