Online Appendix: “Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Voters?”

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Experimental Details

This section describes the basics of each design and setup of each experiment. Question wording for each experiment is given in the next section.

Experiment 1

Subjects were recruited to take part in a study on how citizens learn about politics from the news in a private urban university’s decision-making lab during 9-19 February 2010. Subjects completed this study and 2 others during a one-hour session in exchange for a $10 cash payment (this study, lasting approximately 30-35 minutes, was administered first). As is typically the case, the subjects are not any sort of a representative sample, as 44 percent of the sample is white, 36 percent is male, the average age is 21.5 years, 70 percent of sample respondents are Democrats, and the majority of the sample (85 percent) is students. While student samples often raise generalizability questions, a number of studies show that students and non-students do not typically differ as experimental subjects (Anderson, Lindsay and Bushman, 1999; Druckman and Kam, 2011), a finding that replicates here as well (see the results in table 1 of the paper).

When subjects arrived at the lab, they were initially given a pre-test instrument to gather their baseline political attitudes and opinions, and were then given a brief distracter task (subjects completed a brief battery of items from an IQ test). Subjects were then exposed to the treatment, a series of short video clips, one clip per issue, where the difference across conditions is the partisan/ideological slant of the source for the clips. Here, the sources are: left-wing partisan media sources (Countdown with Keith Olbermann), right-wing partisan media sources (Hannity
and The O’Reilly Factor), or neutral sources with no overt partisan slant (The News Hour with Jim Lehrer), with treatment assignment held constant for each subject (so all subjects saw clips from only one type of media; see the paper for a detailed discussion of why these sources were chosen). Finally, subjects were given a post-test questionnaire to record their attitudes and opinions. The key question here is whether the ideological tenor of the news source (i.e., whether the stories come from a left-wing, right-wing, or neutral source) affects viewers’ attitudes.

The experimental stimulus consists of clips about four issues discussed in the news during the first year of the Obama presidency: whether (George W.) Bush administration officials should be prosecuted for torture, whether the U.S. should pass “cap-and-trade” legislation to control greenhouse gas emissions, whether Americans should support the Afghanistan surge, and whether Khalid Sheik Mohammed (the alleged 9/11 mastermind) should be tried in military or civilian court. These issues were all significant policy debates during the first year of the Obama presidency, and all were discussed on all three types of media.

To ensure that subjects actually perceived the partisan slant of the clips, the post-test instrument included a manipulation check asking whether the segments they saw on balance supported the Democratic or Republican parties. Subjects had no difficulty differentiating the partisan tilt of the shows, with subjects seeing the left-wing shows as most supportive of Democrats, right-wing shows as most supportive of Republicans and the neutral shows as most balanced (a one-way ANOVA yields $F(2,174)=275.1, p<0.01$). For example, only 2 percent of subjects assigned to the left-wing condition saw the treatment as strongly supporting the Republican Party, whereas 83 percent of subjects assigned to the right-wing condition felt this way.¹ This manipulation check demonstrates (unsurprisingly) that subjects can correctly identify

¹ Indeed, no subjects who watched the right-wing treatment viewed the segments as even somewhat supportive of the Democratic Party.
the partisan slant of the sources, and so the differences below are a function of that slant. In all experiments all subjects are included in the analysis, even those that incorrectly identify the slant of the programs. Restricting the analysis to those that correctly identify it would not substantively alter the results.

**Experiment 2**

Experiment 2 carries out the patient preference trial. Experiments 2-3 both follow the same design: subjects are recruited online (from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service, mturk.amazon.com) and offered a small cash payment for completing the study (this study took approximately 8-9 minutes, subjects were paid $1.25 for completing it). Before beginning the actual study, all online subjects pass a small screening test to ensure that they can actually watch Flash videos on their computers (the treatment clips are shown to respondents in Flash); only those who successfully complete the screener actually complete the study.²

All online experiments (experiments 2-3) follow the same basic protocol: they begin with some background items, exposure to the stimulus, and then answer the post-test attitude extremity items. The subjects are still a non-random sample, but are somewhat more heterogeneous (especially in terms of age) than the typical laboratory experiment. Online subjects pools such as Mechanical Turk are relatively new to political science, so some readers may be skeptical of them. Work examining the quality of Mechanical Turk subjects, however, suggests that these individuals are at least as attentive as convenience laboratory samples, and more representative of the general population (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). Work using Mechanical Turk subjects has now been published in

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² The screening test has subjects watch a short video clip (approximately 30 seconds) from a popular television show and then complete a brief quiz about said clip. In order to successfully complete the quiz, subjects must be able to both see and hear the video clip.
several psychology journals (e.g., Alter et al. 2010; Eriksson and Simpson 2010). Further, note that my laboratory-based sample (composed of students, university staff, and community members) generates results that look like the ones from my Mechanical Turk samples, consistent with the claim that these individuals offer the ability to validly conduct experiments online (see also Horowitz and Levendusky 2011 for a similar finding). While more work will be needed to see how Turk subjects perform at different kinds of tasks, the results here suggest they offer exciting possibilities for experimentation beyond the traditional laboratory setting.3

The study was fielded 1-2 June 2010. Subjects here are 61% female, 46% have a college degree, 80% are Caucasian, and 47% are 18-29 years of age. Subjects watched treatment clips about trying terrorism suspects in civilian vs. military courts, and also detected the partisan bias of the sources (one-way ANOVA: F(2,166) = 20.15, p < 0.01).

Experiment 3

Experiment 3 was designed to test the duration of the effects of partisan media. Subjects were recruited via Mechanical Turk, and offered $2 for completing an approximately 8-9 minute study. Subjects who completed the first wave were then asked if they wanted to be enrolled in a follow-up study in exchange for an additional $1 payment, subjects who agreed were invited to take wave 2 (see the paper for the details on sample sizes and retention). Wave 1 was administered on 14 June 2010, wave 2 was administered on 16-17 June 2010. Subjects here saw clips in wave 1 about the Arizona immigration law, subjects in wave 2 saw no clips. The sample here (that completed both waves) is 68% female, 88% Caucasian, 46% is ages 18-29, and 54%

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3 For more detailed descriptions of the demographics and motivations of Mechanical Turk subjects, see Paolacci et al. (2010).
have a college degree. Again, the manipulation check revealed that subjects could differentiate the partisan bias of the sources (one-way ANOVA: $F(2,77) = 4.5$, $p=0.01$).
Supplemental Analyses

This section gives additional details on the analyses presented in the main body, and presents a series of additional steps taken to ensure the robustness of the results reported in the main body of the paper.

Data on Dependent Variable, by Experiment

Table A1 summarizes the distribution of the dependent variable, by experiment, giving the mean and standard deviation. For details on the questions used, see the section on question wording below.

[Tbl: table A1]

Treatment Effects by Party, Experiment 1

In the body of the paper, I estimated a model assuming equivalent treatment effects by party (i.e., that like-minded, cross-cutting, and neutral media have the same effects for both Democrats and Republicans). I can relax this assumption to test differential effects by party with the following model:

\[ y_{ij}^{post} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LM_i + \beta_2 LM_i * Dem_i + \beta_3 CC_i + \beta_4 CC_i * Dem_i + \beta_5 y_{ij}^{pre} + \beta_6 y_{ij}^{pre} * Dem_i + \beta_7 Dem_i + \alpha_i + \phi_j + u_{ij} \]

Where Dem_i is an indicator if respondent i is a Democrat, and all other terms are as defined in equation (1) in the body of the paper. Note that here, I am testing for partisan differences in both the treatment, and the effectiveness of the lagged dependent variable. Table A2 below reports the results.

[Tbl: table A2]
Model 1 in table A2 shows the fully saturated model given above, and finds no differential effect across parties, either looking at the treatment effects or the effect of the lagged outcome. Of course this sort of a model asks a lot of the data, so I estimated a simpler model that only looks for differential treatment effects by party; that model is given in model 2 in table A5. Even here, we see no evidence of differential effectiveness by party. Given this, I opt to present the simpler pooled estimates in the analysis in the main body of the paper.

The results above, to be consistent with the results given in the body of the paper, drops pure Independents from the sample. The strategy I used in the paper is the most substantively appropriate, as it best allows me to capture the logic underlying my hypotheses. But as a check, I can recode the dependent variable to run from liberal to conservative, and estimate the model as:

\[ y_{ij}^{post} = \beta_0 \text{Rep}_i + \beta_1 \text{Dem}_i + \beta_2 y_{ij}^{pre} + \beta_3 y_{ij}^{pre} \times \text{Rep}_i + \beta_4 y_{ij}^{pre} \times \text{Dem}_i + \beta_5 \text{Fox}_i + \beta_6 \text{Fox}_i \times \text{Rep}_i + \beta_7 \text{Fox}_i \times \text{Dem}_i + \beta_8 \text{MSNBC}_i + \beta_9 \text{MSNBC}_i \times \text{Dem}_i + \beta_{10} \text{MSNBC}_i \times \text{Rep}_i + \alpha_i + \phi_j + \epsilon_{ij} \]

Where Fox and MSNBC stand for the treatments from those networks respectively, and all other terms are as defined in the body of the paper. Note that this is a fully saturated model, where the effect of pre-test extremity and all treatments differ for Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. I can also specify a simpler model where only the treatment effects vary by party. The results are given in table A3 below.

[Insert table A3 below]

The findings in table A3 seem to suggest that there is little going on in these models. But on closer inspection, it confirms the main finding of columns (1) and (2) in table 1 in the paper: like-minded media polarizes viewers. Here, that means that the effect of MSNBC for Democrats is negative (i.e., makes them more liberal) and the effect of Fox for Republicans is positive (i.e., makes them more conservative). That is, the hypothesis test of \( \beta_8 \text{MSNBC}_i + \beta_9 \text{MSNBC}_i \times \text{Dem}_i < 0 \) and \( \beta_5 \text{Fox}_i + \beta_7 \text{Fox}_i \times \text{Rep}_i > 0 \) are both highly statistically significant (using the coefficients from
the last column in table A10 gives a p-value in both cases of less than 0.05). Why then do the results seem so muddled just with a quick glance at table A3? This reflects a case of over-fitting the data. With less than 200 respondents, I cannot estimate this many parameters. Instead, estimating a simpler model that enforces some constraints across parties (like the one given in table 1 of the paper) yields more easily interpretable results that generate similar substantive conclusions. Given this, I opt for the simpler strategy used in the body of the paper.

**Validating the Measure of Media Preferences**

As I discussed in the body of the paper, I conducted an additional survey to validate the media preferences measure used in the body of the paper. If my argument that preferences reflect actual viewing habits is correct, then I should find that subjects prefer partisan media should be more likely to report watching it. Table A4 gives the results.

[Insert table A4 about here]

The findings show that viewing habits are strongly related to preferences. Subjects who prefer the like-minded treatment actually watch more like-minded programs; the parallel finding also holds for those who prefer cross-cutting programs. These measures of news preferences do, in fact, actually reflect underlying viewing habits. For example, 48% of those who prefer like-minded media watch it daily, versus only 5% for those who prefer another type of media. On average, those who prefer like-minded media watch it at least weekly, versus only a few times of year for those who prefer other types of media. These findings should bolster confidence that my measure of preferences validly estimates real-world preferences for different types of news.

There is another way to validate these preferences as well, albeit less directly. If my preference measure validly measures actual viewing habits, then I should find that viewers who
prefer like-minded media behave like viewers who actually watch like-minded media. In particular, I would expect them to be more partisan, more ideologically extreme, hold more polarized evaluations of the parties, and be more politically involved, consistent with earlier findings (e.g., Morris 2005; Baum and Groeling 2010; Stroud 2011). Table A5 tests these patterns of relationships using this same follow-up survey.

[Insert table A5 about here]

Table A5 shows that those who prefer like-minded media are somewhat more extreme: they are more likely to be strong partisans, they evaluate their own party more positively and the opposite party more negatively, and hold more polarized evaluations of President Obama (i.e., Democrats (Republicans) who prefer like-minded media more strongly approve (disapprove) of the president’s job performance). They are also more likely to engage in campaign activities beyond voting, and more likely to have voted in a primary election (though there is no difference in reported general election turnout, perhaps as a result of 74 percent of the sample reporting having voted in the 2008 election). Further, note that those who prefer cross-cutting media are less likely to be strong partisans, have less polarized evaluations of the President, and are more favorably rate the opposite party. This is consistent with earlier work showing the relative extremity of those preferring congruent media, and the conflicted nature of those preferring cross-cutting media (Jamieson and Cappella 2008; Holbert, Garrett, and Gleason 2010). This is further confirmation of my claim that preference measures validly estimate viewing habits.

**Media Preferences, Motivation, and Cognitive Skills**

In the body of the paper, I drew on existing work to argue that those who prefer like-minded media have stronger motivation and more cognitive skills, and therefore should be more likely to
polarize in response to like-minded media. The arguments about cognitive skill and motivation are established in the existing literature, but as a further supplement to this point, I use data from the 2010 biennial Pew media survey, as well as the 2008 National Annenberg Election Study rolling-cross section survey to examine these relationships. To be clear, there is evidence for these claims in the ex ante literature, I am merely highlighting and documenting additional support for these claims.

To begin, consider the claim that like-minded viewers are more politically informed and knowledgeable. If this is correct, then I should find that viewers who watch like-minded media know more about politics (assessed here in the Pew data with an index of factual knowledge items). Table A6 tests the link.

[Insert table A6 about here]

As expected, like-minded media consumers know more about politics, even controlling for other known predictors of political knowledge such as age, race, income, and education (Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996). While I report results from the Pew data, I note that I can obtain substantively similar results using the Annenberg data as well (omitted here in the interest of space). This is evidence for my first claim: like-minded viewers are more politically informed.

Unfortunately, neither the Pew data nor the Annenberg data contains a general measure of political interest. But the Annenberg data does contain two measures of campaign-specific interest: how closely the respondent is following the election, and the number of days in the past week the respondent discussed politics or the election. If my claim that like-minded media viewers are more politically interested is correct, I should find that those who watch like-minded media discuss politics more frequently, and they are more interested in the campaign generally.

[Insert table A7 about here]
I again find strong support for my argument. The magnitude of the days discussing politics finding is particularly impressive: on average, even controlling for a host of other factors, watching like-minded media makes you discuss politics approximately 1 day more per week, or approximately 40% of a standard deviation. Simply put, like-minded media viewers are more politically interested.

These findings support the claim I made in the body of the paper that like-minded media consumers are more politically informed, engaged, and so forth—they are the sorts of “news junkies” that Prior (2007) discusses in his analysis. This supports my claim that these are the individuals who have the cognitive skills needed to polarize in response to like-minded media.

In terms of like-minded media consumers being more partisan and ideological, see the evidence presented in table A5 above, as well as in previous studies (Morris 2005; Stroud 2011; Baum and Groeling 2010).

In the body of the paper, I argued that like-minded media viewers were also more (ex ante) extreme than other viewers, based on previous findings (Jamieson and Cappella 2008; Stroud 2010; Stroud 2011). I can also verify this finding using data from the 2008 NAES as well. Here, I examine 4 issues discussed during the campaign: whether the U.S. should legalize gay marriage, whether the U.S. should withdraw its troops from Iraq, whether the U.S. should cut taxes, and whether the U.S. should allow legal abortions. I code these variables using the same rule as discussed in the body of the paper, so that Democratic (Republican) respondents who take more liberal (conservative) positions have higher values of the dependent variable (i.e., hold more extreme attitudes). Given this, if I find a positive coefficient on like-minded media consumption in the analysis below, this will support my argument that like-minded media consumers hold more extreme issue positions. Table A8 gives the results.
The results strongly support my argument: across all issues, like-minded media consumers hold more extreme positions, consistent with earlier findings.

**Robustness Check Experiments**

In addition to the experiments described in the paper, I also several additional experiments to probe the robustness of my results; each one is described below.

**Apolitical Control Condition**

One both strength and weakness of the experimental design described in the paper is that all subjects are exposed to news about the story, the difference across conditions being the partisan bias/tilt of the source. The strength of this design is that all subjects are exposed to information about the story, so the difference between them can be interpreted as the effect of the partisan bias of the sources, holding information about the story (approximately) constant. An alternative design would be to have an apolitical control group, and measure all three types of sources (like-minded, cross-cutting, and neutral sources) relative to this apolitical baseline. The advantage of this design (and the implicit disadvantage of the design used in the paper) is that perhaps simply watching a news story about the topic brings up partisan biases/preconceptions/etc., and so there may be some effect on attitudes of simply learning about the issue.

To test this hypothesis, I conducted a four-condition between subjects experiment from 29-31 July 2010 using an online convenience sample (recruited again via Mechanical Turk; subjects were paid $1.50 for completing an 8-9 minute study). The sample is 54% Democratic, 61% female, 79% Caucasian, 50% have a college degree, and is skewed towards the young (45%...
are 18-29, while only 20% are older than 40). The protocol followed the design of experiments 2-4 above (background questions, exposure to the stimulus, and then post-test items), except that this study adds a fourth group (an apolitical news story describing recent scientific advances in the detection of Alzheimer’s disease; the remaining subjects see stories about civilian vs. military trials for terrorism suspects). Table A9 gives the results of analyzing this experiment following the protocol described in the paper.

Table A9 shows that there is a learning effect to watching neutral media: those who watch neutral media (which lacks any obvious political bias) are more polarized than those who watch the apolitical control story. But note that there is an even larger increase in polarization for those who watch like-minded media. Indeed, the increase in polarization is nearly twice as large (.7 units on a 1-9 scale vs. 0.35 units) for those assigned to like-minded media. So while there is a learning effect, there is also a sizable boost to polarization from watching like-minded media. This shows that the design in the paper is an appropriate one, and beyond any learning effects, there are real and significant increases in polarization due to watching like-minded media.

**Editorial Experiment**

Because the news clips used are actual clips, there may be between-show differences beyond simply the partisan bias of each source. Shows on Fox News may simply be different from shows on MSNBC in some way I cannot measure. While I attempted to minimize these differences (by, for example, finding segments where they talk about the same issues in an approximately comparable way), I cannot completely rule them out using the design in the paper. At some level, this is not a particularly serious limitation if our goal is to understand the real-
world implications of watching these shows: if they are different (beyond just the frame), then we want to capture that difference. Yet given the theoretical mechanism offered in the paper, I would ideally be able to verify that it is the partisan bias of the source that drive the differences in polarization. To do that, I borrow a design from Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997), and use a constructed newspaper editorial to test my hypothesis. That is, I wrote like-minded, cross-cutting and neutral editorials. In all editorials, subjects read several background paragraphs describing the issue, the difference across conditions is the treatment paragraphs: in these paragraphs, subjects either read one-sided arguments (like-minded/cross-cutting content), or see both sides of the argument (neutral). The background and arguments were drawn form major newspapers and partisan media shows to closely mirror the actual arguments used on this topic. Given the construction of the editorials, I can ensure that all subjects see the same background information, and the only difference is the tilt in the argumentation in the treatment paragraphs. In essence, this is a more tightly controlled, albeit less realistic, experimental design.

I fielded this 3-condition between subjects experiment on 5 August 2010. 149 respondents completed the experiment; subjects were recruited via Mechanical Turk and paid $0.50 for completing an 3-4 minute experiment. The sample is 57% Democratic, 61% female, 84% white, and 62% have a college education. Again, the sample skews younger, with 38% ages 18-29, 39% ages 30-40, and the remaining 23% over 40 years of age. As in the main experiments, the subjects had no difficulty detecting the partisan bias across sources (one-way ANOVA yields $F(2,133) = 3.07$, $p < 0.05$).

The key question is whether subjects assigned to the like-minded condition become more polarized (relative to those assigned to the neutral condition). Table A10 tests this hypothesis.

[Insert table A10 about here]
Table A10 confirms the finding from the body of the paper: like-minded media makes subjects more polarized: here, subjects assigned to the like-minded condition are approximately 10% more polarized than those assigned to the neutral condition. Given the differences between this experiment the main experiments discussed in the paper (most notably, that they are in different media, these editorials lack the visual power of TV, etc.), it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about relative effect sizes from this experiment compared to the results reported in the paper. But these findings should reassure readers that even in a much more controlled setting, the partisan bias across sources changes levels of polarization, just as it does in the main body of the paper.

To be clear, the experiments in the main body of the paper are the key ones for testing my hypotheses: the concern is about the real-world effects of partisan media, not about the effects of manufactured news stories. This editorial experiment helps to ensure that some extraneous feature of my treatment does not drive the results presented in the body of the paper.

Additional Duration Experiment

One shortcoming of the duration experiment in the paper is that perhaps the duration effects are due to subjects remembering the attitude items from time 1 to time 2. That is, perhaps what I find is not duration as much as it is that subjects remember the items used between waves. While this is unlikely, the design in the paper cannot rule it out (I thank a reader and an anonymous referee for making this point to me). I therefore designed another experiment to tackle this issue. Here, I expose subjects to the stimulus at time 1, but do not ask for their attitudes. Instead, I re-interview subjects 3 days later to gauge their attitudes, so the only attitude measures are taken at time 2. This design cannot look at decay, but it can look at duration: I can
know if there is any effect of the partisan media treatment 3 days later.\textsuperscript{4} Subjects for this experiment were again recruited via Mechanical Turk: the initial study (conducted on 1 October 2010) were paid $1.75 for completing an approximately 8-9 minute study; subjects returning for wave 2 (4-5 October 2010) were paid $0.85 for completing a 2-3 minute study. The wave 1 sample consists of 40 Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents, 25 of whom return for wave 2. The two-wave sample is 76% female, 92% is 40 years of age or younger, 44% has a college degree, and 88% are white.

Table A11 tests whether I can find duration when I ask the attitudinal items only at wave 2.

[Insert table A11 about here]

The effect of like-minded media endures, but only for a subset of respondents: those who want to see it.\textsuperscript{5} That is, consistent with the message in table 3 of the paper, preferences matter. It is those subjects who want to see like-minded media for whom the effect endures (the overall effect of like-minded media is significant, p=0.08). These findings reinforce both the results above and in the paper: the effects of partisan media endure, but that endurance is limited to those who prefer to watch that sort of media.

\textsuperscript{4} The initial experiment took place on 1 October 2010, and the follow-up took place on 4-5 October 2010, with nearly all respondents completing the follow-up on 4 October. The subject matter was the Arizona immigration law. 40 Republicans (including Republican-leaning Independents) participated in the initial wave, and 25 returned to be re-interviewed at time 2 (63% re-interview rate).

\textsuperscript{5} Given the small sample size, I look at the dichotomous indicator for being assigned to your preferred preference or not (rather than the more nuanced measure used in the body of the paper).
Question Wording, by Experiment

Below, I detail the question wording used for the items, by experiment. Before each set of attitudinal items, subjects were told: “In this next section, we will ask you to give your opinion about a set of political issues. The most important thing is for you to relax and take your time. For these items, there are no right or wrong items, only opinions, and it is your opinion we want you to share.”

Below, comments on response scales etc. are given in brackets. For all branched items, subjects are only asked the branched item if appropriate. Subjects who skip the item are not branched (they are simply treated as missing data, though very few subjects skip the dependent variable items).

Experiment 1

[The party ID item was asked in every experiment in the same fashion. Responses can be combined into the standard NES 7-point party ID scale:]

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent?
   A. Democrat
   B. Republican
   C. Independent

[If D/R:] Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican], or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]?
   A. Strong [Democrat/Republican]
   B. Not Very Strong [Democrat/Republican]

[If Independent:] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?
   A. Closer to the Democratic Party
   B. Closer to the Republican Party
   C. Closer to neither party

Attitude Items:

Note that subjects completed the same attitude items in both the pre-test and post-test waves of the experiment. Here, there is no measure of Cronbach’s alpha, because the items are analyzed as a panel (see the discussion in the body of the paper).

Recently, the United States announced that we will send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan. Do you think that this is too many additional troops, about the right number of additional troops, or too few additional troops?
   A. Far too many additional troops
   B. Somewhat too many additional troops
   C. About the right number of additional troops
D. Somewhat too few additional troops
E. Far too few additional troops

Under a proposal called 'cap and trade,' the federal government would limit the amount of greenhouse gases that companies could produce in their factories or power plants. If companies exceeded those limits, they would either pay a fine or pay money to other companies that produced smaller amounts of greenhouse gases. Would you favor or oppose this proposal?
A. Strongly oppose a cap and trade system
B. Somewhat oppose a cap and trade system
C. Neither support nor oppose a cap and trade system
D. Somewhat support a cap and trade system
E. Strongly support a cap and trade system

Recently, the United States announced that we would begin to withdraw our forces from Afghanistan in 2011. Which comes closest to your view about setting a timetable for beginning to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2011--you agree with that timetable, you think the US should start withdrawing troops sooner than that, or you think it is too soon to set a timetable for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan?
A. Begin withdrawing troops before 2011
B. Agree with the timetable as is
C. Too soon to set a timetable for withdrawing troops

[If A/C are selected:] Do you hold this position strongly, or not so strongly?
A. Strongly
B. Not so strongly

A recent report details the harsh interrogation techniques used on terrorism suspects during the Bush administration. Some argue that a criminal investigation is needed to determine if these techniques broke laws and constituted torture. Would you support such an investigation?
A. Strongly support a criminal investigation
B. Somewhat support a criminal investigation
C. Neither support nor oppose a criminal investigation
D. Somewhat oppose a criminal investigation
E. Strongly oppose a criminal investigation

The man allegedly responsible for planning the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheik Mohamed, is due to stand trial. Would you rather see him brought to trial in a criminal court run by the civilian judicial system, or would you rather see him tried by a military court run by the U.S. armed forces?
A. Prefer a trial in a military court
B. No preference
C. Prefer a trial in a civilian court

[If A/C selected:] Do you prefer a [military/civilian] trial strongly, or only somewhat prefer it?
A. Strongly prefer a [military/civilian] trial
B. Somewhat prefer a [military/civilian] trial
Attitude Strength Items: ⁶

Please use the scale below to indicate how sure you are that your position on that issue is the correct one. [The following items all share a 4 point Likert scale: “Very Sure,” “Pretty Sure”, “Not Very Sure”, and “Not at all Sure”]
- Creating a cap-and-trade system to regulate greenhouse gases
- Sending additional troops to Afghanistan
- Creating a timetable for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan
- Launching a criminal investigation into interrogation techniques
- Trying Khalid Sheik Mohammed in civilian vs. military court

[For each item below, subjects are asked to rate each item as above, so I omit the items for ease of presentation.]

Please use the scale below to indicate how knowledgeable you are the issue. [These items share a 5-point Likert scale: “Extremely Knowledgeable”, “Very Knowledgeable”, “Somewhat Knowledgeable”, “Not too Knowledgeable”, “Not at all Knowledgeable.”]

Please use the scale below to indicate how important it is to you that the federal government do what you think is best. [Subjects are shown a 5-point Likert scale: “Extremely Important”, “Very Important”, “Somewhat Important”, “Not too Important”, “Not at all Important”]

Please use the scale to tell us how important it is to you personally. [Subjects are shown a 5-point Likert scale: “Extremely Important”, “Very Important”, “Somewhat Important”, “Not too Important”, “Not at all Important”]

Please use the scale below to indicate how likely you are to change your position on the issue. [Subjects are shown a 5-point Likert scale: “Very Likely”, “Somewhat Likely”, “Neither Likely Nor Unlikely”, “Somewhat Unlikely”, “Very Unlikely”]

[The manipulation check item was asked in each experiment.]

In the news footage you saw earlier, would you say that the newscasters were more supportive of either the Democrats or the Republicans?
- A. Much more supportive of Democrats
- B. Somewhat more supportive of Democrats
- C. Equally supportive of both Democrats and Republicans
- D. Somewhat more supportive of Republicans
- E. Much more supportive of Republicans

Experiments 2

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⁶ Items in this section were combined into an index to measure attitude strength, α=0.63.
In today’s media marketplace, there are many different kinds of networks with different kinds of news shows that people might like to watch. For example, some people might like to watch a show from PBS, and others might like to watch a show from Fox News. If you had to pick which of the following types of news should would you most like to watch?

A. A show from PBS like The News Hour
B. A show from Fox News like The O’Reilly Factor
C. A show from MSNBC like Countdown with Keith Olbermann

Attitude Extremity Items: (α = 0.89)

[Items share a common response set: 9-point Likert scale ranging from “Very Strongly Agree” to “Very Strongly Disagree”:

- Trying terrorists in civilian courts gives them constitutional rights and protections they do not deserve.
- Civilian courts have successfully tried and convicted terrorism suspects in the past, and they can do so again in the future.
- Trying terrorists in civilian courts demonstrates the strength of the rule of law: our law beats their terrors.
- Terrorists are war criminals, and war criminals should be tried by military courts, not civilian ones.

If forced to choose, would you prefer that terrorism suspects be tried in civilian or military courts?
A. Military Courts
B. Civilian Courts
C. No Preference

[If prefer military or civilian courts:] Do you strongly prefer a [military/civilian] trial, or only somewhat prefer it?
A. Strongly prefer a [military/civilian] trial
B. Somewhat prefer a [military/civilian] trial

[The following demographic items were asked in experiments 2-3.]

I am:
A. Male
B. Female

My age is:
A. 18-28
B. 30-40
C. 41-64
D. Over 65
My highest level of schooling is:
   A. Did not finish high school
   B. High school graduate, no further schooling
   C. Some college, but no degree
   D. Community College/Associates degree
   E. Bachelor’s degree or equivalent
   F. Graduate or professional degree

I consider myself to be:
   A. Caucasian (White)
   B. African-American
   C. American Indian or Native American
   D. Asian-American

Experiment 3
[The following set of items all share a 7-point Likert scale, running from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”: ]

• The U.S. should build a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border to keep out illegal immigrants.
• Laws like the one recently passed in Arizona unfairly discriminate against all Latinos.
• Illegal immigrants take away jobs from ordinary Americans.
• Most illegal immigrants obey the laws and only want a better life for their families.
• Laws like the one recently passed in Arizona increase crime by making immigrants afraid to talk to the police.

Cronbach’s alpha, wave 1: 0.84
Cronbach’s alpha, wave 2: 0.81
Transcripts of Partisan Media Clips Used

Below, I have included the transcripts of the segments used in the experimental stimuli. The transcripts that appear below are from Lexis-Nexis.

Prosecuting Bush Administration Officials for Torture, Left-Wing Clip (Countdown with Keith Olbermann, 16 April 2009)

OLBERMANN: As promised, a Special Comment on the president’s revelation on the remainder of this nightmare of Bush administration torture memos.

Mr. President, when you say we must come together on behalf of our common future, you are entirely correct. We must focus on getting things right in the future as opposed to looking at what we got wrong in the past. That means prosecuting all those involved in the Bush administration’s torture of prisoners, even if the results are nominal (ph) punishments or merely new laws.

Your only other option is to let this sit and fester indefinitely -- because, sir, someday, there will be another Republican president, or even a Democrat just as blind as Mr. Bush, to ethics and this country’s moral force. And he will look back to what you did about Mr. Bush, or what you did not do. And he will see precedent, or as Mr. Cheney saw, he will see as how not to get caught the next time.

Prosecute, Mr. President. Even if you get not one conviction, you will still have accomplished good for generations unborn. Merely by acting, you will deny a further wrong that this construction will enter the history books: Torture was legal. It worked. It saved the country, the end.

This must not be.

"It is our intention," you said today, "to assure those who carried out their duties relying in good faith upon legal advice from the Department of Justice that they will not be subject to prosecution."

Mr. President, you are making history’s easiest, most often made, most dangerous mistake. You are accepting the defense that somebody was just following orders.

At the end of his first year in office, Mr. Lincoln tried to contextualize the Civil War for those who still wanted to compromise with the evils of secession and slavery. "The struggle of today," Lincoln wrote, "it’s not altogether for today -- it is for a vast future also."

Mr. President, you have now been handed the beginning of that vast future. Use it to protect our children and our distant descendants from anything like this ever happening again, by showing them that those who did this were neither unfairly scapegoated, nor absolved. It is good to say we won’t do it again. It is not, however, enough.
Prosecuting Bush Administration Officials for Torture, Right-Wing Clip (Hannity, 30 April 2009)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: Waterboarding violates our ideals and our values. I believe that waterboarding is torture. And I think that the -- whatever legal rationales were used, it was a mistake.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: And that was the president of the United States, accusing his predecessor of sanctioning torture. Now, these shocking and irresponsible comments come as we are still trying to decipher whether or not he supports prosecuting the Bush officials who laid the groundwork for the use of enhanced interrogation techniques.

Joining us now with reaction is Ann Coulter, the author of the best-selling book "Guilty." And Ann, welcome back to the show.

ANN COULTER, AUTHOR, "GUILTY": Thank you. Good to be here, Sean.

HANNITY: This is a question that I want to know. Because if the president changed his mind after saying over and over and over again, and his top aides said over and over again that he wasn't going to do this, I want to know who changed his mind, because that's probably the real president of the United States.

Do you suspect, as I do, that somebody influenced him and got to him and said, "Change your mind," and he just did it?

COULTER: Oh, that's a good point. I would like to know who the real president is, because I don't think it can actually be the teleprompter.

But I think what pushed him into this was the entire mainstream media screaming that this is torture, torture, torture, especially since the memos have been released, without giving you any details from those memos, although I summarized it in my column this week if anyone is interested.

I don't think anyone should be able to talk about what happened at Guantanamo without there being a little picture of a small caterpillar maybe on the side of the screen, because that was one of the tortures. Abu Zubaydah was supposed to be afraid of insects. And so the CIA interrogators requested to put an adorable little caterpillar in his cell with him, and the Department of Justice -- this was the hilarious part about these memos. How the Department of Justice kept stepping in and saying, "OK, you can put the caterpillar in his cell, but you must tell him it is not a stinging insect."

HANNITY: But...
COULTER: This is the sort of insane -- insane, you know, wussie interrogation procedures they're engaging in. And meanwhile, all you see in the headlines are torture, torture, torture.

Prosecuting Bush Administration Officials for Torture, Neutral Clip (PBS News Hour, 17 April 2009)

MARGARET WARNER: In the U.S. and around the world, there was angry reaction today to the Obama administration’s decision to release top-secret memos authorizing extreme interrogation techniques during the Bush administration and to the decision not to prosecute any CIA operatives who used those techniques.

For more now, we go to Ari Shapiro, justice correspondent for National Public Radio.

And, Ari, welcome.

ARI SHAPIRO, National Public Radio: Thanks for having me.

MARGARET WARNER: All right, what’s the origination of these memos? And how did they come to light now?

ARI SHAPIRO: Well, the ACLU had filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit about five years ago asking for these memos. Yesterday was a court deadline, and the Obama administration decided to release them, under some pressure, I might add, from current and former CIA officials not to release them.

So we have four memos. One is from 2002; the other three are from 2005. They’ve all since been revoked. And as you’ve said, they go into some detail about the kinds of extreme interrogation tactics that were allowed.

MARGARET WARNER: So give us examples of the kind of things that were allowed.

ARI SHAPIRO: Well, these memos literally have a list, one, two, three, four, five. And it ranges from nudity, to food deprivation, to dousing with water, to putting one detainee who was afraid of insects in a confined box with a bug to try to exploit that fear. And then, of course, there was waterboarding, which they describe as the most traumatic of the CIA interrogation techniques.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, explain what President Obama said and Attorney General Eric Holder said in announcing that, at the same time, none of the CIA agents who relied on these memos would be prosecuted.

ARI SHAPIRO: Well, President Obama called it a dark and painful chapter in our nation’s history, and he said nothing will be gained by spending our time and energy laying blame for the past.
The message from President Obama, CIA Director Leon Panetta, Attorney General Holder, broadly speaking, was, as you, the CIA, defend the country, we will defend you.

They said people who relied in good faith on this legal guidance should not be prosecuted for that, but they did not say anything about people who went beyond the legal guidance in the memo or the people who wrote the memos at the Justice Department in the first place.

MARGARET WARNER: And there are also calls on the Hill for more investigation.

ARI SHAPIRO: That’s right, calls for a truth commission, both on the Senate side and the House side, and these memos made those calls even louder.

**Cap-and-Trade/Climate Change, Left-Wing Clip (Countdown with Keith Olbermann, 9 December 2009)**

OLBERMANN: Having given her slight of hand stamp of approval to the birthers, Sarah Palin is now moving on to an almost equally popular far right mythology, climate change denial. In our number one story on the COUNTDOWN, Sister Sarah goes op-ed.

She went into full-on denial, climate change is all political mode. Referring to the president’s role in the upcoming international climate conference in Copenhagen, quote, "instead of staying home from Copenhagen and sending a message that the United States will not be a party to fraudulent scientific practices, the president has upped the ante. He plans to fly in at the climax of the conference in hopes of seeing a deal. What Obama really hopes to bring home from Copenhagen is more pressure to pass the Democrat’s cap and tax proposal. This is a political move. The last thing America needs is a misguided legislation that will raise taxes and cost jobs, particularly when the push for such legislations rests on agenda-driven science. The president should boycott Copenhagen."

OLBERMANN: Sister Sarah, even if all you anti-factualists were right, and climate change is entirely cyclical, not at all man-made, what would be the agenda, as you call it, carried out in its name? As Thomas Friedman noted recently, our nation’s economy would be powered by more energy sources, wind, solar, cleaner biofuels; new electric cars would run on batteries; America would become less dependent on foreign oil dictators; our trade deficit would improve. Agenda-driven insanity, indeed.

Let’s turn now to the Washington editor of "The Nation," Chris Hayes. Chris, good evening.

CHRISS HAYES, "THE NATION": Good evening, Keith.

OLBERMANN: From Mrs. Palin’s point of view, from the GOP point of view, is this at all about getting elected anymore, or is this just kind of political cover for big business? Keeping the country safe from polluters for another hour, another month, another year, whatever it is they can manage?
HAYES: Luckily, they go hand in hand. I actually think what’s motivating Palin -- and you can actually see, she has moved, you know, in the direction of the conspiracy theorists on this issue. What’s motivating her is the fact that the polling on this is really disturbing, because it has become an article of faith among the right wing base that this is a grand socialist conspiracy to usher in state control.

So I think she’s really, as she is want to do, pandering to that base right now. I think what’s driving that kind of op-ed, more than any kind of business shilling, is the fact that it has become one of these issues, like the birth certificate, that you can sort of win points with the base with.

**Cap-and-Trade/Climate Change, Right-Wing Clip (Hannity, 9 December 2009)**

Governor Sarah Palin has a suggestion for the president. In a "Washington Post" op-ed she writes, quote, "Without trustworthy science and with so much at stake, Americans should be wary about what comes out of this politicized conference. The president should boycott Copenhagen."

Joining me now with reaction to all of this, Republican strategist, Karen Hanretty, and from the FOX Business Network, our sister network, Sandra Smith is here.

KAREN HANretty, REPUBLICAN STRATEGIST: The Congressional Budget Office, right, this is this nonpartisan office, they don't have -- they're not Democrat, they're not Republican, they've come out and said, if you implement Barack Obama 's cap and trade policy in America which is really what this Copenhagen project is all about, you will, quote, "slow the economy."

We will lose jobs, electricity prices will go up and already we're seeing today an announcement in West Virginia, 500 coal miners are going to lose their job early next year.

HANNITY: That's frightening.

HANretty: . because of Barack Obama's policy.

HANNITY: But don't they really -- is this not the world's socialists and globalists meeting here really to get money from richer countries to redistribute it to the poorer countries?

SMITH: Yes, and in effect lessen the amount of jobs that we have here in this country and raise all our energy costs. Here's the thing. It's not that they're heading to Copenhagen to actually have a discussion on global warming. No.

HANNITY: No. They've decided.

SMITH: No, they've decided. And that's the problem. In Sarah Palin's op-ed, she was not decisive on anything. She was just saying maybe the president shouldn't go over there with these proposals in his hand and make decisions based on shaky details.
HANNITY: We know -- again, if you look at the inner governmental panel on climate change that the U.N. uses, the science that we now know is false and manipulated and fixed and phony and fraudulent, you know, they're using it for an agenda.

HANNITY: But the Heritage Foundation had an interesting study that we would literally lose millions of jobs and cost $3,000 a family.

SMITH: Sean, the cost -- and Palin made that point, too. The cost of this are very, very real. When you're talking about $1 trillion plan and on a whim moving forward with this when we still have shaky details, you know, to work off of, that's a problem.

HANNITY: All right. I say global warming is a hoax. I think it's based on a lie. I think this is manipulated phony science.

*Cap-and-Trade/Climate Change, Neutral Clip (PBS News Hour, 3 November 2009)*

KWAME HOLMAN: The bill is designed to counteract global warming, but, so far, it’s added to the partisan heat in Congress. That was on display this morning, as Democratic Senator Barbara Boxer of California convened a markup in the Environment and Public Works committee.

Republican chairs were empty, except for a brief appearance by George Voinovich of Ohio. Voinovich, like most Republicans, opposes the bill, arguing, the effects on the economy have not been fully examined.

SEN. GEORGE VOINOVICH (R), Ohio: The bill is 1,000 pages. The fact of the matter is, is that those 1,000 pages, in those 1,000 pages, the entire economy is going to be restructured. The bill will have an unprecedented impact on our national security, economy, environment, and energy needs. And, for that reason, all of the members should have a full understanding of what this means for their states and constituents.

KWAME HOLMAN: But Democrats seized on the Republicans’ absence.

SEN. BEN CARDIN (D), Maryland: And I’m disappointed because I think that, if my Republican colleagues were here, offering their amendments, we would have a good debate and reach decisions. And, quite frankly, I think we might even end up with a better bill.

SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D), California: To the author of this great bill...

KWAME HOLMAN: The object of the dispute is the legislation co-sponsored by Boxer and fellow Democrat John Kerry. It would mandate cuts of 20 percent in greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels by the year 2020, cap emissions allowances for industry, and create a market for companies to buy and sell pollution permits.
KWAME HOLMAN: European officials today pressed Washington to act. German Chancellor Angela Merkel told Congress there is no time to lose. And President Obama met with top officials of the European Union. He said they agreed, it’s imperative to make progress toward a framework international agreement.

**Afghanistan Surge, Left-Wing Clip (The Ed Show, 2 December 2009)**

ED SCHULTZ: Mixed reaction to the president’s speech at West Point and I heard (ph) a lot of progressives are not convinced and many Americans have had enough of sending our soldiers and our tax dollars to war.

Joining me now is New York Congressman Eric Massa. Congressman Massa sits on the Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees and has been adamantly opposed to any additional build-up of troops in Afghanistan.

Congressman, did the president say anything tonight that might warm you up to what he’s trying to accomplish?

REP. ERIC MASSA (D), ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: No. And I have to ask you a question - why 30,000 troops and not 40,000? Why 30,000 troops and not 20,000? Why 18 months and not 16 or 24? These are artificial timelines and numbers that have no true military significance as planners sit down and develop what’s called troop to task requirements.

There is nothing that I heard tonight that would convince me that we are embarking on a strategic mission that is both vital and necessary. We invaded Afghanistan with less than 1,000 Special Forces personnel and killed or captured over 98 percent of all the terrorists that we could identify. And now, with the remaining few, less than 100 according to the National Security Adviser, we’re going to deploy an army of 100,000 to rebuild the nation?

The president says as one of his major points, we are going to act as a partnership with the Afghan government and yet, we all know, anyone who has studied it, anyone who has his eyes and ears open that that government is corrupt beyond malice.

I think and I hold strong objection to sending American soldiers into harm’s way in combat to prop up a government that is more corrupt than Tony Soprano and his lieutenants. And so, no, I heard nothing tonight that would sway me against my absolute objection to what I consider to be a fool’s errand.

SCHULTZ: But why shouldn’t the president be given an opportunity to fix this? He didn’t create this. He inherited this. And his generals have now come to him with plans that could stabilize the country. Shouldn’t the Progressive caucus give him the benefit of the doubt and let him make his mistake on this, if it is one?

MASSA: Ed, no, because we’re dealing with a mistake that deals with the lives of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. And so, no, the answer to that is very clear in my opinion. My
life’s experience, 24 years in the United States military is yelling at me, telling me that it is impossible to build a nation where there’s fundamentally no Afghan identity.

We hear over and over and over again from Afghan nationals that they’re going to be there with whoever is there with them. We cannot stay forever and I think it objectionable and wrong to send Americans to fight and die for that which the Afghan people will not fight and die for.

You just saw a series of interviews. Able-bodied military age males, why are they not in uniform? Why are they not standing and fighting for their own freedoms? And why do they expect us and our men and women in uniform to do it for them?

This is not an issue about politics. It’s not about an issue about standing with the president, one president or the other. It’s about deploying five, six, seven times American military personnel to do what is militarily impossible, and I think that we must raise our voices, not as Liberals or Progressives or Conservatives or Republicans or Democrats, but as thinking, common sense Americans who have seen this movie before and we know how it is going to end.

The president has said that we’re going to operate in partnership with the Afghan government. Then we hear behind the scenes that we’re talking about bypassing Kabul and the corrupt Karzai regime.

SCHULTZ: Yes.

MASSA: … and going directly to inject money into the villages and towns in the country side. We can’t get money injected into the villages and towns and cities back in my home district to get people back to work. Why are we worried about building an infrastructure in a country that neither wants one or.

SCHULTZ: Because.

MASSA: . will do one for themselves?

SCHULTZ: Because the president said tonight that our security is at stake. You don’t believe that?

MASSA: Well, I - I disagree with that analysis. If our security is at stake to the extent that we must rebuild a nation because there are 100 terrorists in Afghanistan, then we’d better be willing to occupy every single nation on the face of this planet and do the same.

Our mission is to identify, locate, kill or capture with malice of forethought any terrorists anywhere. That does not call for a standing army of 100,000 people executing an occupational strategy in a foreign nation. We have tried this over and over and over again, and it has never once worked. You cannot achieve this militarily - period.
SEAN HANNITY: And former vice president Dick Cheney came out swinging earlier today before the president had announced his war plans. Cheney criticized the president for taking so long to announce his intentions, arguing that Obama's hesitation projects weakness abroad. And here is what he told Politico.com.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DICK CHENEY, (R) FORMER U.S. VICE PRESIDENT: The mere fact of delaying this long to make a decision or of having nine meeting during which he discussed the decision, this continual agonizing over what the policy ought to be, has consequences. It has consequences for your forces in the field.

HANNITY: And that's not all. The vice president also said that the president's three-month delay may have dire consequences for our effort to convince the Afghans to fight our terrorist enemies.

Let's take a look at that.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

CHENEY: The average Afghan in the street who is not a member of the Taliban is not an insurgent or a guerilla fighter or a terrorist. But he's watching. And he sees hesitation on the part of the United States.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: And joining me now with reaction to all of this is Indiana Congressman Mike Pence. Congressman, good to see you. Thanks for being here.

MIKE PENCE, (R) INDIANA CONGRESSMAN: Thanks, Sean.

HANNITY: Dick Cheney says I begin to get nervous when I see the commander in chief making decisions apparently for what I describe as "small p" political reasons where he is trying to balance the different competing groups of society.

Now, he did not give General McChrystal the 40,000 troops. So was that 10,000 troop number given for his political base? Is that a fair question?

PENCE: I think it is a fair question, and it's one that we intend to bring up with Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton when they come before the foreign affairs committee tomorrow, Sean.

It is a policy, I think John McCain said this well earlier, and I agree with him, I think it is important that we support the president's decision to surge forces in Afghanistan even at the
level that he is calling for them. I think it is incumbent those of us who supported the war in Afghanistan from the beginning to get the president's back on that.

But there really are profound questions about why all the wait here. in effect, the president supported most of what General McChrystal was calling for. Why did we take three months?

To former vice president Dick Cheney's point, why the delays, why the nine separate meetings at the White House? And maybe it was because there was also a lot of talk about what does give many of us pause, and this is this discussion about timelines and benchmarks, and talk on Capitol Hill about raising taxes in the form of a war surtax.

Now, I know the president as a candidate opposed the surge. I know that candidate Barack Obama said that the surge in Iraq would actually make matters worse.

Tonight was as close as he has ever come to acknowledging a surge strategy was successful. It was successful in Iraq, and one of the reasons it was, as you know, Sean, is because President Bush went before Congress of January of and said, "We are committed to winning the war in Iraq."

He said to me personally, "I decided not to lose." And it was that constancy and the commitment of our soldiers that made the surge work there and it would make it work here.

HANNITY: To set a timeline for 18 months, are we telling our enemies to just wait us out, and then it is all yours when we are out of there. Isn't that what he's saying?

PENCE: Absolutely. I think telling the enemy when you commitment to win will run out is a prescription for defeat.

And I really do believe -- and, again, you remember in the last Congress. I think the Pelosi Democrats tried to pass artificial timelines for withdrawal from Iraq about a dozen times. We are ready for those battles again.

I think the president was right tonight when he said that that nexus between Pakistan and Afghanistan represents a threat to the world. That means it ought to be worth more than an 18-month commitment by the United States. We ought to say we are in it to win it.

HANNITY: I might surprise you congressman. I want to applaud the president tonight in one regard. He did not accuse our troops of air raiding villages and killing civilians. So that's a bit of progress in my view.

Afghanistan Surge, Neutral Clip (PBS News Hour, 2 December 2009)

JIM LEHRER: President Obama's new war strategy in Afghanistan drew strong reactions at home and abroad today.

Gwen Ifill has our lead story report.
GWEN IFILL: The White House rolled out its defense of the president's new war policy first thing this morning on Capitol Hill.

But the secretaries of state and defense quickly encountered skepticism about the decision to send in 30,000 more U.S. troops. Some of it came from members of the president's own party.

Michigan Senator Carl Levin, a leading Democrat:

SEN. CARL LEVIN, D-Mich., armed services committee chairman: General James Conway, the commandant of the Marine Corps, said in September, "If I could change only one thing in the south of Afghanistan, it would be to have more Afghan troops."

Well, it seems to me that the large influx of U.S. combat troops will put more U.S. Marines on street corners in Afghan villages, with too few Afghan partners alongside them.

GWEN IFILL: Echoing the reasoning the president laid out in last night's prime-time address, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the Afghan mission is critical to American and global security.

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON: The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have a greater capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag an entire region into chaos.

GWEN IFILL: Republicans in general supported the new deployment, but questioned the president's plan to begin pulling troops out in the summer of 2011. Senator John McCain said that amounts to sounding an uncertain trumpet.

SEN. JOHN MCCAIN, R-Ariz.: You either have a winning strategy and do as we did in Iraq, and then, once it's succeeded, then we withdraw, or we -- as -- as the president said, we will have a date beginning withdrawal of July 2011.

Which is it? It's got to be one or the other. It's got to be the appropriate conditions, or it's got to be an arbitrary date. I -- you can't have both.

GWEN IFILL: Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the administration will decide at the end of 2010 if 2011 is a realistic target date.

ROBERT GATES: Quite frankly, I detest the phrase exit strategy, because what we are looking at over time is a transition in our relationship with the Afghans.

GWEN IFILL: Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed. Much, he said, depends on whether Afghans will be ready to take responsibility for their own security.
GWEN IFILL: Later, Mullen, Gates and Clinton faced similar questions from members of the House. Republican Jeff Flake of Arizona challenged Clinton at a Foreign Affairs Committee hearing.

REP. JEFF FLAKE, R-Ariz.: There's an old adage that a camel is a horse designed by committee. And, in many ways, I think this looks to be a policy designed by committee, a little something for everybody. For those who want to get out, there's the timetable. For those who want to get in, we have the surge. But it may not work very well.

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON: Congressman, camels are very sturdy animals. They are patient and may be plodding, but they eventually get to where you hope they will arrive.

In Afghanistan, the top U.S. commander, General Stanley McChrystal, said he's absolutely supportive of the Obama plan, including its timeline.

GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRystal: I believe that, by next summer, the uplift of new forces will make a difference on the ground significantly. I believe that, by this time next year, we will see a level of progress that will convince us that we can clearly articulate the progress and predict the effect -- the effectiveness of our operations.

Civilian vs. Military Trials for Terrorism Suspects, Left-Wing Clip (Countdown with Keith Olbermann, 16 November 2009)

KEITH OLBERMANN: If any doubt remained about how far mainstream Republicans have strayed from defending or even remembering the real American way, it should finally lie to rest with news that the American justice system is now considered by Republicans a last resort.

Rudy Giuliani yesterday responding to word that the Obama administration will end Mr. Bush’s years of delay and bring Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to trial in New York City, he made the bizarre argument that America should not do that because that’s what Mohammed wants us to do.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

CHRIS WALLACE, FOX NEWS: After the 2006 trial of the so-called "20th hijacker" Zacarias Moussaoui, you said, "It shows we can give people a fair trial, that we are exactly what we say we are. We are a nation of law."

Respectfully, Mayor, you supported civilian trials for terrorists then.

GIULIANI: If there’s no other alternative, I support civilian trials for terrorists.

(END VIDEO CLIP)
OLBERMANN: Since when is America in the business of relying on its justice system as a last resort? And, by the way, when is America in the business of granting the wishes of terrorists, well, when they wish for a lawyer phone call jury of their peers or to face their accusers, when they wish for a last meal perhaps?

We call them terrorists because what they really want is to frighten us into changing how we do things, who we are. And that is precisely what Mr. Giuliani, who once suggested he should stay mayor even after his term expired proposes to give them. It’s a principle Mr. Giuliani used to understand, declaring after 9/11, quote, "a renewed devotion to the rule of law."

Here with us tonight: MSNBC political analyst, Jonathan Alter, also national affairs columnist for "Newsweek" magazine.

Jon, thanks for coming in.

JONATHAN ALTER, MSNBC POLITICAL ANALYST: The other thing we haven’t mentioned is that this will bring a faster conviction than in the military tribunals because the tribunals are uncharted waters. There’s much more room for appeal. Remember, after tribunal, there’s an appeal up to the Supreme Court and those appeals will take longer than the appeals in this case.

So, if you want him brought to justice more quickly, it’s still going to take several years, then you should favor this option.

Civilian vs. Military Trials for Terrorism Suspects, Right-Wing Clip (The O'Reilly Factor, 13 November 2009)

BILL O'REILLY: Hi, I'm Bill O'Reilly. Thanks for watching us tonight. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gets a break. That is the subject of this evening's "Talking Points Memo." Mohammed, the al Qaeda big shot involved in planning the 9/11 atrocity, is perhaps the biggest terrorist ever captured by America. As you may know, he was water boarded and gave up some of his al Qaeda colleagues, who were then taken in custody.

For the past three years, Mohammed has been in prison at Guantanamo Bay, where he should have been tried in front of a military tribunal. The man is a war criminal. He killed thousands of civilians. That's what war criminals do. It's hard to believe the Obama administration doesn't understand that. So now Mohammed will be tried in a New York City civilian court and New York Congressman Peter King is outraged.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

REP. PETER KING (R), NEW YORK: Absolutely no purpose to be gained by this. It's going to put Americans at risk and probably most importantly, it's going to be giving constitutional right to war criminals who are not entitled to them. This, I think, will go down as one of the worst decisions any president has ever made.
O'REILLY: But the Obama administration sees it differently.

ERIC HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL: I'm a prosecutor myself. I've looked at the evidence. I've considered the problems that these cases present. And I'm quite confident that we're going to be successful in the prosecution efforts. To the extent that there are political consequences, well, you know, I'll just have to take my lumps to the extent that those are set my way.

O'REILLY: And there will be lumps. "Talking Points" believes that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will not be on trial in New York City. Water boarding and the CIA will be. The exposition is likely will be a fiasco. It will take years. It will cost tens of millions of taxpayer dollars.

Again, why are we doing this? Do you think the 9/11 families want to see a circus? Do you think they appreciate the fact that an al Qaeda killer and his lawyers will get to spew all kind of anti-American propaganda? Because that's what's going to happen.

This is indefensible. War criminals should be tried by military people. If you don't know about the trials at Nuremberg, look them up. Herman Goering was not taken to New York City and tried before a civilian jury because that would have been insane, just as this is.

Civilian vs. Military Trials for Terrorism Suspects, Neutral Clip (PBS News Hour, 13 November 2009)

JIM LEHRER: The self-proclaimed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks will face trial in federal court. Ray Suarez has our "Lead Story" report.

RAY SUAREZ: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed topped the list today. He has claimed direct credit for organizing the airliner attacks of September 11.

In Washington, Attorney General Eric Holder said Mohammed and four co-conspirators will be tried just blocks from where the Twin Towers fell.

ERIC HOLDER, U.S. Attorney General: The Justice Department has a long and a successful history of prosecuting terrorists for their crimes against our nation, particularly in New York. Although these cases can often be complex and challenging, federal prosecutors have successfully met these challenges and have convicted a number of terrorists who are now serving lengthy sentences in our prisons.
RAY SUAREZ: The suspects have been held for as long as five years at secret sites and at Guantanamo, and have been subjected to harsh interrogations. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was reportedly water-boarded 183 times in 2003, before the practice was banned.

But at today’s news conference, Attorney General Holder said he was sure of convictions.

ERIC HOLDER: But the reality is -- and I want to be as assuring as I can -- that, based on all of my experience, and based on all of the recommendations and the great work and the research that has been done, that I am quite confident that the outcomes in these cases will be successful ones.

RAY SUAREZ: The idea of bringing the detainees to the U.S. has already run into resistance.

REP. PETER KING (R-NY), Homeland Security Committee Ranking Member: This is one of the most disgraceful decisions any president has ever made, to be giving constitutional rights to international terrorists.

RAY SUAREZ: Another group of Guantanamo detainees will not go to federal court. Instead, they will be tried for their alleged crimes before military commissions.

Arizona Immigration Law, Left-Wing Clip (Countdown with Keith Olbermann, 23 April 2010)

OLBERMANN: Good evening from New York. Just hours ago, the governor of Arizona signed into law an immigration bill that may in practical terms mandate racial profiling.

Governor Brewer today signed into law and then defended a law that allows Arizona police to stop anyone on-site and ask them to produce papers, proving that they are in the country legally if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person may be in the country illegally.

OLBERMANN: The president called for comprehensive immigration reform and took the opportunity to critique the Arizona bill.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: Indeed, our failure to act responsibly at the federal level will only open the door to irresponsibility by others. That includes, for example, the recent efforts in Arizona which threaten to undermine basic notions of fairness that we cherish as Americans, as well as the trust between police and their communities that is so crucial to keeping us safe. In fact, I’ve instructed members of my administration to closely monitor the situation and examine the civil rights and other implications of this legislation. But if we continue to fail to act as a federal level, we will continue to see misguided efforts opening up around the country.

(END VIDEO CLIP)
OLBERMANN: Opponents of that misguided Arizona immigration measure include Arizona’s attorney general, Terry Goddard, and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. Catholic bishops opposed the law. Reverend Jim Wallis of the progressive Christian group Sojourners has said in a statement that churches will not comply with it for moral reasons.

Protesters who camped out at the Arizona state capitol for days in opposition to this bill reacted to the governor’s act, the signing today, with boos and chants of "Shame on you."

Joining me now: Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez of California’s 47th district.

REP. LORETTA SANCHEZ (D), CALIFORNIA: Let me just add one other thing that really worries me, and this comes from my law enforcement. Now, some people say, oh, the cops want this, law enforcement want this, the police chiefs of my area do not want to have an immigrant community. When you begin to shut down a community because they may not -- their people may not have the status, therefore they don’t want to interact with the police, then criminals can hide within those communities.

OLBERMANN: Right.

SANCHEZ: Even criminals who are not part of that community.

OLBERMANN: Yes, that becomes a new self-feeding problem that can replace the problem they think they’re fixing here.

SANCHEZ: And then there’s more crime.

OLBERMANN: Exactly.

SANCHEZ: So my police officials actually are against these types of situations.

Arizona Immigration Law, Right-Wing Clip (The O'Reilly Factor, 3 May 2010)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The racism in this country is well known. Arizona has just pulled the sheets off of it.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

O'REILLY: The pro-illegal alien lobby is using the racism card once again. But how do they explain an Arizona sheriff’s deputy gunned down by Mexican drug dealers? We'll investigate.

Apparently, the far left is using the new alien law in Arizona to vent its anger. But what is the truth behind the law that allows local and state authorities to investigate immigration status?
Governor Jan Brewer has ordered Arizona police not, not to question anyone unless the cops are already involved with that person. That is investigating a violation. If police cannot prove their questioning is lawful, they can and will be sued. All foreigners in the USA are required by law to carry identification. But the Arizona police cannot question foreigners simply because of that. There has to be another reason. Nevertheless, nevertheless, the far left media in America has defined the law in Nazi terms.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

JOY BEHAR: We're going to judge you on how you look. We are going to throw you in jail. And also, they're going to throw these people in jail for six months?

MICHAEL MOORE: I think it's a result of a bunch of bigots in the Republican party of Arizona. That's what it's the result of. And it's sad that they're behaving that way and it makes the rest of us look bad as Americans.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

O'REILLY: Nonsense, nonsense. Arizona had to do something. In the capital city, Phoenix, crime's out of control. For example, last year, New York City was six times as many residents as Phoenix had just 16,000 more reported crimes. San Diego, the same size as Phoenix, has 60 percent less crime.

The recent murder of an Arizona rancher by a suspected illegal alien and the shooting of a deputy sheriff by alleged alien drug dealers have made the situation almost desperate. Arizona has almost a half million illegal aliens on the ground, costing the state about $1.3 billion a year, money Arizona doesn't have. So a reasonable person can understand why the state instituted a crackdown.

But the liberal press is having none of that. Led by some "Washington Post" columnists at NBC News, cries of racism fill the air.

Arizona Immigration Law, Neutral Clip (PBS News Hour, 23 April 2010)

JEFFREY BROWN: In Arizona, where the governor approved a tough new law aimed at illegal immigrants. In Phoenix, as protesters and supporters of the measure flocked to the state capital today, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed one of the country’s strictest immigration laws.

Among other provisions, the law calls on police to question someone’s immigration status if -- quote -- "reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States."

Arizona is believed to have some 460,000 illegal immigrants, with the most illegal border crossings in the country. Tensions there grew last month when rancher Bob Krentz was shot
to death in southeastern Arizona. Authorities believe he was killed by an illegal migrant, but the case remains open.

Governor Brewer, a Republican, faces a tough primary reelection challenger in the upcoming primary who supported the passage of the bill.

And joining us for more on today’s developments are Congressman Raul Grijalva, a Democrat who represents Arizona’s 7th District, which shares a 300-mile border with Mexico, and Michael Hethmon, general counsel for the Immigration Law Reform Institute. He helped write the Arizona bill.

Mr. Hethmon, you worked with the people in Arizona. Why did they feel this bill was -- this law was necessary?

MICHAEL HETHMON, General Counsel, Immigration Law Reform Institute: Well, this is the -- the culmination of an effort by Senator Pearce and other legislators since 2004 to deal with the federal government’s failure to develop a viable, sustainable immigration policy, which means control of illegal immigration and the reduction of legal immigration to sustainable levels.

REP. RAUL GRIJALVA: So, you know, I -- it's a convenient excuse to say we want to control immigration and we want to limit immigration and, at the same time, provide no reasonable, rational approach to it.

I think this legislation is a harbinger for very bad things.
Works Cited [Not Cited in the Body of the Paper]:


Eriksson, Kimmo and Brent Simpson. 2010. “Reactions to Losing Explain Gender Differences in Entering a Risky Lottery.” Judgment and Decision Making. 5:159-163.


Table A1: Descriptive Statistics, Dependent Variable, by Experiment

Note: Cell entries give the N, mean, and standard deviation of the dependent variable measure by experiment. All experiments give the figures for the attitude extremity measure on the [-1,1] scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>Number of Subjects</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 3, Wave 1</td>
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<td>Experiment 3, Wave 2</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>Pre-Test Attitude</td>
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<td>0.77 (0.03)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.25 (0.34)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.15)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Respondent* Pre-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Attitude</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Respondent</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Includes Issue Fixed Effects?</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Subjects)</td>
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<td>720 (164)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2: Testing For Differential Treatment Effects by Party, Experiment 1

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, see the text for additional details.
Table A3: Fully Saturated Model, with Independents

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses; see the text for additional details.
Table A4: Validating the Measure of Media Preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency of Like-Minded Media Consumption</th>
<th>Frequency of Cross-Cutting Media Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prefer Like-Minded Media</td>
<td>1.96 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.32 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer Cross-Cutting Media</td>
<td>0.32 (0.34)</td>
<td>2.09 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.15 (0.14)</td>
<td>1.82 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
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<td>124</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with associated standard errors underneath in parentheses; see table 2 for additional details.
<table>
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<th>Strength of Party ID</th>
<th>Same-Party Feeling Thermometer</th>
<th>Other-Party Feeling Thermometer</th>
<th>Obama Approval</th>
<th>2008 Turnout</th>
<th>Primary Turnout</th>
<th>Number of Campaign Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prefer Like-Minded Media</td>
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<td>6.45 (3.92)</td>
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<td>-0.80 (0.24)</td>
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<td>0.32 (0.25)</td>
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<td>Prefer Cross-Cutting Media</td>
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<td>-2.54 (6.24)</td>
<td>11.23 (5.26)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.71)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.65)</td>
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<td>Democrat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.46 (0.21)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Prefer Like-Minded Media*Democrat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.84 (0.32)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer Cross-Cutting Media*Democrat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-1.29 (0.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.62 (0.10)</td>
<td>60.77 (2.62)</td>
<td>19.16 (2.25)</td>
<td>2.26 (0.16)</td>
<td>1.04 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.23)</td>
<td>1.11 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
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<td>136</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table A5: Partisan Media, Attitude Extremity, and Participation

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with associated standard errors underneath (except for the turnout models, which report logistic regression coefficients and standard errors).

Unless otherwise specified, readers should assume all future appendix tables contain OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors underneath.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Hispanic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
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<td>Sorted Partisan</td>
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<td>Total Media Consumption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watch Like-Minded Media</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watch Cross-Cutting Media</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A6: Partisan Media Consumption and Political Information, Pew Data

Note: cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses; coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 are given in bold.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Following Campaign</th>
<th>Days Discussing Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.59 (0.08)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.04 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>0.16 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born-Again Christian</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.03 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.50 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southerner</td>
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<td>0.14 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.04 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
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<td>0.20 (0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal-Conservative Self ID Strength</td>
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<td>0.25 (0.02)</td>
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<td>0.95 (0.05)</td>
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Table A7: Political/Campaign Interest, NAES 2008 Data

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses; coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels are given in **bold**.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gay Marriage</th>
<th>Tax Cuts</th>
<th>Withdraw Troops from Iraq</th>
<th>Abortion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>Married</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watch Like-Minded Media</td>
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<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
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<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\tau_3$</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.46</td>
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</tr>
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Table A8: Effect of Partisan Media on Attitude Extremity, 2008 NAES Data

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses; coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels are given in bold.
Table A9: Effects of Partisan Media Relative to an Apolitical Control

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Standard Error</th>
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<td>Like-Minded Media</td>
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<td>Neutral Media</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Estimate</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Like-Minded Treatment</td>
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Table A10: Editorial Experiment Results
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<th>Estimate</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Cross-Cutting Treatment</td>
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<td>(0.64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned Preferred Treatment</td>
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<td>(0.64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Like-Minded Treatment*Assigned Preferred Treatment</td>
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<td>(0.93)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-Cutting Treatment*Assigned Preferred Treatment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
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Table A11: Attitude Durability over Three Days