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Chapter 15

Solomon Asch: Scientist and Humanist

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Perhaps the easiest way to introduce Solomon Asch is to say that he had a dedication to psychology as a natural science and a talent for arresting experiments, joined with the cultural knowledge and sensitivity of William James (chap. 2, *Pioneers I*). James was long gone by the time Asch came into psychology, and the complex humanity of Jamesian psychology was largely forgotten. Asch lived and worked in a mid-20th-century psychology dominated by behaviorist paradigms that were a reaction against the speculative excesses of psychoanalysis and Titchener's (chap. 7, *Pioneers I*) structuralism. For Asch, the behaviorists and the Freudians were alike in their reductionism. Asch aimed instead to represent the scope and depth of *Homo sapiens* in a Gestalt psychology that focused on context and relationships.

CONTEXT: JAMES, THE MODEL OF HUMANIST PSYCHOLOGY

For many years James was professor of philosophy at Harvard at a time when psychology was a subdiscipline of philosophy. It was not until the 1880s, when G. Stanley Hall (chap. 2, this volume) at Johns Hopkins University and James McKeen Cattell at the University of Pennsylvania became professors of psychology, that psychology departments were organized and psychologists began moving out of philosophy. This exodus is generally celebrated by psychologists as a transition from speculation to science. But James's *Principles of Psychology*

(1890/1950) is worth reading today, not for the research referred to but for the cultural and humanistic concerns that directed the psychological questions James raised and the answers he attempted.

The humanities survey the peaks of human creativity and achievement, and James made psychology come alive to the human conditions and capacities represented at these peaks. Experimental psychology starts at the bottom—with issues simple enough to be brought into the laboratory—and tends therefore to produce a psychology that human beings share with other animals. Humanistic psychology starts at the top—with issues raised by creativity and genius—and reveals human beings in their uniqueness and complexity. The humanists note, for instance, that religion has been an important part of the human experience for many centuries, and James in *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) laid out a road that can still bring psychologists to unsettled lands. When psychology moved out of philosophy, most psychologists left behind the humanist education that could leaven empiricist paradigms. Asch brought a humanist perspective back to psychology.

ASCH'S EARLY EXPERIENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY

Solomon Asch was born in Poland in 1907, and emigrated to the United States as a teenager. He attended the City College of New York, where he majored in both literature and science. He received a bachelor's degree in 1928 at the age of 21. Asch heard about psychology toward the end of his undergraduate career and developed an impression of this new field by reading James and philosophers such as Santayana and Royce (Ceraso, Rock, & Gruber, 1990, pp. 4–5). As a graduate student in psychology at Columbia University, he took an interest in anthropology and attended seminars with Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas. In 1930, Asch married Florence Miller and took his bride with him on a summer fellowship to study Hopi children and their culture. In those studies he noticed that Hopi children sent to the blackboard to do a math problem would not turn from the board until all the children at the board had completed the problem, suggesting the powerful effects that culture has on human behavior.

Although such experiences laid the foundation of Asch's humanist interests, these were not obvious in his master's and doctoral research at Columbia. Robert S. Woodworth supervised and provided the data for Asch's master's degree, awarded in 1929 for a statistical analysis of test scores of 200 children. H. E. Garrett supervised his doctoral research and, in the custom of the day, gave Asch his thesis problem. Garrett wanted Asch "to find out whether all learning curves had the same form" (Ceraso et al., 1990, p. 6). Thus, Asch's graduate studies, with the exception of his study of Hopi children, provided little scope for his humanist interests and little basis for his work in social psychology.

After obtaining his doctorate in 1932, Asch became a faculty member at Brooklyn College. Soon after taking up this position, he met Max Wertheimer

(chap. 13, *Pioneers I*), then at the New School for Social Research, the Gestalt psychologist who became the major intellectual influence in his life. When Wertheimer died in 1943, Asch replaced him as chair of psychology at the New School. Like Wertheimer, Asch became a moderate, someone who offered an alternative to behaviorism's highly analytic but impoverished accounts of the human condition. Dismayed at the attempts of the behaviorists to capture the complexity of human beings with a few elementary principles, Asch turned to Gestalt psychology with its focus on emergent properties and relations as a more promising starting point. He believed that the Gestalt principles of perception could support a psychology of whole persons in their social context.

Asch moved to Swarthmore College in 1947 and spent 20 productive years there. His time at Swarthmore was special because, uniquely in the history of the discipline, a small college became the intellectual center of a major movement in psychology. Wolfgang Kohler (chap. 17, *Pioneers I*) and Hans Wallach were at Swarthmore, and Asch was in contact with two of the brightest stars of Gestalt psychology. It was in this environment that Asch completed his classic studies of social psychology to be described later.

In his last years at Swarthmore, in his later years as director of the Center for Cognitive Psychology at Rutgers University (1966–1972), and in his final appointment as professor at the University of Pennsylvania (1972–1979), Asch turned his attention away from social psychology to study, among other topics, the psychology of metaphor and the nature of association (Asch, 1958, 1968). In this work, in typical Aschian form, he showed the poverty and inadequacy of existing formulations and proposed deeper accounts and more promising lines of investigation. His contention that learning of associations reflects something more than temporal and spatial contiguity, and depends on the nature of the material and the relations among the elements, served as the inspiration for his undergraduate student, Robert Rescorla, who became the leading scholar of association learning of a later generation (Rescorla, 1990).

ASCH'S FIRST PRINCIPLES

Asch aimed always for a psychology that brings scientific method to the understanding of human behavior without losing its complexity. In his uniquely thoughtful textbook, *Social Psychology* (1952), he reacted against behaviorism and argued for the primacy of the social world in human psychology:

We conclude that to discover the full potentialities of men we must observe them in the social medium, that the basic problems of psychology require the extension of observation into the region of social processes. (p. 34)

Most social acts have to be understood in their setting, and lose meaning if isolated. No error in thinking about social facts is more serious than the failure to see their place and function. (p. 61)

It will be the contention of this work that the decisive psychological fact about society is the capacity of individuals to comprehend and to respond to each other's experiences and actions. This fact, which permits individuals to become mutually related, becomes the ground of every social process and of the most crucial changes occurring in persons. (p. 127)

The essential problem of social psychology [is] how individuals create the reality of groups and how the latter control their further actions. (p. 256)

Asch also argued for research methods that are appropriate to the complexity of the social world. While respecting traditional experimental methods, he was careful to warn against losing the phenomenon of interest in a desire for rigor. Experiments, which hold everything constant but one or a few factors, are necessarily decontextualizing. The art of experimentation has to do with knowing how much context one can strip away from a phenomenon and still find out something useful. Only experiments thus informed are useful (Asch, 1952):

If there must be principles of scientific method, then surely the first to claim our attention is that one should describe phenomena faithfully and allow them to guide the choice of problems and procedures. If social psychology is to make a contribution to human knowledge, if it is to do more than add footnotes to ideas developed in other fields, it must look freely at its phenomena and examine its foundations. (p. ix)

The aim [is] to establish a psychology of social life by means of systematic observation and, where possible, of experiment. (p. viii)

In their anxiety to be scientific, students of psychology have often imitated the latest forms of sciences with a long history, while ignoring the steps these sciences took when they were young. They have, for example, striven to emulate the quantitative exactness of natural sciences without asking whether their own subject matter is always ripe for such treatment, failing to realize that one does not advance time by moving the hands of the clock. Because physicists cannot speak with stars or electric currents, psychologists have often been hesitant to speak to their human subjects. (pp. viii-ix)

Psychology must center on great and permanent problems, and psychologists should avoid the undignified posture of those whom in another connection Santayana has described as redoubling their effort when they have forgotten their aim. (p. 31)

The primacy of the social world and the implications of this primacy for scientific methods are summed up in Asch's 1987 retrospective comment on his work:

Thus a human psychology necessarily had to be a social psychology. In turn, it had to be an account of human experience, of beliefs and actions as they appeared to their human agents. This was an important step from the standpoint of method. In short, my intention was to produce, in contrast to the prevalent non-cognitive versions, a phenomenological psychology in which social facts and processes held central place. By the same token facts of culture were inseparable from this aim. . . . Not to sound too grandiloquent, I aimed for a treatise on human nature, informed by recent Gestalt strivings . . . a psychology with a human face. (1987, p. ix)

THREE CLASSIC STUDIES

Asch's first major research initiative, a series of studies of visual perception from a Gestalt perspective, was undertaken at Brooklyn College in collaboration with Herman Witkin. The results were reported in four articles on spatial orientation, all published in 1948. These experiments introduced the "rod-and-frame test." In this test people see a narrow rod surrounded by a frame of about the same width. With controls that are provided they try to set the rod to true vertical, although the enclosing frame may be tilted. These judgments pit the participants' gravitational sense of the vertical against the influence of a tilted visual frame. Asch and Witkin demonstrated that there is a tendency for people to judge the vertical as parallel to the sides of the tilted rectangle in which the rod is displayed. This work emphasized the idea of framing, a central concept in psychology some 50 years later (Rock, 1990b). Both the importance of framing and the balancing of forces—gravitational versus visual in the work with Witkin, social versus visual in Asch's later work—became central to Asch's social psychology.

In this section, we focus on Asch's three best-known and most influential studies. In order of their publication, these were "Forming Impressions of Personality" (1946), "The Doctrine of Suggestion, Prestige, and Imitation in Social Psychology" (1948), and "Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority" (1956). Each of the three investigations joined an elegantly simple method with a question of surprising depth. Each involved a conflict of judgment that was presaged in Asch's earlier research.

Impression Formation

Asch's study of impression formation emerged from his Gestalt perspective. His concern was to show that one individual's perception of another person is a creative integration of a pattern of information about the person, rather than just a summation of the separate pieces of information. In one of his best-known procedures, college students were asked to form an impression of someone de-

scribed by a list of personality traits: intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm, determined, practical, and cautious. The students wrote brief descriptions of their impressions of this person and then checked off, on a list of 18 pairs of traits, the traits most likely descriptive of the person they described.

The first and in some ways most surprising aspect of the results was that students do as they are asked. They do not complain that the task is impossible, that all they know is what the experimenter gave them in the list, that they have no idea how to say more than they were given. Rather, they write the sketch and check the traits with no signs of strain; they seem to have no trouble going beyond the given. How is this possible?

One answer to this question is suggested by the results of a comparison condition in which the task was the same except that the stimulus list of personality traits was changed by substituting *cold* for *warm* in the list. The sketches elicited were very different from those elicited by the list in which the adjective was *warm*. The impression now was of a self-centered person using positive traits to obtain advancement at the expense of others, whereas the impression from the *warm* list was of someone whose positive traits are directed at the service of others. Asch suggested that these data provide evidence that the meaning of the other traits has changed. A cold intelligence is analytical, logical, closed, whereas a warm intelligence is social, holistic, and open. One way the students could go beyond the given, then, is that the collection of traits is understood as a pattern in which the elements take on different meaning in combination than in isolation.

Further evidence came from a variation of this study in which *polite* and *blunt* were used in the stimulus list instead of *warm* and *cold*. This time the sketches and the trait checking were not very different; *polite* and *blunt* did not have the strong effect on impressions that *warm* and *cold* had had. Nor did *polite* and *blunt* have much effect on the meaning of other traits: The personality sketches did not suggest much difference between blunt intelligence and polite intelligence. Asch suggests that *warm* and *cold* should be considered *central traits*, in the sense that other impressions are organized around them to a degree that is not true of traits such as *polite* and *blunt*. Again, the organization is key to the impression of personality conveyed by the word list, but *warm* and *cold* affect that organization more than other pairs of adjectives.

Another kind of organization implied by these results is a network of trait inferences in which every trait is connected to many others, such that knowing one trait about a person makes some other traits more likely and other traits less likely. If a person is warm, he or she is more likely to be generous; if a person is cold, he or she is less likely to be generous. Asch's checklist data showed just this pattern. The network of trait inferences provides a second answer to the question of how we go beyond the given in impression formation: Even a brief list of traits implies a rich network of expectations about other, unmentioned, traits made more or less likely by the stimulus traits. This network of mutual im-

plications among traits came to be called "implicit personality theory" and research exploring the origins and implications of this theory continues today. Of particular interest is the degree to which empirical evidence of actual correlations among traits is similar to the implicit correlations we carry in our heads.

Prestige Suggestion

Asch's research on prestige suggestion was prompted by a study by Irving Lorge (1936) that seemed to show that people evaluate opinions on the basis of who expresses them, with little regard to content. Lorge had students read a number of opinion statements, each attributed to a notable political figure. For instance, students read that Thomas Jefferson had said, "I hold it that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms are in the physical." The students then rated the level of their agreement or disagreement with the statement. After rating all the statements, students rated their degree of respect for each of the political figures quoted. Some months later, when the students were unlikely to recall the statements or their ratings, the same students repeated the task but now the attribution of each statement was changed. The rebellion statement, for instance, was now said to be a quotation from Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Russian Revolution.

The results of Lorge's experiment showed that level of respect for the figure associated with the quotation has a big effect on students' agreement with the opinion expressed in it. Agreement with the rebellion quotation was much higher when it was attributed to Jefferson than when it was attributed to Lenin. In general, the greater the discrepancy in respect for the attributed sources of a quotation, the greater the discrepancy in student agreement with the quotation. Lorge concluded that students were irrationally attending to source rather than content of statements of opinion, that their evaluations were determined by blind association of source and statement.

Asch took a more positive view of the students' capacities and performance. His idea was that the students agreed more or less with a statement because the meaning of the statement changed with its attributed source. Thus, it was not the same opinion that the students evaluated differently according to its attribution; rather, they were evaluating effectively different opinions differently. Asch was able to marshal two kinds of evidence in support of this interpretation. First, he reanalyzed Lorge's data to show that the attribution effect was concentrated in the opinion statements that were most ambiguous. The meaning of rebellion, for instance, can range from peaceful protest to violent insurrection. Second, he repeated the Lorge experiment using the more ambiguous quotations and asked students to write briefly how they understood each quotation. The results supported his interpretation. Students understood "rebellion" to mean rapid political change when the quotation was attributed to Jefferson, but understood the same quotation to mean violent revolution when attributed to Lenin. A certain irony

attaches to the fact that Jefferson was the source of the quotation that could mean violent revolution in the context created by the name of Lenin.

For Asch, then, the differential response to a quotation depending on its source was not an indication of irrationality and blind association. Rather, the students were doing their best to organize the quotation and its source into a single coherent perception that accounted for the entire pattern of the information they were given. The fact that they were wrong about what Jefferson meant did not indicate something wrong with the inferential capabilities they brought to the task; their perception was the result of a creative effort to make sense of what they were presented with.

Independence and Conformity

Asch's studies of independence and conformity were undertaken in a context where many psychologists were claiming that human opinions are the result of the same kinds of stimulus associations, rewards, and punishments that shape nonhuman behavior. Asch wanted to show instead that human opinions are the result of an active search for interpretations of whole perceptual fields. So, he arranged a task in which social pressure was in conflict with reality. The task differed slightly in the two phases of his work, the first reported in his 1952 *Social Psychology* text and the second in his 1956 *Psychological Monographs* article. Here, we describe the first procedures.

A college student, recruited for a study of visual perception, arrive at the laboratory and is seated near the end of a row of seven seats, with five other students to the right and one to the left. The six other students are all confederates of the experimenter. The experimenter puts two cards in the chalk tray of a blackboard facing the students. One card is a "standard" card with a single vertical line on it (on different trials these lines are nine different lengths ranging from 1 in. to 9 in.). The other card is a "comparison" card with three vertical lines labeled 1, 2, and 3. Starting at the right end of the row of students, each student is asked to say out loud the number of the comparison line that matches the standard. The experimenter records each student's judgment.

There were 12 trials of this kind in which, on 7 of the 12 trials—the critical trials—the confederates unanimously gave the same incorrect judgment. Actually, the correct answer was easy to see—students making the same judgments privately were correct 93% of the time—but the confederates in the majority made errors that identified the matching line as one that differed from the standard by as little as 0.25 in. to as much as 1.75 in. The behavior of interest was the judgment of the naive students: Would they conform to the incorrect judgment of the majority or give the correct answer?

The results show surprising levels of conformity. Only 20% of the naive students gave the correct answer on every critical trial; 80% yielded to the majority at least once. Across all students and all trials, yielding to the majority occurred

on 33% of the critical trials. There was considerable individual consistency in the pattern of the students' yielding. Those who yielded on the first trial or two were likely to keep yielding on succeeding trials, whereas those who were independent on the initial trials were more likely to be independent later on.

After each session, Asch interviewed the naive students, asking in particular why they had conformed. The majority said they didn't want to stick out, didn't want to be laughed at. A smaller number said they believed that the majority must be correct, must be able to see the lines better than they could. This difference defines an important distinction between *compliance* and *internalization*. Compliance is public show of conformity without true commitment—going along to get along. Internalization is a real and private conviction that the group is correct. Most of those who yielded did so only at the level of compliance, but a smaller number exhibited internalization and accepted the majority opinion as better evidence of reality than the evidence of their own eyes.

Many people who hear about these results believe that they would be among the 20% who never conformed in Asch's experiments, and that those who did conform must be inferior people. This belief is hard to maintain, however, given that Asch conducted his experiments at Swarthmore, Haverford, and St. Joseph's Colleges—all small institutions with excellent students. The naive student for each session was recruited by a friend who was one of the confederates for that session. Thus the naive student was facing, not a group of strangers, but a peer group of acquaintances and friends. It is hard to imagine a majority with more power in relation to a minority of one.

There is little doubt that Asch would have preferred to find 100% independence and 0% conformity, but he nevertheless emphasized that the majority of responses actually were independent. As mentioned previously, across all trials and participants, only 33% of the responses were conforming. Indeed he suggested (Asch, 1990, p. 54) that sensitivity to the opinions of others and the tendency to dislike public disagreement is a positive human disposition. Without this kind of sensitivity, social life would be undermined and cooperation for common goals less likely. In contrast to many subsequent interpretations—which have tended to stress the weaknesses and irrationality of people who conform to the group—Asch's own interpretation emphasized participants' efforts to make sense of conflicting information.

Replications of Asch's conformity research have been many and worldwide. In a meta-analysis of this research tradition, Bond and Smith (1996) found 133 studies from 17 countries that used Asch's line-length task to examine conformity. The analysis indicated that conformity had declined in the United States since the 1950s, that conformity is less in countries where individualism is valued more than collectivism, and that females are more likely to conform than males. From Asch's point of view, the decline in conformity may not be altogether good news, and the greater conformity of females may not be altogether bad news.

Asch's View of Human Perception and Judgment

What is common to the studies just reported is a view of human perception and judgment as creative responses to the whole array of available information. The response is a Gestalt, an organized whole in which the elements of information are interpreted rather than merely summed. An explicit version of Asch's theoretical perspective is provided by Yates (1983) in his article, "The Content of Awareness Is a Model of the World." Yates reviewed a wide array of research in cognitive psychology and argued that perceptual machinery outside awareness operates to provide awareness with the "best" interpretation of the data received. This best interpretation is one that is maximally simple (integrates the most data), univocal (only one of multiple possible interpretations is available in awareness at a given moment), and complete and consistent (missing or inconsistent information is not represented in the interpretation). Yates also argued that the interpretations we naively identify as reality go beyond immediate sense data. They represent our theories of where perceptual objects came from and anticipations of what they may lead to.

The view of perception as problem solving is the key to Asch's experiments, each of which poses a conflict for the research participants. In studies of personality impressions, the conflict is between positive and negative traits in descriptions of a person. In research on prestige suggestion, the conflict is between the content of a quotation and the source to which it is attributed. In experiments on conformity, the conflict is between perceptual and social evidence about the length of a line. These experiments are revealing because, in all of them, the stronger the conflict in the inputs, the stronger must be the creativity of the judgment that integrates the inputs. Asch had confidence in the creativity of human perception, and his studies demonstrated and supported his confidence.

ASCH'S TEXTBOOK, *SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*

Asch's *Social Psychology* (1952) is one of the great books in psychology, a book written by someone with an unusual gift of expression. The presentation is brilliant even as it is surprisingly close to common sense and, at the same time, surprisingly balanced. The critiques of other views—from associationism and behaviorism to psychoanalysis—are sympathetic. They aim to learn from these alternatives rather than to destroy them. There is also balance in Asch's view of the discipline of psychology. He respects human complexity and dignity while shaping a scientific approach. He acknowledges the importance of the individual in understanding social phenomena while recognizing the importance of groups and culture as more than the sum of the individuals that compose them. There is balance again in his treatment of the issues later battled over between universalists and relativists or deconstructionists. For Asch, our world and our minds are,

for the most part, socially constructed, but he allows for universal aspects of human thought and nature. And on the ever-divisive nature–nurture issue, Asch again holds a middle line. As a Gestalt psychologist, and in contrast to the classical behaviorists, he accepts the idea that there is substantial genetic determination of psychological dispositions, but he also sees great opportunities for shaping of human beings by experience and culture.

Unlike most subsequent texts in social psychology, Asch (1952) confronted the fundamental issues in social psychology, such as how we know there are other minds in other persons. This realization is at the root of social psychology, and Asch described it as "the basic psychological unity among men." Our surroundings are equally accessible to all of us, as are perceptions of causality and inference, and we somehow understand this:

To take our place with others we must perceive each other's existence and reach a measure of comprehension of one another's needs, emotions and thoughts. (p. 139)

To naive thought nothing is less problematic than that we grasp the actions of others, but it is precisely the task of psychology to remove the veil of self-evidence from these momentous processes. (pp. 139–140)

What we need to understand is how psychological events, which as such can never leave the individual, can nevertheless make contact with another individual. This is the heart of the problem. (p. 143)

It is precisely the interpenetration of conscious events in individuals that is necessary for the birth of society, of language, of art, and of science. (p. 163)

Asch argued that it is impossible to understand how we acquire knowledge of other minds through experience alone, and that, just as with some of the Gestalt principles of perception, the predisposition to appreciate other minds is innate. "It is necessary to assume that there is an intrinsic correspondence between experience and action, that they are isomorphic" (p. 159). His conclusion here, and the argument that leads to it, has much in common with the later argument by Chomsky and others that we must presume a predisposition for language to understand how language is acquired.

In the last section of his text, Asch questioned the Western presumption that an independent individual is the optimal and "morally desirable" outcome that we should wish to achieve (see Markus and Kitayama, 1991, on the independent versus interdependent self). Donald Campbell (1990) realized the importance of this question in describing the "moral epistemology" of Asch. Campbell noted that conformity is really about our dependence on the report of others, and he developed three Asch-based moral norms for socially achieved knowledge:

1. Trust: It is our duty to respect the reports of others and be willing to base our beliefs and actions on them.
2. Honesty: It is our duty to report what we perceive honestly, so that others may use our observations in coming to valid beliefs.
3. Self-respect: It is our duty to respect our own perceptions and beliefs, seeking to integrate them with the reports of others without deprecating them or ourselves.

These ideas offer the prospect of a moral foundation for research on social influence.

CONCLUSION

Partly as a result of spending much of his academic life at an undergraduate institution, Asch did not sponsor a legion of doctoral candidates. Instead, he inspired many undergraduates at Swarthmore to careers in psychology and influenced numerous others who came to know him during or after their graduate education. Stanley Milgram (chap. 21, *Pioneers II*) spent a postdoctoral year with Asch, and Milgram's later studies of obedience are like Asch's classic studies in examining reactions to a situation of conflicting social pressures. More explicitly, 17 eminent psychologists who contributed to *The Legacy of Solomon Asch: Essays in Cognition and Social Psychology* (Rock, 1990a) offered individual testimonies of the range and fecundity of Asch's influence on their research.

Asch's own work—the classic studies and especially his textbook—pointed the way to a social psychology that is yet to be achieved. Fifty years later, only half of his advice has been heeded. His goal of a natural science of social psychology has been developed exquisitely in modern experimental social psychology, but his focus on the essential sociality of human beings, and the richness of the human experience, has been lost to a large extent in the urge to imitate particle physics (Rozin, 2001). Asch made this point many times in his 1952 text, and in 1987, in the preface to the reprinting of the 1952 book, looked back in distress at what had happened in social psychology in the years after his text was published:

Clearly I was swimming, often without realizing it, against the current. (p. x)

Why do I sense, together with the current expansion, a shrinking of vision, an expansion of surface rather than depth, a failure of imagination? (p. x)

Why is not social psychology more exciting, more human in the most usual sense of that term? To sum up, is this discipline perhaps on the wrong track? (p. x)

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Chapter 16

Anne Anastasi: Master of Differential Psychology and Psychometrics

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Anne Anastasi is known to generations of psychology students as the author of *Psychological Testing*, a textbook that she first published in 1954. She completed work on the seventh edition, more than 40 years later, at age 87. It was her last publication. Anastasi's mastery of differential psychology and psychometrics established her as an international authority on those subjects.

Anastasi was also the author of several other important books and more than 200 monographs, articles, and reviews. In 1972, she became the third woman president of the American Psychological Association, and the first woman to hold that office in 51 years. In addition to her work in differential psychology and psychometrics, she was a scholar of general psychology and contributed important writings in that area. Beyond her academic accomplishments, she had a striking personality and a sharp sense of humor. Almost everyone who knew her had a story they wanted to tell about her.

CHILDHOOD AND EARLY EDUCATION

Anne Anastasi was born December 19, 1908, to Anthony and Theresa Gaudiosi Anastasi, Italian immigrants who settled in the Bronx, the northern county of New York City. Her father worked for the New York City Board of Education. When she was a year old, her father died suddenly. She later said that his death was a pivotal point in her development. It resulted in her unusual upbringing in a household consisting of her mother, her mother's brother, and her maternal