Reputations and International Organizations in Financial Markets

Through a book and several articles, I explore the ways in which IOs influence the ways that countries are perceived, particularly by investors. IO reputations do not hinge on the design of the agreements or the material benefits they bring. Rather, heuristic aspects of the IOs — primarily, the reputation of the IO’s other members — drive investor perceptions.

Published Work
International organization as a seal of approval: European union accession and investor risk

The company states keep: International economic organizations and investor perceptions

Reputations, Perceptions, and International Economic Agreements (with Raymond P. Hicks)

Working papers

What Counts as a Credible Commitment? Presented at IPES 2017, EPSA 2018, APSA 2018

Pecunia Non Olet: Do Markets Punish EU Backsliders? (with Dan Kelemen and Terence Teo) Presented at TWIIG 2018

Opportunistic, Not Optimal, Policy: Political Appointments to Independent Central Banks (with Nicole Baerg and Jakob Willisch) Presented at IPES 2016, APSA 2017

Inflation Preferences and Exchange-Rate Regimes (with Michael Aklin and Eric Arias)