

Online Appendix for:  
Drafting Support for War: Conscription and Mass Support for Warfare  
*Journal of Politics*

Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew S. Levendusky  
26 August 2010

Table of Contents:

Original Survey Items	1-2
Control Variable Coding	3
Gender and the Draft	4
Supplemental Experiments, Casualties Factor	5-9
Supplemental Experiments, “Real World” Scenarios	10-19
Hawkishness as a Moderator of Experimental Effects	20-21
Items Used in the Supplemental Experiments	22-25
Tables	26-35
References	36

## Original Survey Items

The survey items used in the paper come from a survey conducted with Knowledge Networks between 17 and 30 December 2008. 3281 respondents were invited to participate in the study, with 2098 actually completing the study, for a completion rate of 63.9%. Below, we present the actual survey items used in our study. Note that respondents saw each item separately.

Q1. Some people believe the United States should solve international problems by using diplomacy and other forms of international pressure and use military force only if absolutely necessary. Suppose we put such people at 1 on this scale. Others believe diplomacy and pressure often fail and the US must be ready to use military force. Suppose we put them at number 7. And of course others fall at positions in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. What about you: where would you place yourself on this scale? 1. U.S. should solve with diplomacy and international pressure 2. U.S. should be willing to solve with diplomacy and international pressure 3. U.S. should not rule out solving with diplomacy and international pressure. 4. U.S. should equally consider diplomacy and military force 5. U.S. should not rule out the use of military force 6. U.S. must be willing to consider using military force 7. U.S. must be ready to use military force

Now we are going to describe a separate scenario involving U.S. leaders dealing with other nations. Please read the questions carefully.

Q2. [If draft=control] There have recently been several stories in the news about the U.S. armed forces. Have you heard about these stories? 1. Yes 2.No

Q2. [If draft=treatment] There have recently been several stories in the news about the U.S. armed forces. Our armed forces are currently composed entirely of volunteers, where only those who agree to serve join the military and face combat. After the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, some leaders argue that we should change this system and re-introduce a draft so that all American citizens would be eligible to serve in the armed forces. Congressional leaders think this is highly likely to happen before the next war. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors. This would occur prior to American involvement in a future international conflict. Have you heard about these stories? 1. Yes 2.No

Q3. A country is threatening to invade its neighbor. The threatened nation has asked the U.S. to send troops to help their military. The U.S. President is considering sending the United States military to help the country that was attacked. [Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the U.S. forces would easily overwhelm the opposition./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong.]

[If draft=control:] Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect the threatened country? [If draft=treatment:] Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect the threatened country if a draft were reintroduced before the war? The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

1. Definitely should send troops 2 Should send troops 3. Should not send troops  
4. Definitely should not send troops

Q4. What is the probability that the United States will reintroduce a draft system for military recruiting? 1. Very unlikely 2. Somewhat unlikely 3. Neither likely nor unlikely 4. Somewhat likely 5. Very likely

## Gender and the Draft

In our experiments, we did not exclude women from the draft. We presented a gender-neutral draft prompt for three main reasons. First, this mirrors the 2006 Charlie Rangel proposal to reinstate the draft that received the most media coverage on this issue (Heilprin 2006). Second, the range of recent articles about the increasing prominence of women in the military, including a special series in the New York Times, suggests there is no reason to presume people would assume their exclusion if another draft occurred (Meyers 2009; Alvarez 2009). Third, the trend of recent events in the United States, including the decision to lift the ban on women serving in submarines, is in favor of more integration (Associated Press 2010). Thus, we believe it is probably most straightforward to frame the treatment in terms of all citizens being eligible, so we wrote our draft prompt accordingly.

## Supplemental Experiments, Casualties Factor

In what follows, we describe the results of a series of additional experiments to test the robustness and validity of our results. First, we detail a series of experiments that vary the wording of the casualties factor. We then discuss a series of experiments that more closely mirror “real world” scenarios to test the robustness of our results. Finally, we discuss the potential for interactions between some of the variables in our main experiment, especially hawkishness and whether or not respondents have children. For specific details on these supplemental surveys, please see below.

### Casualties and Success

In our casualties manipulation, rather than just stating that experts expected casualties to be high or low, we gave a justification of those expectations to the respondents (either that casualty risks were low because “U.S. forces will easily overwhelm the opposition” or they were high because “the opposing forces are quite strong”). One concern is that subjects are not just responding to the expectations about casualties, but also about the likelihood of success (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility to us). This could potentially skew our results for two reasons: (1) the conflation of success and casualties might influence how subjects evaluated the importance of conscription (based on hypothesis 2), or (2) by conflating success and casualties, we might have over-estimated the effects of casualties on support for sending troops (even if there is no effect on conscription). To address this concern, we ran another version of our experiment where we gave randomly assigned subjects to see one of four versions of our casualties manipulation: the casualties factor as given in the initial experiments, or a version which simply gives the expectations about casualty levels, without any arguments about

the likelihood of success; subjects were also independently randomized into the treatment and control conditions on the draft factor as well. This allows us to examine whether subjects are really responding to our claims about casualty levels, or rather simply to perceptions of the likelihood of success.

We gathered the data for this additional experiment (and the ones that follow) from on-line convenience samples (via Amazon's Mechanical Turk service), so the data do not in any way constitute a random sample of the U.S. population. Given this, these results lack straightforward ecological validity (i.e., they do not generalize to the broader U.S. population). That said, a convenience sample can still help us ensure that our particular wording did not skew our results. Obviously random samples of the U.S. population would be ideal, but lacking them is not a particular impediment in this case.

One concern with on-line convenience samples is that subjects may simply satisfice, completing the survey as quickly as possible to receive their small monetary reward (subjects were paid between \$0.50 and \$1.50 for completing each experiment). While satisficing is always a concern with any sort of survey data (Krosnick 1999), it is a particular concern with online subjects, who cannot be monitored by an interviewer or experimenter (as they could be with a phone survey or laboratory experiment). To ensure that subjects are actually attending to our experimental manipulations, we included a small "attentiveness check" at the end of our instrument.<sup>1</sup> Such items are commonly used by psychologists collecting this sort of data (Oppenheimer et al. 2009), and have been used by other political scientists gathering similar sorts of data as well (Kriner and Shen 2010). Using this, we find that approximately 80 percent of our subjects are paying attention (that is, approximately 80 percent of the subjects successfully

---

<sup>1</sup> The attentiveness check is an item that appears to be asking subjects where they get their political news, but if subjects read the instructions for the item, simply asks them to write an unrelated brief phrase in a text box.

complete the task).<sup>2</sup> In the results we report below, we include all subjects (including those who fail the attention task) because we want to report conservative estimates (and including these respondents is equivalent to including random noise into our measure). We have also estimated our results on only the attentive sample, and the results do not change.

Table 1 gives the simple statistical results of this experiment decoupling expected casualties and perceptions of success.<sup>3</sup>

[Insert table 1 about here]

Table 1 verifies a strong negative relationship still exists between conscription and public support for going to war. Looking at the raw data, in the high casualties condition, there is no difference in support for sending troops between those who see the success language and those who do not (35 percent support when the success language is included, and 36 percent support it when it is not, and that difference is not statistically significant,  $p=0.96$ ). In the low expected casualty condition, there is a difference: 42 percent support sending troops when the success language is not included, but that figure rises to 53 percent when it is, but it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ( $p=0.21$ ).<sup>4</sup> What does this imply for our results? It suggests that the phrasing of the casualties item might lead us to slightly over-estimate the effect of casualties on support for the war (given that support in the low casualties condition is higher when the success language is included, thereby increasing the difference between the high and

---

<sup>2</sup> We included these checks in the surveys for the three specific-scenario experiments we describe below (unfortunately one was not included in the casualties and success experiment). For the China experiment, 79% of respondents are attentive, 86% are attention in the Iran experiment, and 78% are attentive in the Yemen experiment.

<sup>3</sup> Those interested in seeing the raw levels of support for this experiment should see table 2. [Insert table 2 about here]

<sup>4</sup> Technically, these p-values are too low: we should be adjusting for the fact that there are multiple comparisons here (i.e., we could compare low casualty respondents who see the success language to high casualty respondents who do not see the success language). That is, we should apply a multiple comparisons correction (such as Tukey's HSD method) to inflate the p-values as necessary. That said, we chose to present the unadjusted comparisons as an extremely conservative standard (given that presenting the unadjusted p-values works against our hypothesis by making it easier to find an effect).

low casualties condition).<sup>5</sup> That said, however, given that the difference is not statistically significant, however, the effect is likely to be quite modest. Further, this does not affect our main substantive finding about the effect of the draft, so the consequences for our substantive conclusions are minimal.

### Casualties and Risk Acceptance

One further concern with the wording of our casualties factor is that we have a high or low risk of “significant U.S. casualties,” rather than simply expecting high or low casualties. Given this wording, respondent’s risk acceptance might confound our results. That is, maybe risk-averse subjects are especially sensitive to the wording of our original experiment.<sup>6</sup> To test this, we conducted another supplemental experiment, where we varied the wording of the casualties factor, giving some subjects the original wording, and other subjects a wording that indicated foreign policy experts expected high or low casualties (again, see below for the specific question wording). Table 3 gives the results.

[Insert table 3 about here]

Table 3 shows that adding this language has no effect: the factor measuring the effect of the prospect theory language is statistically insignificant. But perhaps there is simply an interactive effect: the prospect theory language might matter only in the high casualties case. The data is not consistent with this hypothesis either (see model 2).<sup>7</sup> It appears here that this particular aspect of

---

<sup>5</sup> One additional concern is that the success language might interact with either another experimental factor (such as the draft) or with other control variables (such as prior military service). We checked these possibilities and found no interactive effects.

<sup>6</sup> We thank Adam Berinsky for making this point to us.

<sup>7</sup> The raw levels of support are: all-volunteer force with low casualties and original language: 56%; all-volunteer force with low casualties and new language: 68%; all-volunteer force with high casualties and original language: 37%; all-volunteer force with high casualties and new language: 29%; draft force with low casualties and original language: 31%; draft force with low casualties and new language: 43%; draft force with high casualties and original language: 16%; draft force with high casualties and new language: 19%.

the wording did not really influence our results. One limitation of this setup, however, is that given the nature of these experiments, risk acceptance factors in to both sets of experiments: they are implicitly about future settings. That said, however, it is unclear how to test this sort of hypothesis in another setting, so we leave that for future work.

## **Supplemental Experiments, “Real World” Settings**

Another concern with the experimental approach used in the paper is that our scenario is very “bare bones.” Our experiment attempts to create a baseline or generalized notion of the relationship between conscription and public support for the use of force. It does not name or provide any information about the countries involved in the dispute. As we explained in the paper, establishing the baseline effect of the draft on support for conflict without these complicating factors is necessary before we can understand specific scenarios in context (for more discussion of this point, see Hermann et al. 1999). That said, however, one concern is that our results might look different if we used specific nations, or varied the primary policy objective (PPO) of the mission, since these factors have been shown to affect support for war (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Gelpi et al. 2009). That is, perhaps introducing the draft might only have a minimal effect if we named a particular conflict, or if the mass public sees the policy objective as particularly important. Jentleson (1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998) finds, for example, that there is much more public support for war in “foreign policy restraint” scenarios where a country is threatening another country than in cases of humanitarian intervention or internal political change in another country. More recent research adds the possibility of a specific “war on terrorism” PPO to determine if the mass public is more willing to send troops into harm’s way when the conflict is connected to the war on terror (Gelpi et al. 2009). To test for these sorts of effects, we conducted three additional experiments to see if using more “real world” scenarios changed the effect of the draft on support for war.

All experiments follow the same basic format as described in the body of the paper (i.e., all three experiments randomly assigned subjects to the draft or all-volunteer military conditions, and experiments 1 and 2 also randomly varied the level of expected casualties). At the outset, we

stress that the goal of every one of these experiments was to determine if our conclusions about the draft survive in a variety of different real-world scenarios. That said, however, we also test a number of more specific hypotheses in each scenario, which we describe below.<sup>8</sup> The experiments we conducted were:

- *Varying the Target Nation*: experiment 1 asks respondents whether we should send troops if China threatens to invade either Taiwan (a U.S. ally), or Cambodia (a nation with few political, economic, and military ties to the U.S.).<sup>9</sup> Here, we keep the PPO fixed (foreign policy restraint), but we vary the target nation (Taiwan or Cambodia) and the expected level of casualties to determine the effect these manipulations have on subjects' willingness to deploy troops.
- *The PPO-Casualty Interaction*: experiment 2 asks respondents whether we should send troops if either (a) Iran threatens to invade Saudi Arabia or (b) if continued protests from the Green Movement topple the Iranian regime, and troops are needed to help stabilize the nation. These two scenarios vary the PPO: scenario (a) is an example of a foreign policy restraint mission, while scenario (b) is an example of an internal political change mission.<sup>10</sup> This allows us to see how the public responds to different PPOs. We also test how different kinds of PPOs might interact with the risk of casualties (i.e., is the public more sensitive to casualties in an internal political change mission?).
- *Varying the PPO*: experiment 3 asks respondents if we should consider sending troops to Yemen in four different scenarios, each embodying a different PPO: (a) Yemen blocks the shipment of oil through the Persian Gulf, a foreign policy restraint scenario, (b) the Yemeni

---

<sup>8</sup> For details on the sample size, field dates, etc., please see below.

<sup>9</sup> We acknowledge that Taiwan is not a U.S. treaty ally by law; we use the word ally here in the more informal sense of the word. We borrow this experimental setup from Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999).

<sup>10</sup> While this most closely matches Jentleson's (1992) description of an internal political change scenario, depending upon how it is framed, it could also be seen as a humanitarian intervention scenario.

government launches a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide, a humanitarian intervention scenario, (c) the Yemeni government falls and help is needed to stabilize the nation, an internal political change scenario, and (d) the Yemeni government allows Al Qaeda training camps to operate inside Yemen, a war on terror scenario. Scenarios (a), (b), and (d) come from Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009), we add scenario (c) to fully cover the range of PPOs discussed in Jentleson and Britton (1998). Given the additional complication of evaluating four PPOs, we did not test for the effect of casualties in this scenario.

Taken together, these experiments allow us to examine support for war in a series of “real world” scenarios. As in the experiment on casualties discussed above, these are fielded using online convenience samples. Again, while these samples may not generalize to the broader population in any simple fashion, they are still extremely useful because they help us to determine if our results about the draft replicate across different contextual settings. If the results from these real world scenarios are consistent with the more generalized survey results described in the text of the paper, it demonstrates the robustness of our results.

### *China and Foreign Policy Restraint*

We begin by analyzing experiment 1. As in the main body of the paper, we analyze support for sending troops (1=support sending, 0=oppose sending) as a function of the draft factor (where subjects are told the troops will be from a draft military vs. not), the level of expected casualties (high/low expected casualties), and the target nation (Taiwan or Cambodia). Model 1 in table 4 gives the basic results; those interested in the raw level of support by condition (for all of these supplemental experiments) should see table 5.

[Insert tables 4 and 5 about here]

In this scenario—as in the scenarios discussed in the paper—the draft and expected casualties have large effects, with subjects more opposed to sending troops both when there is a draft or when casualties are expected to be high. Since our key finding is the link between the draft and public support, this is reassuring. In this case, however, there is also a large effect of the target state—subjects are much more willing to send troops when China threatens Taiwan than when it threatens Cambodia. The effect size here is nearly as large as the effect of the draft: just using the raw data, introducing the draft lowers support for troop deployment by 19%, but changing the target from Taiwan to Cambodia lowers support by 17%. Unsurprisingly, subjects are more willing to send U.S. troops into harm’s way when the target of Chinese aggression is Taiwan, where the United States has considerable ties, rather than Cambodia (where the United States has far fewer ties). This suggests, consistent with previous work, that subjects consider the nation’s interests when making foreign policy decisions (Hermann et al. 1999; Tomz 2007).

Further, the effect of the target nation (Taiwan/Cambodia) may not simply be additive, but rather interactive. That is, whether China is attacking Taiwan or Cambodia may also condition the effect of the draft manipulation: the negative effect of the draft may be larger when Taiwan is the target, because subjects are hesitant to send any troops—even volunteer forces—to defend Cambodia. Model 2 in table 4 tests this hypothesis and the results demonstrate strong evidence of an interactive effect. Interestingly, the main effect of the draft becomes insignificant, which implies that when Cambodia is the target, the draft does not affect support for sending troops. Subjects are always opposed to sending troops to Cambodia, even when those troops volunteered for military service. These results verify what we argue in the conclusion of the paper: reinstating the draft might not significantly change support for a war in cases where there are floor or ceiling effects (i.e., wars that are so popular that subjects are willing to fight them

with a draft, or wars that are so unpopular that subjects will not send even volunteer troops). This scenario seems to fit that particular bill.

Further, beyond these experimental factors, we also suspect that attitudes toward China itself (whether the respondent perceives China to be a threat to the U.S.) will also affect respondent's willingness to deploy troops. We hypothesize that respondents who feel China is a threat will be more likely to support deploying troops, regardless of other factors. Model 3 in table 4 tests this hypothesis. As we suspected, subjects who think China is a threat to the U.S. are more likely to support sending troops, all other things being equal.<sup>11</sup> Thus, scenario experiment 1 verifies the results in our paper by showing that, even in a condition where the public might have some interest in deploying troops abroad (defending Taiwan), reinstating the draft strongly decreases public support. However, the experiment also provides evidence that the scenario also matters and shapes the way the public will react to conscription.

### *Iran, PPOs, and Casualties*

Scenario experiment 2 asks if our findings about the draft survive when we consider different PPOs. In particular, we consider the two PPOs originally proposed in Jentleson (1992): foreign policy restraint (a threatened Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia) and internal political change (a collapse of the Iranian regime in the wake of continued protests by the Green Movement). Given Jentleson's (1992) initial findings, we expect more support for the foreign policy restraint scenario than the internal political change scenario. We are less certain, however, about how the PPO will interact with the draft to shape support for troop deployments. It may be that the effect of the draft overwhelms the effect of the PPO: the draft makes both PPOs so unpopular that it

---

<sup>11</sup> We also tested for interactive effects here (i.e., that thinking China was a threat might condition subject's support for the draft). We found no evidence of interactive effects here, though see below on these interactive effects in the case of Iran.

swamps the variation induced by the mission. Alternatively, it may simply be that the draft and the PPO effect simply operate in an additive fashion, with both simply decreasing support for war with little interactive effect. Table 6 presents our model of support in this scenario, with the setup paralleling the one described in the China scenario above.

[Insert table 6 about here]

Model 1 in table 6 shows a very surprising finding: the PPO itself is not significant in the simple additive model. In the baseline model, there is no difference in support between the foreign policy restraint scenario and the internal political change scenario, contrary to our expectations. This non-finding could result because of an interaction between the draft and the PPO, as we hypothesized above. Model 2 tests this possibility, and finds evidence supporting this claim. In the all-volunteer scenario, there is a large (and significant) difference in support between the PPOs consistent with Jentleson's (1992) original findings: 63% support sending troops if Iran invades Saudi Arabia, but only 49% support sending troops when the Iranian regime collapses. But that difference vanishes in the draft condition, where 30% and 26% support sending troops, respectively. This suggests that, in this particular scenario, the differences in support between PPOs hinge on having an all-volunteer force. Subjects presented with a draft military become so unlikely to support deploying US troops that the difference between PPOs disappears. Put slightly differently, the draft effect overwhelms the PPO effect: the key factor here is that we introduce the draft, not that we vary the reason for sending troops into harm's way.<sup>12</sup>

As in the China experiment above, we hypothesize that whether or not a respondent perceives that Iran is a threat to the United States will also influence their willingness to send

---

<sup>12</sup> Another possibility is that changing the PPO varies the public's casualty sensitivity (i.e., that subjects are more sensitive to expected casualty levels in the internal political change scenario than they are in the foreign policy restraint scenario). We tested this hypothesis and found no support in our data.

troops, with subjects who perceive Iran is more of a threat being more willing to send troops. Model 3 in table 6 tests this hypothesis and finds strong support for it: those who perceive Iran to be more threatening are more willing to send troops into battle. Model 4 tests whether this threat perception interacts with the draft, that is, if subjects who perceive Iran to be more threatening are still willing to send troops into harm's way even when the draft is in place. Model 4 demonstrates that there is a large and significant interactive effect between the draft and perceptions that Iran is a threat. In the all-volunteer condition, those who perceive Iran to be a threat are much more likely to support sending troops: 71% of those who perceive Iran to be a threat want to send troops, versus 33% for those who do not see it as a threat. That difference vanishes in the draft condition, however (the difference is 29% vs. 24%). Fascinatingly, even those who view Iran as a threat are unwilling to send troops into harm's way in the draft condition. Opposition to the draft simply overwhelms the impact of believing Iran is a threat. Note that this finding contrasts with the earlier China scenario, where we found no interactive effects. We leave explore this between-nation difference for future work, and for now simply note that in some cases, threat perceptions condition the size of the draft effect. So this second scenario experiment provides further evidence supporting the core claim in the paper about the way reinstating the draft would decrease public support for going to war in a variety of conditions. As with the China experiment, however, the results also show that the specific scenario does matter as well, meaning the size of the draft effect depends somewhat on the specific conflict in question (though the draft decreases support for war in all scenarios).

### *Yemen and PPOs*

Finally, scenario experiment 3 considers what happens in each of the PPOs originally proposed by Jentleson and Britton (1998), as well as the new “war on terror” PPO introduced by Gelpi et al. (2009). Given that Gelpi et al. have previously considered how the PPO affects casualty sensitivity, we focus here on how the draft will interact with these various PPOs. Given the salience of the war on terrorism, we hypothesize that the mass public would be willing to send draft or volunteer forces to destroy Al Qaeda training camps (i.e., the draft will have a smaller effect in the war on terror scenario than in the other scenarios). Further, given the findings in scenario experiment 2 above (the Iran scenarios), we also suspect that the internal political change scenario will be especially unpopular in both the draft and conscription conditions. Table 7 gives the basic results.

[Insert table 7 about here]

Column 1 in table 7 shows that in the basic additive model, the draft has a large effect, but there are very few differences across PPOs (here, the PPOs are measured as offsets relative to the baseline category, the foreign policy restraint scenario). The internal political change scenario is the only one that achieves statistical significance at conventional levels, and it is markedly less popular than the foreign policy restraint scenario (as prior work suggests). We would note, however, that the war on terrorism scenario is marginally statistically significant ( $p=.09$ , one-tailed) and positive, which does suggest somewhat greater support for war on terrorism missions (though future work will be needed to determine the robustness of this particular finding). Overall, however, the general pattern is really a lack of sharp differences across the various PPOs. As with our other scenario experiments, the draft exercises a significant and negative effect on public support. This further suggests that our findings are not just artifacts of the generalized hypothetical we presented in the paper, but a more robust result.

Model 2 in table 7 tests for potential interactions between various PPOs and the reintroduction of the draft. We find surprisingly little support for an interactive effect. None of the interactions terms are statistically significant, and the results are otherwise similar to the baseline model in model 1. Indeed, just looking at the raw data (see table 5), in every PPO, reinstating the draft has a large negative effect on attitudes. For example, in the war on terrorism PPO, 71 percent support sending troops in the all-volunteer condition, but that falls to 39 percent when the draft is reintroduced, a drop of more than 30 percent. Other PPOs show similar drops in support, with the smallest different in support coming in the internal political change PPO. As with the Cambodia specification in the China scenario, this finding is probably due to the relative unpopularity of deploying troops even in the all-volunteer forces condition (support in this PPO is 35 percent in the all-volunteer condition, falling to 18 percent in the draft condition). These findings underline the central conclusion of our paper: subjects are always sensitive to the reintroduction of a draft, regardless of the nature of the mission or the nations involved; the only exceptions are extraordinarily popular/unpopular missions (i.e., floor and ceiling effects).

### *Conclusions looking across these three scenarios*

Looking across all three different scenarios, two important conclusions emerge. First, and most importantly, these more realistic scenarios show strong support for our main argument: the draft has a large negative and statistically significant effect on the willingness of subjects to send troops into harm's way independent of the other aspects of the mission. Regardless of the nation involved, or the specific PPO, our finding about the draft is robust. This suggests that our findings are not limited to only a baseline hypothetical scenario, but instead replicate quite broadly across different kinds of real-world settings.

Second, the specifics of the scenario matter. This might seem trite, but it means that, in addition to establishing a baseline for public support for war under a draft, it is important to consider the consequences of specific scenarios. Our results show that the draft always matters, regardless of the scenario. However, the size of the effect might change, or the public's casualty tolerance might change depending upon the specifics of the conflict and the PPO of the mission. Further, attitudes toward the particular nations involved (especially the extent to which those nations are seen as a threat) also matter a great deal. Therefore, scholars looking to consider how the draft affects the public's willingness to deploy troops should not only consider our general findings, but also the specific details of the scenario of interest.

## Hawkishness as a Moderator of Experimental Factors

In the models estimated in the body of the paper, we include hawkishness as a control variable predicting support for troop deployment (to test the hypothesis that more hawkish respondents will be more willing to send troops into harm's way). But it is also possible that hawkishness also moderates the effect of either the draft or casualty sensitivity (i.e., that there is an interactive effect of the draft). To explore this possibility, we have estimated a further series of models where we explore how hawkishness might moderate the effect of our experimental factors. In particular, we focused on three situations: (1) the possibility that hawkish respondents with children might be less sensitive to the draft (i.e., a hawk x draft x have children interaction), (2) that young hawkish respondents might be less sensitive to the draft (draft x young x hawk interaction), and (3) hawkish respondents with children might be less casualty sensitive (hawk x children x casualty interaction). Table 8 reports the results.

[Insert table 8 about here]

In all three cases, there are no significant three-way interactive effects. Indeed, there are only two significant interactive effects in table 8. First, we replicate the effect from the body of the paper showing that young people are especially sensitive to the effect of the draft (i.e., the interaction between young and draft is negative and statistically significant). Second, we find an odd interaction between having children and casualty sensitivity, such that parents are more willing to send troops into harm's way when casualties are expected to be high. We have no principled explanation for this finding, and leave it to future work to explain this anomaly. One possibility not explored in table 8 is that three-way interactions might mask significant two-way interactive effects between hawkishness and the draft. Table 9 explores this possibility.

[Insert table 9 about here]

The results in table 9 show that hawks are no less sensitive to the draft, but there is an interactive effect on casualty sensitivity. Interestingly, hawks become less supportive when casualties are expected to be high. Put slightly differently, even hawks are casualty sensitive, and they too respond by being less enthusiastic for war when many Americans are expected to die.

In short, the findings in tables 8 and 9 suggest that hawkishness has only a weak moderating effect on our experimental manipulations (though a strong effect on overall support for war). That said, hawkishness may matter in ways we cannot test in our data. For example, a different manipulation might more directly prime hawkish attitudes, though we leave these sorts of tasks for future work.

## Items Used in the Supplemental Experiments

### *Casualties and Success Items*

N=249 subjects participated in this study fielded 21-22 April 2010. For all supplemental surveys, all subjects are a non-random convenience sample collected via Amazon's Mechanical Turk service. Subjects were asked the same items as in the original survey; we do not repeat those items here to save space (see above the specific wordings). The new item to test the casualties/success linkage is:

A country is threatening to invade its neighbor. The threatened nation has asked the U.S. to send troops to help their military. The U.S. President is considering sending the United States military to help the country that was attacked. [Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the U.S. forces would easily overwhelm the opposition./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong.]

Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect the threatened country?

[If draft=treatment:] The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

### *Casualties and Risk Acceptance*

N=268 subjects participated in this study, fielded 10-11 August 2010. Subjects were asked the same items as in the original survey, with one exception:

A country is threatening to invade its neighbor. The threatened nation has asked the U.S. to send troops to help their military. The U.S. President is considering sending the United States military to help the country that was attacked. [Foreign policy experts predict that the conflict will produce only a small number of U.S. casualties, as U.S. forces should easily overwhelm the opposition. / Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the U.S. forces would easily overwhelm the opposition./Foreign policy experts predict the conflict will produce a high number of U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong. / Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong.]

Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect the threatened country?

[If draft=treatment:] The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

### *China Survey Experiment*

N=248 subjects participated in this experiment, fielded 27-28 April 2010. Subjects were asked the same items as in the original survey, with two exceptions:

Now we'd like to get your opinion about situations that some people think are threats to the United States. For each of the following issues, please tell us if you consider it to be an extremely serious threat, a very serious threat, a somewhat serious threat, not too serious a threat, or not at all a serious threat to the United States. [China's emergence as a world power]

Imagine that China has recently begun massing troops on its border and is threatening to attack and invade [Taiwan, a U.S. ally/ Cambodia, a Southeast Asian nation with few political and financial ties to the U.S.]. \$NATION<sup>13</sup> has asked the U.S. to deploy U.S. forces to help the \$NATION military. The U.S. President is considering allowing U.S. troops to help defend \$NATION if it is attacked. [Foreign policy experts anticipate that the conflict will produce a large number of U.S. casualties, as the Chinese forces are quite strong./ Foreign policy experts anticipate that the conflict will produce only a small number of U.S. casualties, as the Chinese forces will back down shortly after U.S. forces begin engaging them.]  
Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect \$NATION?

[If draft=Treatment] The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

### *Iran Survey Experiment*

N=250 subjects participated in this experiment, fielded 27-29 April 2010.

#### Foreign Policy Restraint Scenario:

Imagine that Iran has recently begun massing troops and is threatening to attack and invade Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has asked the U.S. to deploy U.S. forces to help them. The U.S. President is considering allowing U.S. troops to help defend Saudi Arabia if it is attacked. Foreign policy experts anticipate that the conflict will [only produce a small/produce a large] number of U.S. casualties.  
Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect Saudi Arabia?

[If draft=Treatment] The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

#### Internal Political Change scenario:

Imagine that continuing protests by the Green Movement in Iran have led to massive internal instability and the regime is toppling. A humanitarian disaster has erupted with reports of killings and starvation throughout the country. The United States is considering intervening to help restore order and provide support to the civilian population. Foreign policy experts anticipate that the mission will [only produce a small/produce a large] number of U.S. casualties.  
Should the U.S. send the American military to help stabilize Iran?

---

<sup>13</sup> \$NATION is a place-holder for the name of the nation given in the text (i.e., if a respondent is assigned to the Cambodia condition), then Cambodia (or the appropriate variant thereof) appears in place of \$NATION).

[If draft=Treatment:] The military that goes to Iran would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

### *Yemen Experiment*

N=260 respondents participated in this survey, fielded 30 April – 3 May 2010.

#### Foreign Policy Restraint Scenario:

Imagine that the government of Yemen has threatened to disrupt the shipment of oil through the Persian Gulf. Doing so would cause the price of oil to spike on the world market, and would likely have a serious impact on the global economy and U.S. security interests in the Middle East. The U.S. has threatened to launch military against Yemen if it attempts to block the shipment of oil.

Should the U.S. send the American military to stop Yemen from disrupting Persian Gulf oil shipments?

[If draft=Treatment:] The military that goes to Yemen would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

#### Humanitarian Intervention Scenario:

Imagine that the government of Yemen has begun a campaign of ethnic cleansing and forced slavery against tribal minorities living in the country. Reports indicate that many civilians have been sold into slavery, and others have been killed. The U.S. has threatened to launch military against Yemen to stop these practices.

Should the U.S. send the American military to stop this ethnic cleansing campaign?

[If draft=treatment:] The military that goes to Yemen would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

#### War on Terror Scenario:

Imagine that new evidence suggests that the government of Yemen is aiding Al Qaeda terrorists by allowing terrorist training camps to operate inside their borders. These training camps may be preparing for attacks on U.S. or other Western targets. The U.S. has threatened to launch military against Yemen to destroy the training camps.

Should the U.S. military send troops to destroy the terrorist camps?

[If draft=treatment:] The military that goes to Yemen would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

#### Internal Political Change Scenario:

Imagine that Islamic militants toppled the government in Yemen, leading to reports of religious persecution and starvation throughout the nation. The United States is considering intervening to help restore order and provide support to the civilian population.

Should the U.S. military send troops to help stabilize Yemen?

[If draft=treatment:] The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.

	(1)
Draft Reintroduced	<b>-0.95</b> (0.27)
Success Language Included	0.28 (0.27)
High Expected Casualties	<b>-0.54</b> (0.27)
Constant	0.22 (0.26)
Observations	248

Table 1: De-linking Casualties and Success.

*Note:* cell entries are logistic regression coefficients predicting support for sending troops in different experimental conditions, with associated standard errors in parentheses underneath. Coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels of statistical significance are given in bold.

	Volunteer Forces	Conscripted Forces
No Success Language	42	35
Success Language	52	36
Difference	-10	-1

Table 2: Support by Condition, Casualties and Success Experiment.

*Note:* cell entries are percentage that support sending troops, by experimental condition.

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Draft Reintroduced	<b>-0.58</b> (0.16)	<b>-0.57</b> (0.17)
High Expected Casualties	<b>-0.70</b> (0.16)	<b>-0.50</b> (0.23)
New Casualties Wording	0.14 (0.16)	0.33 (0.22)
New Casualties Wording*High Expected Casualties		<b>-0.41</b> (0.33)
Intercept	0.22 (0.16)	0.12 (0.18)
N	268	268

Table 3: Casualties and Risk Acceptance.

*Note:* cell entries are probit coefficients with associated standard errors underneath. Coefficients that can be differentiated from 0 are given in bold.

	(1)	(2)	(2)
Target is Taiwan	<b>0.80</b>	<b>1.21</b>	<b>0.76</b>
	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.28)
Draft Reintroduced	<b>-0.89</b>	<b>-0.39</b>	<b>-0.91</b>
	(0.28)	(0.40)	(0.28)
Target is Taiwan* Draft Reintroduced		<b>-0.94</b>	
		(0.55)	
High Expected Casualties	<b>-0.69</b>	<b>-0.71</b>	<b>-0.82</b>
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Perceive China as a Threat			<b>0.59</b>
			(0.29)
Constant	<b>-0.09</b>	<b>-0.28</b>	<b>-0.25</b>
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Observations	248	248	248

Table 4: Support for Sending Troops, China Experiment.

*Note:* Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients predicting support for sending troops in different experimental conditions, with associated standard errors in parentheses underneath. Coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels of statistical significance are given in bold.

	Volunteer Forces	Conscripted Forces	Difference
<i>Experiment 1 (China):</i>			
Cambodia, Low Casualties	40	29	11
Cambodia, High Casualties	30	24	6
Taiwan, Low Casualties	81	39	42
Taiwan, High Casualties	47	27	20
<i>Experiment 2 (Iran):</i>			
Stabilization, Low Casualties	56	35	21
Stabilization, High Casualties	38	26	12
Invade Saudi Arabia, Low Casualties	66	30	36
Invade Saudi Arabia, High Casualties	62	21	41
<i>Experiment 3 (Yemen):</i>			
Prevent Disruption to Oil Shipments (FPR)	56	31	25
Stop Ethnic Cleansing (HI)	54	27	27
Destroy Al Qaeda Training Camps (WoT)	71	39	32
Stabilization (IPC)	35	18	17

Table 5: Support for sending troops by experimental condition, “Real World” experiments.

*Note:* cell entries give the percentage supporting troop deployments in each experimental scenario. In each row, the “Difference” column gives the effect of the draft manipulation (i.e., the difference between the all-volunteer and draft conditions).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Draft Reintroduced	-1.21 <b>(0.28)</b>	-0.76 <b>(0.39)</b>	-1.43 <b>(0.29)</b>	-0.43 <b>(0.52)</b>
Foreign Policy Restraint PPO	0.31 <b>(0.27)</b>	0.66 <b>(0.35)</b>	0.29 <b>(0.28)</b>	0.31 <b>(0.28)</b>
Draft Reintroduced* Foreign Policy Restraint PPO		-0.91 <b>(0.56)</b>		
High Expected Casualties	-0.40 <b>(0.27)</b>	-0.45 <b>(0.27)</b>	-0.42 <b>(0.28)</b>	-0.42 <b>(0.28)</b>
Perceive Iran as a Threat			1.19 <b>(0.31)</b>	1.62 <b>(0.38)</b>
Draft Reintroduced* Perceive Iran as a Threat				-1.37 <b>(0.63)</b>
Constant	0.29 <b>(0.25)</b>	0.14 <b>(0.27)</b>	-0.41 <b>(0.32)</b>	-0.67 <b>(0.35)</b>
Observations	249	249	249	249

Table 6: Support for Sending Troops, Iran experiment.

*Note:* Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients predicting support for sending troops in different experimental conditions, with associated standard errors in parentheses underneath. Coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels of statistical significance are given in bold.

	(1)	(2)
Draft Reintroduced	<b>-1.14</b>	<b>-1.03</b>
	(0.27)	(0.53)
Humanitarian Intervention PPO	<b>-0.13</b>	<b>-0.06</b>
	(0.37)	(0.48)
War on Terrorism PPO	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.66</b>
	(0.37)	(0.53)
Internal Political Change PPO	<b>-0.80</b>	<b>-0.83</b>
	(0.39)	(0.51)
Draft Reintroduced* Humanitarian Intervention PPO		<b>-0.15</b>
		(0.75)
Draft Reintroduced* War on Terrorism PPO		<b>-0.34</b>
		(0.75)
Draft Reintroduced* Internal Political Change PPO		<b>0.09</b>
		(0.79)
Constant	<b>0.28</b>	<b>0.24</b>
	(0.29)	(0.35)
Observations	258	258

Table 7: Support for Sending Troops, Yemen experiment.

*Note:* Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients predicting support for sending troops in different experimental conditions, with associated standard errors in parentheses underneath. Coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels of statistical significance are given in bold.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Intercept	-0.51 (0.18)	-0.40 (0.15)	-0.56 (0.18)
High Expected Casualties	-0.33 (0.06)	-0.33 (0.06)	-0.26 (0.15)
Draft Reintroduced	-0.44 (0.15)	-0.28 (0.16)	-0.46 (0.06)
Parent with Children	0.02 (0.23)		-0.46 (0.24)
Young Person		0.28 (0.20)	
Hawkish Attitudes	0.08 (0.02)	0.09 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)
Military Service	0.11 (0.09)	0.15 (0.08)	0.11 (0.09)
Female	-0.21 (0.06)	-0.20 (0.06)	-0.21 (0.06)
Age	0.04 (0.02)		0.05 (0.02)
Income	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
College-Educated	0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)
Partisanship	0.11 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)
Draft Reintroduced* Parent	-0.26 (0.33)		
Parent* Hawk	0.02 (0.06)		
Draft Reintroduced* Hawk	0.007 (0.04)		
Draft Reintroduced * Parent* Hawk	0.02 (0.08)		
Draft Reintroduced* Young		-0.63 (0.29)	
Young* Hawk		-0.05 (0.05)	
Draft Reintroduced* Hawk		-0.004 (0.05)	
Draft Reintroduced* Young* Hawk		0.05 (0.07)	
High Expected Casualties* Parent			0.71 (0.33)
Parent* Hawk			0.08 (0.06)

High Expected Casualties* Hawk			-0.04 (0.04)
High Expected Casualties* Parent* Hawk			-0.12 (0.09)
N	2029	2029	2029

Table 8: Effect of Hawkishness as a Moderating Variable.

*Note:* cell entries are probit regression coefficients, with associated standard errors underneath. Coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels of statistical significance are given in bold.

Intercept	-0.58 (0.18)
High Expected Casualties	-0.24 (0.14)
Draft Reintroduced	-0.62 (0.15)
Hawkish Attitudes	0.12 (0.03)
Military Service	0.12 (0.09)
Female	-0.22 (0.04)
Age	0.05 (0.02)
Income	-0.004 (0.008)
College-Educated	0.06 (0.07)
Partisanship	0.11 (0.01)
High Expected Casualties* Draft Reintroduced	0.27 (0.12)
Draft Reintroduced* Hawk	0.005 (0.03)
High Expected Casualties* Hawk	-0.07 (0.04)
N	2029

Table 9: Effect of Hawkishness as a Moderator of Treatment Effects.

*Note:* cell entries are probit regression coefficients, with associated standard errors underneath. Coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels of statistical significance are given in bold.

References [to works not included in the bibliography for the main paper]

- Alvarez, Lizette. 2009. "Women at Arms - G.I. Jane Breaks the Combat Barrier." *New York Times*, August 15, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/us/16women.html>.
- Associated Press. 2010. "Women Allowed on Submarines." *New York Times*, April 30, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/us/30brfs-WOMENALLOWED\\_BRF.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/us/30brfs-WOMENALLOWED_BRF.html).
- Krosnick, John A. 1999. "Survey research." *Annual Review of Psychology* 50 (1):537-67.
- Meyers, Steven Lee. 2009. "Women at Arms - Living and Fighting Alongside Men, and Fitting In." *New York Times*, August 16, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/17/us/17women.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/17/us/17women.html?_r=1).
- Oppenheimer, Daniel, Tom Meyvis, and Nicolas Davidenk. 2009. "Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 45:867-72.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach." *International Organization* 61 (4):821-40.