

Supplementary Materials for

Has the Supreme Court become just another political branch? Public perceptions of court approval and legitimacy in a post-*Dobbs* world

Matthew Levendusky *et al.*

Corresponding author: Matthew Levendusky, mleven@sas.upenn.edu

Sci. Adv. **10**, eadk9590 (2024)
DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adk9590

This PDF file includes:

Sections A to F
Tables S1 to S22
Fig. S1
References

Section A: Pre-Analysis Plan, Dobbs Leak & Decision Study

Our pre-analysis plan (filed 24 May 2022) is available via OSF at:
https://osf.io/gewyc/?view_only=20b096474b8947c08ee09f7fb36ab9f4.

Section B: Deviations from our Pre-Analysis Plan

Here, we detail several ways in which we slightly deviated from our pre-analysis plan in our final analyses:

1. We mis-labeled our favorability item in the pre-analysis plan as “approval.” This was a mistake in the narrative text, but not in the question wording submitted in the pre-analysis plan.
2. In our pre-analysis plan, we said we would present regression results. The initial version of the paper had regressions, but readers argued—correctly—that given our data, figures would be easier to understand. We therefore present the figures in the body of the paper, and the regression results are in the section on regression results and additional results later in the supplemental materials.
3. In our pre-analysis plan, we planned to study the effects of the *Dobbs* leak and decision on attitudes toward abortion. In revising the paper, however, we realized that they did not fit here. We also discussed various heterogeneous treatment effects, but they too did not fit logically into the paper. But we do want to make them public, so we have included them in analyses that we have published to OSF:
https://osf.io/gewyc/?view_only=20b096474b8947c08ee09f7fb36ab9f4
4. In our pre-analysis plan, we only focused on favorability of the Court. After presenting an initial draft of the analysis to colleagues, they recommended adding the items on Court legitimacy and reform to later waves, and to tracking the results forward in time. We also re-asked trust in the Court, which had been asked on an earlier wave in 2020. We then added these results, though they were not pre-registered.

Section C: Survey Details, AIOD Panel Study

The AIOD Panel Study is an ongoing survey of voters in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Subjects were first recruited to join the panel in late 2019 and early 2020 via address-based sampling, and as such, this data is a random sample of voters in each state; we use post-stratification weights in our analyses to ensure our data are reflective of each state's population. Throughout the study, panelists haven taken our surveys via a custom web portal hosted by the survey firm SSRS. To ensure that the survey does not miss important groups with low rates of Internet usage, especially those in more rural areas and those with less education, respondents are allowed to take the study via the telephone; 2.3 percent of the sample did so in the most recent wave (this figure has been relatively constant across time). Full details on the recruitment of these panelists, response rates, construction of our post-stratification weights, and so forth, please see reference number 60. Informed consent was obtained for all survey subjects included in this project. The data collection for the AIOD study, as well as the APPC data used later in the paper, was approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board.

During the 2020 election, panelists were interviewed quite regularly—nearly every month. After Trump's second impeachment trial in February 2021, AIOD reduced the frequency to one survey per quarter, and reduced the sample to approximately one-third of our original size. To avoid biasing the sample, when AIOD reduced the panel size, they did so by randomly sampling from our existing sample, hence the data are a random sample of a random sample.

In the 2021 data used in the paper, respondents were interviewed between October 6th and 12th (replicate 1), November 3rd and 9th (replicate 2), and December 1st and 7th (replicate 3); the dates of the 2022 wave are provided in the body of the paper. Note that replicate 1 is the

pre-leak replicate, replicate 2 is the post-leak replicate, and replicate 3 is the post-decision replicate.

All currently active panelists were invited by AIOD to take each wave discussed in the paper. The start dates, sample sizes, and participation rates of each replicate are presented in Table S1 below. Note, in wave 18, all respondents were surveyed at the same time.

Wave	Replicate	Start Date	N	Participation Rate
2	1	6/10/20	3535	84.6%
	2	6/17/20	3532	84.1%
	3	6/24/20	3367	82.7%
10	1	1/8/21	2826	79.9%
	2	1/21/21	2856	80.9%
	3	1/28/21	2694	80.0%
15	1	10/6/21	1288	76.5%
	2	11/3/21	1291	79.5%
	3	12/1/21	1228	79.5%
17	1	4/14/22	1318	79.5%
	2	5/12/22	1244	77.2%
	3	7/5/22	1179	77.1%
18	1	8/11/22	1167	70.6%
	2	8/11/22	1117	69.6%
	3	8/11/22	1192	78.5%
20	1	11/9/22	1288	76.5%
	2	11/16/22	1291	79.5%
	3	11/30/22	1228	79.5%
21	1	2/1/23	1298	79.7%
	2	3/1/23	1241	78.7%
	3	4/12/23	1159	77.2%
22	1	5/17/23	1269	78.1%
	2	6/14/23	1228	78.3%
	3	7/10/23	1154	77.1%

Table S1: Sample Sizes, Field Dates, and Participation Rates for AIOD Panel

Section D: Survey Details, Cross-Sectional Surveys

In our over-time analysis, we draw on surveys conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center (APPC) from 2005 to 2023. The 2005 study was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International for APPC. The telephone survey polled 1,504 adults aged eighteen years and older and was conducted between March 16 and April 18, 2005. Later surveys were conducted as part of the APPC's annual Constitution Day Surveys. These surveys were conducted as part of the SSRS omnibus sample, a national, dual-frame bilingual telephone survey. The SSRS Omnibus sample is designed to represent the adult U.S. population (including Hawaii and Alaska). SSRS Omnibus uses a fully-replicated, single-stage, random-digit-dialing (RDD) sample of landline telephone households, and randomly generated cell phone numbers. Sample telephone numbers are computer generated and loaded into on-line sample files accessed directly by the computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system. Summaries of these surveys can be found in Table S2 below.

Year	Start	End	N	DEFF	MOE (95%)
2005	3/15/05	4/18/05	1504	1.22	2.8
2006	8/3/06	8/16/06	1002	1.3	3.5
2007	8/8/07	9/2/07	1514	1.37	2.9
2011	9/6/11	9/13/11	1230	1.41	3.3
2013	9/10/13	9/27/13	1302	1.26	3
2015	8/27/15	9/1/15	1012	1.45	3.7
2018	8/8/18	8/12/18	1008	1.52	3.8
2019	8/16/19	8/27/19	1104	1.5	3.6
2020	8/4/20	8/9/20	1009	1.36	3.6
2021a	8/3/21	8/8/21	1007	1.51	3.8
2021b	9/7/21	9/12/21	1008	1.67	4
2022	8/2/22	8/13/22	1113	1.56	3.7

2023	5/31/23	6/7/23	1004	1.61	3.9
------	---------	--------	------	------	-----

Table S2: Sample Sizes, Field Dates, and Margin of Errors for Over-Time Surveys from the APPC Constitution Day Surveys Note that the 2023 sample was collected online using the SSRS Opinion Panel, rather than through an RDD telephone sample.

The 2022 APPC Constitution Day Telephone Survey was conducted for APPC via telephone (CATI) by SSRS, an independent research company. Interviews were conducted August 2 – August 13, 2022, among 1,113 U.S. adults, aged 18 and older. Respondents were drawn from a national probability sample in all 50 states. The dual frame sample included 889 cell phone respondents and 37 respondents who completed the survey in Spanish. Data were weighted to represent the target U.S. adult population. The adjusted margin of error for total respondents in the sample is +/-3.58% at the 95% confidence level. The response rate was 3.0% (AAPOR RR 3).

The 2023 APPC Online Survey was conducted for APPC via the SSRS Opinion Panel among U.S. adults ages 18 and older. Data collection was conducted from May 31 to June 7, 2023 among a sample of n=1,004 respondents. The survey was conducted via web (974) and telephone (30) in English (956) and Spanish (48). Data were weighted to represent the target population of U.S. adults ages 18 or older. The survey had a completion rate of 41.76% and a Survey RR3 of 42.33%. The cumulative response rate, accounting for response rate at recruitment, is 2.94%. The margin of sampling error for the complete set of weighted data is ± 3.9 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.

More information on the TAPS data can be found at: <https://wc.wustl.edu/american-panel-survey>.

In both the APPC and TAPS over-time analysis, we are constrained by the variables that were included in each year: some years included many variables, some far fewer. This affects the number of variables included in the indices over time (as readers can see in later tables, the alpha for the index varies widely by year, largely as a function of the number of variables included). Table S3 shows which variables were included in the analysis in which years.

Item	2005	2006	2007	2011	2013	2015	2018	2019	2020	2021	2021	2022	2023	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	APPC	TAPS-8	TAPS-32	TAPS-42	TAPS-56	TAPS-69
<i>Abolish</i>	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓
<i>Too Much Power</i>	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓				✓	✓					
<i>Less Controversial</i>								✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Less Independent</i>								✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Too Mixed Up</i>	✓							✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Ideological Decisions</i>								✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					
<i>Strip Jurisdiction</i>			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓						
<i>Best Interest</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓				✓	✓					

Table S3: Variables Used Across Years, APPC and TAPS Analysis [See Figure 5]

In the panel analysis, Independent “leaners” are treated as partisans, following the conventions in the political science literature (see, e.g., 59). Unfortunately, these cross-sectional surveys survey did not ask a “leaning” partisanship question in all years, and therefore the omitted category in these models is those who did not identify as a Republican or Democrat. When leaners can be broken out, doing so does not change our results.

Section E: Question Wording for All Items Used in the Analysis

AIOD Panel Study (Dobbs Leak/Decision Analysis)

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court?

- 1 Very unfavorable
- 2 Somewhat unfavorable
- 3 Neither favorable nor unfavorable
- 4 Somewhat favorable
- 5 Very favorable
- 8 Don't know enough about that group to say
- 998 Don't know

How much, if at all, do you trust the Supreme Court to act in the best interest of people like you?

- 1 Not at all
- 2 A little
- 3 A moderate amount
- 4 A lot
- 5 A great deal
- 998 Don't know

If the 2024 presidential general election were being held today and the candidates were (Joe Biden) and (Donald Trump), how important, if at all, would abortion be in deciding your vote for president?

- 1 Not at all important
- 2 Not too important
- 3 Somewhat important
- 4 Very important
- 998 Don't know

Thinking about all the factors you would consider in your presidential vote choice, how important, if at all, is the possibility that the next president will nominate new justices for the U.S. Supreme Court?

- 1 Not at all important
- 2 Not too important
- 3 Somewhat important
- 4 Very important
- 998 Don't know

Do you think abortion:

- 1 Should be legal under any circumstances
- 2 Should be legal only under certain circumstances
- 3 Should not be legal under any circumstances
- 998 Don't know

Thinking about the U.S. Supreme Court, please indicate if you (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree / strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree) with the following statements:

Statements:

- a. If the Supreme Court started making a lot of rulings that most Americans disagreed with, it might be better to do away with the Court altogether.
- b. The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.
- c. The U.S. Supreme Court ought to be made less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people want.
- d. The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.

Response Options:

- 1 Strongly disagree
- 2 Somewhat disagree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Somewhat agree
- 5 Strongly agree
- 998 Don't know

How much do you favor or oppose each of the following proposals?

Proposals:

- a. Increasing the number of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
- b. Setting a specific number of years that U.S. Supreme Court justices serve instead of granting them lifetime appointments
- c. Requiring that U.S. Supreme Court justices retire by a certain age

Response options:

- 1 Strongly oppose
- 2 Somewhat oppose
- 3 Neither favor nor oppose
- 4 Somewhat favor
- 5 Strongly favor
- 998 Don't know

APPC Over-Time Surveys and TAPS Surveys

There are all the items asked in our over-time analysis. For the specific list of year-by-item, please see Table S3. For full wordings of TAPS items, see <https://wc.wustl.edu/taps-data-archive>.

Generally speaking, how much do you trust the U.S. Supreme Court/the courts* to operate in the best interests of the American people—a great deal, a fair amount, not too much or not at all?

- 4 A great deal
- 3 A fair amount
- 2 Not too much
- 1 Not at all
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused/Decline/Web blank

*“the courts” was used in 2013

Thinking about the U.S. Supreme Court, please indicate if you (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree /strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree) with the following statements.

Do you (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree /strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree)?

- 1 Strongly disagree
- 2 Somewhat disagree
- 3 Somewhat agree
- 4 Strongly agree
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused/Decline/Web blank

- a. “If the Supreme Court started making a lot of rulings that most Americans disagreed with, it might be better to do away with the Court altogether.” **[Abolish]**
- b. “Supreme Court Justices are just like any other politicians; we cannot trust them to decide court cases in a way that is in the best interests of our country.” **[Politicians]**
- c. “The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.” **[Mixed Up]**
- d. “The U.S. Supreme Court ought to be made less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people want.” **[Less Independent]**
- e. “The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.” **[Less Controversial]**
- f. “When Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court’s decisions, Congress should pass legislation saying the Supreme Court can no longer rule on that issue or topic.” **[Strip Jurisdiction]**

Do you feel that the U.S. Supreme Court, in general, has too much power, too little power or about the right amount of power? [**Too Much Power**]

- 1 Too much power
- 2 Too little power
- 3 About the right amount of power
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused/Decline/Web blank

Now, thinking about individual Supreme Court justices...

Which comes closer to your view: [**Ideological Decisions**]

- 1 Supreme Court justices set aside their personal and political views and make rulings based on the constitution, the law, and the facts of the case
- 2 Supreme Court justices nominated by Democratic presidents are more likely to make liberal rulings and Supreme Court justices nominated by Republicans are more likely to make conservative rulings regardless of the constitution, the law, and the facts of the case
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused/Decline/Web blank

Knowledge

Do you happen to know any of the three branches of government?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused/Decline/Web blank

Would you mind naming any of them, the three branches of government?

- 1 Executive branch, the president, presidency, the White House
- 2 Legislative branch, Congress, people in Congress, Congressmen, Congress people
- 3 Judicial branch, the courts, Supreme Court
- 4 Republicans, Democrats, Independents, political parties
- 5 Local, state, and federal government
- 7 Other (SPECIFY) _____
- 8 Yes, I would mind
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused
- 999 Decline/Web blank

If the president and Supreme Court differ on whether an action by the president is constitutional, who has the final responsibility for determining if the action is constitutional- (the president), (Congress), or (the Supreme Court), or are you not sure?

- 1 President
- 2 Congress
- 3 Supreme Court
- 8 Not sure/Don't know
- 999 Refused
- 999 Decline/Web blank

If the U.S. Supreme Court rules on a case 5 to 4, does this mean...

- there
- 1 The decision is the law and needs to be followed
 - 2 The decision is sent back to Congress for reconsideration
 - 3 The decision is sent back to the federal court of appeals to be decided
 - 998 Don't know
 - 999 Refused
 - 999 Decline/Web blank

How accurate is it to say that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a citizen has a constitutional right to own a handgun?

- 1 Very accurate
- 2 Somewhat accurate
- 3 Somewhat Inaccurate
- 4 Very Inaccurate
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused
- 999 Decline/Web blank

How accurate is it to say that the U.S. Constitution allows a judge to insist that a defendant testify at his own trial?

- 1 Very accurate
- 2 Somewhat accurate
- 3 Somewhat Inaccurate
- 4 Very Inaccurate
- 998 Don't know
- 999 Refused
- 999 Decline/Web blank

How much of a majority is required for the US Senate and the House of Representatives to override a presidential veto—51 percent, two-thirds, three-quarters, 90 percent, or are you not sure?

1. 51 percent
2. Two-thirds
3. Three-quarters
4. 90 percent
5. Not sure

Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the United States House of Representatives?

1. The Democratic Party
2. The Republican Party
3. Don't Know

Democratic Values

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Do you strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree:

- a. Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather than wait for a legal solution.
- b. The government should have some ability to bend the law in order to solve pressing social and political problems.
- c. It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government I did not vote for.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Somewhat disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Somewhat agree
5. Strongly agree
998. Don't Know

Section E: Regression Results & Supplemental Analyses

In this section, we provide the regression results underlying the figures presented in the body of the paper. In the body of the paper, we focused on graphical presentations given their ease of interpretation, but in the interest of transparency, we present the full regression results here. Tables S4 and the effects of our pre-specified (from the pre-analysis plan) regressions for the effects of the Dobbs leak and decision on Court favorability, Table S5 shows a similar specification for trust (though the baseline is different here, since the pre-*Dobbs* measure was taken in 2020, not 2021). These analyses reinforce what we saw in Figure 3 in the body of the paper: Dobbs dramatically lowered trust in, and favorability of, the Court.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-Dobbs (PD)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
R2		0.02* (0.01)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
R3		0.02* (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
PD*R2	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.03)
PD*R3	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.03)
PD*R2*Democrat			-0.20*** (0.05)		
PD*R2*Republican			0.00 (0.05)		
PD*R3*Democrat			-0.22*** (0.05)		
PD*R3*Republican			0.12* (0.05)		
PD*R2*Always Support				-0.21*** (0.03)	
PD*R2*Never Support				0.03 (0.05)	
PD*R3*Always Support				-0.24*** (0.03)	
PD*R3*Never Support				0.06 (0.05)	
PD*R2*Liberal					-0.15*** (0.04)
PD*R2*Conservative					0.07 (0.04)
PD*R3*Liberal					-0.12** (0.04)
PD*R3*Conservative					0.22*** (0.04)
Individual F.E.	X	-	-	-	-
Num.Obs.	7241	7241	7241	6867	6505
R2	0.794	0.034	0.173	0.135	0.189
R2 Adj.	0.533	0.033	0.171	0.132	0.187
RMSE	0.13	0.29	0.27	0.28	0.26

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S4: Regression Analysis of the Effect of Dobbs on Court Favorability, AIOD Panel Data [See Figure 3 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-Dobbs (PD)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)
PD*Democrat			-0.18*** (0.02)		
PD*Republican			0.17*** (0.02)		
PD*Always Support				-0.23*** (0.01)	
PD*Never Support				0.06** (0.02)	
PD*Liberal					-0.12*** (0.02)
PD*Conservative					0.23*** (0.02)
Individual F.E.	X	-	-	-	-
Num.Obs.	7538	7538	7538	6628	6764
R2	0.690	0.030	0.124	0.097	0.113
R2 Adj.	0.268	0.030	0.123	0.096	0.113
RMSE	0.16	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S5: Regression Analysis of the Effect of Dobbs on Trust in the Court, AIOD Panel Data [See Figure 3 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In Table S6, we run a parallel specification to Table S4, looking at the effects of the 2023 term. Here, we see much weaker effects, suggesting that the 2023 term had little effect on favorability; this is likely because the set of decisions released contained some decisions more favorable toward Democrats (like the voting rights and independent state legislature doctrine cases), alongside a few decisions favoring Republicans (affirmative action, student loans, religious freedom), and none were as out-of-step with public opinion as Dobbs was in 2022. But because favorability fell so dramatically in 2022, these patterns persisted in 2023, this analysis simply shows that they did not get worse.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
W22 (W22)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
W22 * Replicate3 (R3)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
R3		0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
W22*R3*Democrat			-0.09* (0.04)		
W22*R3*Republican			0.04 (0.05)		
W22*R3*Always Support				-0.10** (0.03)	
W22*R3*Never Support				-0.01 (0.06)	
W22*R3*Liberal					-0.01 (0.04)
W22*R3*Conservative					0.13*** (0.03)
Individual F.E.	X	-	-	-	-
Num.Obs.	7066	7066	7066	6772	6357
R2	0.864	0.000	0.237	0.123	0.240
R2 Adj.	0.698	0.000	0.236	0.122	0.239
RMSE	0.11	0.31	0.26	0.28	0.26

Table S6: Regression Analysis of the Effect of the 2023 Term on Court Favorability, AIOD Panel Data [See Figure 3 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Tables S7 and S8, we replicate the specification for Table 1 in the paper, but we break out each individual item. Recall that Table 1 in the body of the paper analyzed an index of items measuring legitimacy and Court reforms. The legitimacy index ($\alpha = 0.79$) was the combined responses to four survey items (43): (1) If the Supreme Court started making a lot of rulings that most Americans disagreed with, it might be better to do away with the Court altogether, (2) The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics, (3) The U.S. Supreme Court ought to be made less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people want, and (4) The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced. The reform index ($\alpha = 0.75$) is a combination of the respondent's support of three proposals: (1) Increasing the number of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, (2) Setting a specific number of years that U.S. Supreme Court justices serve instead of granting them lifetime appointments, and (3) Requiring that U.S. Supreme Court justices retire by a certain age. Here, we show that the results hold when we analyze each item separately (they do).

	Retire	Term Limit	Pack Court	Retire	Term Limit	Pack Court
Favorability 2021	-0.304*** (0.023)	-0.396*** (0.023)	-0.395*** (0.022)			
Δ Favorability	-0.240*** (0.022)	-0.316*** (0.022)	-0.308*** (0.021)			
Trust 2021				-0.223*** (0.023)	-0.277*** (0.024)	-0.260*** (0.023)
Δ Trust				-0.246*** (0.020)	-0.295*** (0.020)	-0.262*** (0.020)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	2991	2990	2990	2851	2851	2851
R2	0.144	0.235	0.415	0.120	0.185	0.359
R2 Adj.	0.140	0.232	0.413	0.117	0.182	0.356
RMSE	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.28	0.29	0.27

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S7: Item-by-Item Analysis of Support for Court Reform [See Table 1 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Abolish	Mixed Up	Less Independent	Strip Jurisdiction	Abolish	Mixed Up	Less Independent	Strip Jurisdiction
Favorability 2021	-0.346*** (0.024)	-0.524*** (0.021)	-0.352*** (0.026)	-0.439*** (0.024)				
Δ Favorability	-0.304*** (0.023)	-0.395*** (0.020)	-0.318*** (0.025)	-0.358*** (0.023)				
Trust 2021					-0.326*** (0.025)	-0.380*** (0.021)	-0.302*** (0.027)	-0.339*** (0.025)
Δ Trust					-0.272*** (0.021)	-0.325*** (0.018)	-0.310*** (0.023)	-0.332*** (0.021)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	3154	3154	3152	3155	2986	2987	2987	2989
R2	0.210	0.279	0.207	0.230	0.210	0.218	0.198	0.205
R2 Adj.	0.207	0.276	0.204	0.228	0.207	0.215	0.195	0.202
RMSE	0.29	0.25	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.25	0.32	0.30

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S8: Item-by-Item Analysis of Court Legitimacy [See Table 1 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In Table S9, we show the regression results for Figure 4 on the effects on the importance of the Supreme Court to vote choice, highlighting that the effect of Dobbs increased the importance of the Supreme Court on vote choice for all respondents (though we lack the power to detect heterogeneous effects by party/ideology).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-Dobbs (PD)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
R2		0.00 (0.01)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
R3		-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
PD*R2	0.02* (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
PD*R3	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07 (0.05)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)
PD*R2*Democrat			0.04 (0.05)		
PD*R2*Republican			0.04 (0.05)		
PD*R3*Democrat			-0.01 (0.05)		
PD*R3*Republican			-0.01 (0.05)		
PD*R2*Always Support				0.00 (0.03)	
PD*R2*Never Support				-0.04 (0.05)	
PD*R3*Always Support				0.03 (0.03)	
PD*R3*Never Support				0.00 (0.05)	
PD*R2*Liberal					0.04 (0.04)
PD*R2*Conservative					0.03 (0.04)
PD*R3*Liberal					0.01 (0.04)
PD*R3*Conservative					-0.08* (0.04)
Individual F.E.	X	-	-	-	-
Num.Obs.	7539	7539	7539	7142	6760
R2	0.799	0.004	0.059	0.024	0.064
R2 Adj.	0.555	0.004	0.057	0.022	0.062
RMSE	0.12	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S9: Effect of Dobbs on the Importance of the Supreme Court to Presidential Vote Choice [See Figure 4 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S10 shows the regression results, separately by year, for the legitimacy index in Figure 5 (and also provides the year-by-year alpha for the index of legitimacy). Tables S11 – S18 provide the regression results separately for each item by year; for the list of items used by year and survey, please refer to Table S3. For all remaining tables, these reinforce the analyses seen graphically in the body of the paper and are provided in the interest of completeness.

	2005	2007	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2019	2022	2023
Democrat	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)
Republican	0.01 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)
30-49	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
50-64	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
65+	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)	0.07** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.04)
4-year Degree	0.10*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Female	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)
Black	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)
Asian	-0.10 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.14** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.13* (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.16** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)
Hispanic	-0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Other Race	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.09)
Index α	.57	.43	.48	.73	.75	.60	.66	.72	.68	.79	.71
Num.Obs.	1436	1458	1144	1240	1057	975	928	735	1003	1034	973
R2	0.049	0.075	0.115	0.070	0.129	0.126	0.146	0.184	0.062	0.220	0.188
R2 Adj.	0.042	0.068	0.106	0.062	0.120	0.116	0.135	0.171	0.051	0.212	0.179
RMSE	0.25	0.24	0.22	0.25	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.28

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S10: Regression Results, Legitimacy Index, by Year [See Figure 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2019	2022	2023
Democrat	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Republican	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.03)
30-49	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
50-64	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.04)
65+	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
4-year Degree	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Female	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Black	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)
Asian	0.13* (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.18** (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.06)
Hispanic	0.08 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.08)	0.00 (0.05)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Other Race	0.33*** (0.07)	0.05 (0.12)	0.03 (0.13)	0.10 (0.05)	0.30 (0.22)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.10)
Num.Obs.	1366	1024	972	926	720	991	1030	970
R2	0.112	0.072	0.107	0.127	0.172	0.028	0.121	0.104
R2 Adj.	0.105	0.062	0.097	0.117	0.159	0.017	0.112	0.094
RMSE	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.36	0.37	0.30

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S11: Regression Results, Limit the Court's Ability to Hear Controversial Cases, by Year [See Figure 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2019	2022	2023
Democrat	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)
Republican	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)
30-49	0.03 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)
50-64	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.04)
65+	0.00 (0.04)	-0.10* (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.15*** (0.04)
4-year Degree	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)
Female	0.05* (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Black	0.04 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)	0.10* (0.05)	0.08* (0.04)
Asian	0.04 (0.05)	0.16** (0.05)	0.17** (0.05)	0.13* (0.06)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.09)	0.09 (0.05)
Hispanic	0.00 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.20* (0.08)	0.14** (0.05)	0.14** (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Other Race	0.44*** (0.08)	0.13 (0.17)	-0.08 (0.20)	0.09 (0.05)	0.30 (0.23)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.02 (0.11)
Num.Obs.	1370	1022	972	926	717	999	1030	972
R2	0.151	0.177	0.152	0.171	0.183	0.092	0.156	0.157
R2 Adj.	0.144	0.168	0.142	0.161	0.170	0.082	0.147	0.147
RMSE	0.29	0.29	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.40	0.39	0.33

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S12: Regression Results, Make the Court Less Independent, by Year [See Figure 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	2005	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2019	2022	2023
Democrat	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)
Republican	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
30-49	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
50-64	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)
65+	-0.03 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
4-year Degree	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)
Female	0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)
Black	0.05 (0.03)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)
Asian	0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.11 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.00 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Hispanic	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)
Other Race	0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.15 (0.15)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.12)	0.02 (0.11)
Num.Obs.	1435	1369	1016	967	922	719	995	971	972
R2	0.040	0.038	0.056	0.058	0.072	0.073	0.020	0.069	0.157
R2 Adj.	0.032	0.030	0.046	0.048	0.060	0.059	0.009	0.059	0.147
RMSE	0.29	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.37	0.29	0.33

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S13: Regression Results, the Court Is Too Mixed Up in Politics, by Year [See Fig. 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	2005	2006	2007	2011	2013	2019	2022	2023
Democrat	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Republican	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)
30-49	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
50-64	0.08** (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.19*** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)
65+	0.09** (0.03)	0.10** (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.21*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)
4-year Degree	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Female	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Black	0.08* (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)
Asian	0.17* (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.17* (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.24 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.07)
Hispanic	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.03)
Other Race	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.10 (0.07)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.13)
Num.Obs.	1436	926	1455	1142	1237	999	1022	973
R2	0.038	0.050	0.070	0.025	0.038	0.053	0.142	0.151
R2 Adj.	0.031	0.039	0.063	0.016	0.029	0.043	0.133	0.141
RMSE	0.28	0.31	0.30	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.32

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S14: Regression Results, Distrusting of the Supreme Court, by Year [See Figure 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	2005	2006	2007	2013	2019	2022	2023
Democrat	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.09* (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)
Republican	0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.05)
30-49	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)
50-64	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.07)	0.14* (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.40*** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)
65+	0.14* (0.05)	0.12 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.36*** (0.06)	-0.14* (0.07)
4-year Degree	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Female	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Black	0.15* (0.06)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.09)
Asian	0.07 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.47** (0.15)	0.04 (0.09)
Hispanic	0.15* (0.07)	-0.14 (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)
Other Race	0.05 (0.10)	0.22 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.13)	0.07 (0.16)	0.23* (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.18)
Num.Obs.	1433	931	1452	1233	1001	1020	971
R2	0.027	0.023	0.026	0.019	0.018	0.147	0.073
R2 Adj.	0.019	0.011	0.019	0.010	0.007	0.138	0.063
RMSE	0.53	0.53	0.61	0.59	0.44	0.50	0.53

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S15: Regression Results, Supreme Court Has Too Much Power, by Year [See Fig. 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	2019	2020	2020.9	2021.1	2022	2023
Democrat	0.11* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Republican	0.00 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)
30-49	-0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.05)
50-64	-0.05 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.16** (0.06)
65+	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.22*** (0.06)
4-year Degree	0.07 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Female	0.00 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Black	-0.01 (0.08)	0.04 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.13)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)
Asian	-0.09 (0.12)	0.20 (0.17)	0.20 (0.40)	0.05 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.09)
Hispanic	-0.02 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.19*** (0.05)
Other Race	0.00 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)	-0.25*** (0.06)	0.14 (0.08)	-0.24 (0.18)
Num.Obs.	914	835	944	916	932	972
R2	0.024	0.024	0.015	0.028	0.084	0.074
R2 Adj.	0.012	0.011	0.004	0.017	0.073	0.063
RMSE	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.45

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S16: Regression Results, Supreme Court Makes Partisan/Ideological Decisions, by Year [See Figure 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	2007	2011	2013	2015	2018	2021a	2021b	2022
Democrat	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.04)
Republican	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
30-49	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.11* (0.04)
50-64	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)
65+	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
4-year Degree	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Female	0.04 (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Black	0.08 (0.04)	0.15** (0.05)	0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.09)	0.07 (0.05)
Asian	0.18* (0.08)	0.02 (0.10)	0.10 (0.09)	0.17* (0.08)	0.21* (0.10)	0.15 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)
Hispanic	0.01 (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.11* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)
Other Race	0.14 (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)	0.15 (0.08)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)
Num.Obs.	1450	1140	1231	914	906	968	935	999
R2	0.063	0.087	0.086	0.060	0.087	0.048	0.087	0.144
R2 Adj.	0.056	0.078	0.078	0.048	0.076	0.037	0.076	0.135
RMSE	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.34	0.34	0.36	0.36	0.36

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S17: Regression Results, Congress Should Limit the Court's Jurisdiction, by Year
[See Figure 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	2005	2007	2011	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021	2022	2023
Democrat	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.09)
Republican	0.00 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.09)
30-49	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.19*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.25* (0.11)
50-64	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.47*** (0.12)
65+	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.09 (0.04)	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.70*** (0.12)
4-year Degree	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.46*** (0.08)
Female	0.04* (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.17* (0.07)
Black	0.08* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.06 (0.10)	0.15* (0.06)	0.38*** (0.12)
Asian	0.10 (0.08)	0.15 (0.09)	0.14 (0.11)	0.12 (0.09)	0.14* (0.06)	0.16 (0.11)	0.22* (0.09)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.17)	0.16 (0.14)	0.00 (0.08)	0.29 (0.16)
Hispanic	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.11 (0.13)	0.05 (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	0.11* (0.04)	0.16 (0.11)
Other Race	0.00 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.08)	0.55 (0.36)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.23** (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.05)	0.14 (0.28)
Num.Obs.	1433	1454	1141	1235	1052	918	717	904	1000	970	937	1031	972
R2	0.044	0.076	0.124	0.084	0.116	0.037	0.196	0.101	0.091	0.057	0.152	0.120	0.163
R2 Adj.	0.036	0.069	0.116	0.076	0.106	0.025	0.183	0.090	0.081	0.047	0.142	0.111	0.153
RMSE	0.34	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.36	0.24	0.31	0.30	0.37	0.35	0.32	0.90

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S18: Regression Results, Do Away with the Court Altogether, by Year [See Figure 5 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S19 shows the regression results underlying Figure 6 in the paper, showing the effect of knowledge of the Court on legitimacy. Here, knowledge of the Court was measured with an index of items: (1) knowledge of the three branches of government (2007, 2009, 2011, and 2022), (2) meaning of a 5-4 Supreme Court decision (2007, 2009, 2011, and 2022), (3) which branch has the final say on the constitutionality of a law (2007, 2009, 2011, and 2022), (4) citizens have a constitutional right to own a handgun (2007, 2009, 2011, and 2022), (5) the U.S. Constitution allows a judge to insist that a defendant testify at his own trial (2019 and 2022), (6) How much of a majority is required for the US Senate and the House of Representatives to override a presidential veto (2007, 2009, 2011), and (7) party currently in the majority in the U.S. House of Representatives (2007, 2011). Note that because the specific items used in each year differ, the alpha for the knowledge index differs as well; that figure is given by year in Table S19.

	2007	2011	2019	2022
Knowledge Index (KI)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.05)
Democrat*KI	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.07)
Republican*KI	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)
Democrat	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Republican	0.09* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
30-49	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)
50-64	-0.05* (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.16*** (0.03)
65+	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)
4-year Degree	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Female	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Black	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Asian	0.05 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.18** (0.06)
Hispanic	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Other Race	0.00 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
KI α	.73	.72	.57	.57
Num.Obs.	1458	1144	1003	1034
R2	0.103	0.197	0.132	0.305
R2 Adj.	0.095	0.187	0.119	0.296
RMSE	0.24	0.21	0.22	0.23

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S19: Regression Results, Interacting with Knowledge [See Figure 6 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In Table S20, we show the regression results underlying Figure 7 on the effect of democratic values (here, support for the rule of law). Support for the rule of law was measured as an index of agreement with three items: (1) Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather than wait for a legal solution, (2) The government should have some ability to bend the law in order to solve pressing social and political problems, and (3) It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government I did not vote for. Alpha for the scale by year is presented in Table S20.

	2015			2023				
Democratic Norms (DN)	0.26*** (0.03)		0.28*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.42*** (0.04)		0.39*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.06)
Democrat*DN				0.09 (0.08)				0.16 (0.09)
Republican*DN				0.02 (0.09)				0.32*** (0.09)
Democrat	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.15* (0.06)
Republican	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.07 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.14* (0.07)
30-49	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
50-64	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)
65+	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)
4-year Degree	0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Female	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Black	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Asian	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Hispanic	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)
Other Race	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
DN α	.63	.63	.63	.63	.65	.65	.65	.65
Num.Obs.	1052	975	901	901	974	973	973	973
R2	0.193	0.126	0.194	0.195	0.240	0.188	0.267	0.276
R2 Adj.	0.185	0.116	0.183	0.183	0.232	0.179	0.257	0.266

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S20: Regression Results, Interacting with Support for the Rule of Law [See Figure 7 in Paper]

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S21 shows the over-time effects of the *Dobbs* leak and decision on the spring 2023 wave items measuring legitimacy and support for reform. The results show no further polarization, but also that the polarization that existed in 2022 continues.

	Reform Index				
W22 (W22)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
W22 * Replicate3 (R3)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
R3		0.02 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
W22*R3*Democrat			0.05 (0.04)		
W22*R3*Republican			0.03 (0.04)		
W22*R3*Always Support				0.03 (0.03)	
W22*R3*Never Support				0.06 (0.05)	
W22*R3*Liberal					0.02 (0.03)
W22*R3*Conservative					-0.04 (0.03)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	7333	7333	7333	7059	6584
R2	0.905	0.002	0.182	0.097	0.191
R2 Adj.	0.796	0.001	0.181	0.096	0.189
RMSE	0.08	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.23

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table S21: Regression Analysis of the Effect of the 2023 Term on Court Reform Support, AIOD Panel Data

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Section F: Details on the Content Analysis of the *New York Times*

In the body of the paper, we present a series of results about the coverage of the Supreme Court from the *New York Times* (see Figure 2). To produce those results, we used the *New York Times* API, we first downloaded the corpus of news articles from 1 January 2008 – 20 June 2023 (the last date available at the time we performed our content analysis) that included the words “Supreme Court” as a keyword for the article. This proceeds in two steps. The API does not return the full text but does return the full-text URL, so we used the API to generate the set of URLs, and then used the URLs to scrape the full text of the articles. Finally, we randomly selected samples of 100 to check for false positives. After removing a large subset of articles concerning the Supreme Court of India, we were left with approximately 88-92 percent accuracy (i.e., approximately 9 in 10 articles were actually about the U.S. Supreme Court). Given the large number of articles (8,497), the trends are either conservative or likely unaffected by the small portion of false positives. False negatives are extremely unlikely here: it is hard to imagine the Times writing many articles (or even any articles) about the Supreme Court without listing it as a keyword.

In the body of the paper, we discussed various trends in coverage of the Court: coverage of key cases and controversies, ideological/partisan coverage, and discussion of the Court’s legitimacy. To conduct these analyses, we used a set of keywords, which are presented in Table S22.

Concept	Category	Classifiers
Ideology	General Ideology	ideologically div, ideological div, polariz
	Liberal	liberal justice, liberal member, liberal wing, liberal court
	Conservative	conservative justice, conservative member, conservative wing, conservative court
Partisanship	Partisan	republican-appoint, republican appoint, democrat-appoint, democrat appoint, democratic-appoint, democratic appoint, politiciz, partisan court, partisan justice
Legitimacy	Legitimacy and Reform	ethics code, code of conduct, ethics standard, ethical standards, mandatory retirement, term limits, court pack, packing, legitimat, corrupt, conflict of interest, stolen seat, hijacked
Issue Area	Gun Rights	gun rights, gun control, second amendment, district of columbia v. heller, bruen, caetano, heller
	Same-sex Marriage	same-sex marriage, same sex marriage, gay marriage, same-sex couples, same sex couple, obergefell, windsor
	Voting Rights	disenfranchis, voter suppress, voting right, shelby county, allen v. milligan, gerrymand, redistrict
	Campaign Finance	citizens united, campaign financ, mccutcheon
	Abortion	abortion, dobbs, roe , planned parenthood v. casey

Table S22: Keywords Used for the *New York Times* Content Analysis

In Figure 2 in the body of the paper, we presented an analysis that showed how much attention various cases/topics received over time (in the bottom panel of the graph). To make the graph, we used the full set of keywords from Table S1 about each topic. In Figure S1, we break this down to look at mentions of the cases specifically vs. the broader set of terms to ensure that pooling them did not skew our findings. Figure S1 confirms that this did not occur.




Figure S1: *New York Times* Analysis, Trends Separate by Cases and Terms

Data cover through June 20, 2023. Issue shares less than 10% are suppressed for clarity.

Taken together, the content analysis makes it clear that *Dobbs* is, in many ways, *sui generis* in the contemporary Court's history. No other case has been covered this extensively in recent years, and no other case is so directly linked and framed to the Court's legitimacy. This means that even if the public normally does not update its views of the court, especially its legitimacy, in response to key cases (14), they may well do so in response to *Dobbs*.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. J. Gibson, G. Caldeira, *Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations* (Princeton Univ. Press, 2009).
2. J. Hibbing, E. Theiss-Morse, *Congress as Public Enemy* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
3. J. Gibson, M. Nelson, The legitimacy of the US Supreme Court: Conventional wisdoms and recent challenges thereto, *Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci.* **10**, 201–219 (2014).
4. A. Gou, E. Erskine, J. Romoser, SCOTUSblog: Stat Pack for the Supreme Court’s 2021-2022 Term; <https://bit.ly/3TgJw5t>.
5. D. Gregorian, “Sotomayor suggests Supreme Court won’t ‘survive the stench’ of overturning *Roe v. Wade*,” *NBC News*, 1 December 2021.
6. T. Clark, *The Limits of Judicial Independence* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012)
7. B. Bartels, C. Johnston, *Curbing the Court: Why the Public Constrains Judicial Independence* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020).
8. J. Gibson, Performance evaluations are not legitimacy judgements, *Wash. Univ. J. Law Policy* **54** (2017).
9. J. Gibson, The legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a polarized polity, *J. Empir. Leg. Stud.* **4**, 507–538 (2007).
10. T. Tyler, Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation, *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* **57**, 375–400 (2006).
11. D. Easton, A re-assessment of the concept of political support, *Br. J. Polit. Sci.* **5**, 435–457 (1975).
12. G. Caldeira, J. Gibson, The etiology of public support for the Supreme Court, *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* **36**, 635–664 (1992).

13. A. Grosskopf, J. Mondak, Do attitudes toward specific Supreme Court decisions matter? The impact of *Webster* and *Texas v. Johnson* on public confidence in the Supreme Court. *Polit. Res. Q.* **51**, 633–654 (1998).
14. J. Gibson, G. Caldeira, L. Spence, The Supreme Court and the U.S. presidential election of 2000: Wounds, self-inflicted or otherwise? *Br. J. Polit. Sci.* **33**, 535–556 (2003).
15. V. Baird, Building institutional legitimacy: The role of procedural justice, *Polit. Res. Q.* **54**, 333–354 (2001).
16. M. Nelson, P. Tucker, The stability and durability of the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy, *J. Polit.* **83**, 767–771 (2021).
17. B. Bartels, C. Johnston, On the ideological foundations of Supreme Court legitimacy in the American public, *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* **57**, 184–199 (2013).
18. D. Christenson, D. Glick. 2015, Chief Justice Roberts’s health care decision disrobed: The microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy, *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* **59**, 403–418 (2015).
19. L. Strother, S. K. Gadarian, Public perceptions of the Supreme Court: How policy disagreement affects legitimacy, *Forum* **20**, 87–126 (2022).
20. S. Jessee, N. Malhotra, M. Sen, A decade-long longitudinal survey shows that the Supreme Court is now much more conservative than the public, *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.* **119**, e2120284119 (2022).
21. J. Mondak, S.I. Smithey, The dynamics of public support for the Supreme Court, *J. Polit.* **59**, 1114–1142 (1997).
22. J. Bravin, “Kagan v. Roberts: Justices spar over Supreme Court’s legitimacy,” *Wall Street Journal*, 28 September 2022.
23. D. Mangan, “Trump: I’ll appoint Supreme Court justices to overturn *Roe v. Wade* abortion case,” *CNBC*, 19 October 2016.

24. A. Coney Barrett, Precedent and jurisprudential disagreement, *Tex. L. Rev.*, **91**, 1711 (2013).
25. J. Gerstein, “How rare is a Supreme Court breach? Very rare,” *Politico*, 2 May 2022.
26. R. Barnes, “Clarence Thomas says Supreme Court leak has eroded trust in institution,” *Washington Post*, 14 May 2022.
27. A. Liptak, “A Supreme Court in disarray after an extraordinary breach,” *New York Times*, 24 June 2022.
28. J. Kantor, A. Liptak, “Behind the scenes at the dismantling of *Roe v. Wade*,” *New York Times*, 15 December 2023.
29. N. Carrington, L. Strother, Plugging the pipe? Evaluating the (null) effects of leaks on Supreme Court legitimacy, *J. Empir. Leg. Stud.* **20**, 669–712 (2023).
30. V. Baird, A. Gangl, Shattering the myth of legality: The impact of the media's framing of Supreme Court procedures on perceptions of fairness. *Polit. Psychol.* **27**, 597–614 (2006).
31. Pew Research Center, Majority of public disapproves of Supreme Court’s decision to overturn *Roe v. Wade*; <https://pewrsr.ch/45p4wx4>.
32. B. Sullivan, Becky, What conservative justices said—and didn’t say—about *Roe* at the confirmations, NPR; <https://n.pr/3OmRTvH>.
33. J. Gibson, Losing legitimacy: The challenges of the Dobbs ruling to conventional legitimacy theory (2023); <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4206986>.
34. W. Benoit, K. Stein, G. Hansen, New York Times coverage of presidential campaigns, *J. Mass Commun. Q.* **82**, 356–376 (2005).
35. L. Epstein, J. Segal, Measuring issue salience, *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* **44**, 66–83 (2000).

36. K. Lin, C. Doherty, Favorable views of Supreme Court fall to all-time low, Pew Research Center; <https://pewrsr.ch/3qdNuTT>.
37. P. Coy, “The politicization of the Supreme Court is eroding its legitimacy,” *New York Times*, 27 June 2022.
38. S. Bokan-Lindell, “Is the Supreme Court facing a legitimacy crisis?,” *New York Times*, 29 June 2022.
39. D. Leonhardt, “Supreme Court criticism,” *New York Times: The Morning Newsletter*, 22 May 2023.
40. J. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
41. J. Gibson, M. Nelson, Reconsidering positivity theory: What roles do politicization, ideological disagreement, and legal realism play in shaping U.S. Supreme Court legitimacy? *J. Empir. Leg. Stud.* **14**, 592–617 (2017).
42. M. Nelson, J. Gibson, How does hyperpoliticized rhetoric affect the US Supreme Court’s legitimacy? *J. Polit.* **81**, 1512–1516 (2019).
43. A. Badas, E. Simas, The Supreme Court as an electoral issue: Evidence from three studies, *Polit. Sci. Res. Methods* **10**, 49–67 (2022).
44. M. Thiesen, “For the fall of *Roe v. Wade*, thank Donald Trump,” *Washington Post*, 24 June 2022.
45. P. Noonan, “The end of *Roe v. Wade* will be good for America,” *Wall Street Journal*, 5 May 2022.
46. J. Gibson, G. Caldeira, L. Spence, Measuring attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* **47**, 354–367 (2003).
47. C. Clark, E.L. Paluck, S. J. Westwood, M. Sen, N. Malhotra, S. Jessee, Effects of a US Supreme Court ruling to restrict abortion rights. *Nat. Hum. Behav.* **8**, 63–71 (2024).

48. J. Gibson, Do the effects of unpopular Supreme Court rulings last? The Dobbs decision rescinding abortion rights (2023); <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4503240>.
49. A. Liptak, A. Parlapiano, “Along with conservative triumphs, signs of New caution at Supreme Court,” *New York Times*, 1 July 2023.
50. A. Liptak, E. Murray, “The major Supreme Court decisions in 2023,” *New York Times*, 29 June 2023.
51. A. Gelman, Z. Huang, Estimating incumbency advantage and its variation, as an example of a before–after study, *J. Am. Stat. Assoc.* **103**, 437–446 (2008).
52. J. Gibson, G. Caldeira, V. Baird, On the legitimacy of national high courts, *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **92**, 343–358 (1998).
53. J. Gibson, M. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court's legitimacy grounded in performance satisfaction and ideology? *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* **59**, 162–174 (2015).
54. N. Robertson, “Democratic senators introduce bill establishing Supreme Court term limits,” *The Hill*, 10 October 2023.
55. D. Smith, “Democrats fight to expand a ‘broken and illegitimate’ Supreme Court,” *The Guardian*, 21 May 2023.
56. D. Rivkin, J. Taranto, “Samuel Alito: The Supreme Court’s plain-spoken defender,” *Wall Street Journal*, 28 July 2023.
57. J. Jones, Trust in federal government branches continues to falter, Gallup, press release (11 October 2022).
58. M. Brennan, Views of Supreme Court remain near record lows, Gallup, press release (29 September 2023).
59. B. Keith, D. Magelby, C. Nelson, E. Orr, M. Westyle, R. Wolfinger, *The Myth of the Independent Voter* (University of California Press, 1992).

60. Annenberg IOD Collaborative, *Democracy Amid Crises* (Oxford Univ. Press, 2023).